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This research is motivated by the recent phenomenal growth in the use of
business-to-business (B2B) online reverse auctions, by organizations on a global basis. 
Business-to-business online reverse auctions have gained popularity among Fortune 1000 
companies (Emiliani and Stec 2004) as a tool to reduce the price of purchased products
and services (Judge 2001; Richards 2000; Tully 2000). 
Virtually every major industry has begun to use online reverse auctions on a 
regular basis; examples include General Electric (GE), Motorola, Boeing, Quaker Oats, 
Dell, and many others. Some of these companies, such as Quaker Oats and 
SmithKlineBeecham, reported millions of dollars of savings with the use of online 
reverse auctions compared to traditional purchasing methods (Brunelli 2000). Others 
have reported that the annual volume of industrial purchases for their organizations 
through online reverse auctions has reached billions of dollars. According to Jason 
Seigel, Motorola Director of Corporate E-procurement, in the fiscal year of 2003,
Motorola outsourced $2.8 billions of direct material through online reverse auctions with 
an estimated savings of 20%, up from $1.6 billion in 2002. Motorola auctions off about 
15 percent of its total spend, up from 10 percent in 2002 and 5 percent in 2001 (Carbone 
2004). 
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This dissertation investigates the business-to-business online reverse auction 
implementation by buying organizations. The goal is to generate a reliable and valid 
theory through the introduction of hypotheses that will help guide companies and 
researchers in successfully implementing online reverse auctions in this rapidly evolving 
field of inquiry. For the purpose of this research, am online reverse auction is defined as 
an online real-time bidding event hosted by a single buyer to outsource products and/or 
services, in which multiple pre-qualified suppliers compete for the buyer’s business. 
These suppliers compete by bidding against each other online over the Internet using 
specialized software by submitting successively lower-priced bids during a scheduled 
time period. The price is successively reduced until no one bids less than the current 
price. The research focuses on the use of one-sided auctions. “One-sided” refers to the 
fact that there exists a single buyer and multiple sellers. 
Business-to-business online reverse auctions promise a range of benefits to both 
buyers and suppliers. Lower transaction costs, shorter order cycle-times, and competitive 
purchase prices are the obvious benefits of online reverse auctions for the buying 
organizations. Buyers are not the only benefactors of online reverse auctions. Suppliers 
can benefit by obtaining market information, by having an outlet to better manage excess 
capacity, and by competing for business from new customers. Suppliers also gain 
valuable information about their competitors’ cost structures that can help then become
more effective in the long run. The fact that less time is required for online reverse 
auctions compared to traditional competitive bidding reduces the supplier’s reliance on 
forecasting for planning purposes. Consequently, suppliers may need less inventory and, 
thus, have lower total inventory costs.
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The purpose of the research is to explore the implementation of online reverse 
auctions by buying organizations, with the goal of reducing the purchase prices and 
developing/maintaining the buyer-supplier strategic alliance. The research studies the 
effects of the auction design and the purchase/product type on reducing the purchase 
prices and on the buyer-supplier partnership. The research studies the auction design 
from the following two dimensions: auction format and event organization. The research 
focuses on three types of industrial purchases: production material and components, 
MRO’s, and services. 
The following sections present the problem statement of the research, discuss the 
research purpose, and summarize the contribution of the research. An outline detailing 
the structure of the rest of the research concludes this chapter. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In 2003, Giants Eagle, a 72 year-old supermarket retailer with a presence in 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, and West Virginia, used business-to-business online 
reverse auctions to outsource $100 million dollars worth of unbranded goods like frozen 
pizza, lettuce, tomatoes, onions, cheese, bottled water, and indirect items like steel for 
construction, paper, PCs, advertising, print services, and air conditioning, according to 
Russ Ross, Giant Eagle’s CIO. In the last five years, many companies in the United 
States, Europe, and Southeast Asia have used online reverse auctions to outsource 
billions of dollars. Examples include General Electric (GE), General Motors, Ford, 
Nissan, Motorola, Boeing, Quaker Oats, DuPont, Dell and many others.
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Although business-to-business online reverse auctions hold many promises for 
both the buyers and the suppliers, numerous risks exist. Many articles in the popular
business press defending the applications of online reverse auctions, have been contrasted 
with other articles summarizing and arguing the risks, limits, and abuses of online reverse 
auctions (Atkinson 2000; de Saint-Seine 2002; Kenczyk 2001). Other articles indicate 
that online reverse auctions are a destructive cost reduction tactic if it divides buyers and 
suppliers (Emiliani 2000a; Emiliani and Stec 2001). 
 Like any tool, online reverse auctions can provide value when properly 
implemented, but the savings they promise can be illusory when online reverse auctions
are over used, misused, or poorly implemented. Even more dangerous is the deterioration 
in the buyer-supplier relationships when online reverse auctions are used to beat up 
suppliers on prices. Many buyers, suppliers, and researchers are concerned about the 
damage of the online reverse applications to the buyer-supplier relationship in the long-
term and how it affects the potential savings. Suppliers who have been building 
relationships with the buying company for years might feel betrayed when asked to 
participate in a reverse auction, which might affect supplier responsiveness to the buyer’s
needs (Sehwail and Ingalls 2004).  
 Several recent studies (Emililiani 2000b; Jap 2002; Pearcy et al. 2002; Van Tulder 
and Mol 2002) concluded that online reverse auctions damage the buyer’s long-term 
performance by creating distrust among its incumbent suppliers. One such source of 
distrust arises when buyers use online reverse auctions to test the market with no real 
intention of switching sources, but instead to drive down prices of incumbent suppliers.
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In order to fill the gap in the supply management literature about online reverse 
auctions implementation, this research addresses the implementation of online reverse 
auctions with respect to (1) reducing purchase prices, and (2) developing/maintaining 
buyer-supplier strategic alliance relationships in the business-to-business online reverse 
auction environment for different auction design options and different types of industrial 
purchases. The research was motivated by three reasons: the lack of available survey 
research on best practices in the area of implementing online reverse auctions, the lack of 
understanding of how and when to use online reverse auctions, and finally the need to 
provide a platform/directions for companies who are using or plan to use online reverse 
auctions. 
Over the past few years, practitioners have been swamped with information about 
online reverse auctions in journals and magazines, as well as, seminars and conferences. 
All major consulting firms (e.g., Boston Consulting Group, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu), 
market research institutions (e.g., Datamonitor, Jupitor Research, AMR Research), 
software companies (e.g, Ariba, CommerceOne, Oracle) as well as application service 
providers (ASP) and electronic procurement service providers (e.g., TradingPartners, 
Freemarkets, eBreviate, Iasta) have published “best practice” studies, market reports, and 
products, software, or service brochures related to the use of online reverse auctions in 
industrial purchasing. The business press is also replete with articles on online reverse 
auctions, drawing primarily on the experiences of individual organizations. Most of these 
materials are commercial marketing materials with their sole target to promote the use of 
online reverse auctions based on a few successful case studies without arguing the risks, 
limits, and abuses of online reverse auctions.
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Only recently has research on online reverse auctions begun to be presented at 
academic conferences and published in journals in the supply chain, marketing, 
management, and purchasing fields. A review of the methods underlying these 
publications (presented in Chapter Three) reveals that the majority of the research is 
conceptual, prescriptive and descriptive in nature, and based on few interviews and case 
studies. Furthermore, the small amount of survey research is based on rather small 
sample sizes when compared to “typical” quantitative research. This clearly indicates that 
online reverse auctions are a very recent emerging research area.
In summary, the phenomenon of business-to-business online reverse auctions in 
procurement has been receiving increasing attention among scholars from purchasing and 
supply management (e.g., Atkinson 2000; De Ruiter and Van Heck 2004; de Saint-Seine 
2002; Emiliani 2000b; Emiliania and Stec 2004; Hong and Hartley 2001; Jap 2002; 
Pearcy 2002; Smeltzer and Carr 2002; Sehwail and Ingalls 2004; Smart and Harrison 
2003; Van Tulder and Mol 2002; Wagner and Schwab 2004). The use of business-to-
business online reverse auctions by managers is still quite new, and the research in the 
area of reverse auctions is in its infancy (Jap 2002). As a result, the following central 
research question remain largely unanswered in the literature: How does a corporation
effectively use and implement one-sided online reverse auctions to meet the buying 
organization’s simultaneous emphasis on cost management while developing/maintaining
the cooperative buyer-supplier strategic alliance?
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1.3 Research Purpose 
The primary objective of this research is to address the gap in the academic literature by 
developing and testing a model to successfully implement online reverse auctions with 
respect to (1) reducing purchase prices, and (2) developing/maintaining buyer-supplier 
strategic alliance relationships in the business-to-business online reverse auctions 
environment.
The overall research question is: How to effectively use and implement one-sided 
business-to-business online reverse auctions to achieve organizational objectives of cost 
management while maintaining/developing the strategic alliance partnership with the 
suppliers? Specifically, the research seeks to address the following research questions:
1. What is the relationship between successful online reverse auction events (as 
perceived by the buying organization) and the reduction in purchase prices?
2. What is the relationship between successful online reverse auction events (as 
perceived by the buying organization) and developing/maintaining a strategic 
alliance with the suppliers?
3. What is the relationship between online reverse auction design and the reduction 
in purchase price objective in terms of auction format and event organization?
4. What is the relationship between the product/purchase type and the reduction in 
purchase price objective?
5. What is the relationship between the product/purchase type and the online reverse 
auction application?
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6. How does the use of the online reverse auction as a sourcing tool affect the buyer
strategic alliance relationship with the supplier, based on the measures developed 
by Mohr and Spekman (1994) and expanded by Monczka et al. (1998)?
In addition, the prime advantage of this research is the knowledge base that will 
assist organizations in their benchmarking efforts, as they compare their use of online 
reverse auctions as a procurement tool to the results of this research. This is true for 
organizations that use online reverse auctions. At the same time, the research presents the 
current best practices in the online reverse auction implementation for those who are still 
using traditional purchasing methods and are looking at the transition to online reverse 
auctions as one of their sourcing tools.
1.4 Contribution of the Research
According to AMR Research, online reverse auctions continue to gain acceptance. 
In 2003, only 15% of buyers reported using online reverse auctions while AMR Research 
2004 numbers show 27% of buyers use online reverse auctions and another 21% say they 
will use them in the future (Carbone 2004). Because of the expected surge in the use of 
online reverse auctions, the research aims to increase the body of knowledge in the area 
of implementing online reverse auctions.
More specifically, the objective of the research is to understand the implementation of 
online reverse auctions to meet organizational objectives of reducing purchase prices 
while maintaining/developing the strategic buyer-supplier collaborative alliance. The 
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research will investigate the effects of the auction design and the industrial purchase type 
on the implementation of online reverse auctions.  
 The findings from this study will increase the understanding of the 
implementation of business-to-business online reverse auctions, from the auction design 
and industrial purchase type perspectives, as an effective procurement tool among both 
procurement professionals and academicians in several ways. First, a review of the 
available literature (presented in Chapter Two and Chapter Three) reveals that the 
majority of the research is conceptual, prescriptive, and descriptive in nature or is based 
on few interviews and case studies; this research will be the first study to develop a scale 
for measuring the effects of the auction design on online reverse auction implementation, 
the first research  to study the effects of purchase product type, in particular service, on 
the online reverse auction implementation, and the first research  to adopt the Mohr and 
Spekman (1994) model to test the buyer-supplier strategic alliance in the online reverse 
auction environment. 
Second, the development and testing of the research model can guide future 
research on various aspects of business-to-business online reverse auction 
implementation and provide a foundation for further exploration and analysis for auction 
design elements. Third, the research will provide important directions for companies who 
are using or considering using online reverse auctions. The research will guide the 
companies in assessing two auction designs elements for outsourcing different types of 
industrial purchases in the online reverse auction implementation process.
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1.5 Outline of Dissertation
The research is organized into six chapters. In Chapter Two, a literature review is 
presented over the areas deemed relative to this research. The literature review 
summarizes the published research in the areas of electronic commerce and supply chain 
management, electronic procurement, online marketplaces, online reverse auctions, and 
buyer-supplier relationships.
Chapter Three proposes the research framework on which the research is based. 
The chapter addresses the research question and the research hypotheses. The chapter 
begins with outlining the academic research on online reverse auction implementation. In 
the remaining part of the chapter, the research hypotheses are presented and supported 
with the necessary theoretical and logical basis. Finally, the research model is presented.
Chapter Four presents the methodological procedures used to test the research 
model. Specifically, this chapter presents the research instrument, the methodology for 
data analysis, the sample, data collection, and the research timeline.
Chapter Five contains an evaluation of the data that will be collected, and the 
results of the statistical analysis. The hypotheses are reviewed to check whether they are 
supported or not supported by the data. The proposed model is modified accordingly. A 
summary of the data analysis findings is also presented.
Finally, the results of this research are summarized in Chapter Six. The chapter is
dedicated to interpretations, limitations, contributions, and implications of the research.
The managerial implications and future research areas are also discussed in Chapter Six. 
Figure 1-1 provides a graphical overview of the structure of this study.
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Figure 1-1: Research Structure and Content
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
For more than a decade, the academic literature and business press have been 
remarking that “The Internet will change everything.” One trend that is showing 
increasing promise is the use of online reverse auctions. Virtually every major industry 
has begun to use and adopt online reverse auctions on a regular basis (Smith 2002). For 
example, Motorola has been using online reverse auction since the summer of 2003, 
according to Rob Haraln, senior e-procurement director, “Motorola had $11 billion direct 
material spend and $9.8 billion was electronically quoted and about $2.8 billion went 
through reverse auctions” (Carbone 2004).
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to the research. Section 2.2 examines 
the impact of electronic commerce on supply management practices. The review focuses
on how electronic commerce has affected the information exchange side of supply chain 
management.  New technologies in electronic commerce, such as online marketplaces, 
have reduced the transaction costs and total transaction time for many processes in the 
supply chain management system.
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Section 2.3 presents the concept of electronic procurement. The emphasis in this 
section is on electronic procurement benefits for the buyers and suppliers. Section 2.4 
presents online marketplace. The emphasis of the review will be on the definition, 
benefits for buyers and suppliers, and the functions of online marketplaces. Section 2.5 
presents a differentiation of online marketplaces along four segmentation dimensions: 
ownership, stakeholder-focus, commerce model, and revenue model.
Section 2.6 reviews what has currently been written about online reverse auctions.
First, different definitions of online reverse auction are presented; next, a summary of 
reasons for using online reverse auctions by buyers and suppliers; a review of the buyer 
and sellers risks of participating in an online reverse auction; the different types of 
auctions based on the research presented by McAfee and McMillan (1987); and finally, 
the differences between online reverse auctions and manual physical auctions.
Section 2.7 reviews and summarizes the literature that deals with the buyer-
supplier relationships. One focus of this review is to present the two major types of 
buyer-supplier relationships. The review of the buyer-suppliers using online reverse
auctions is important because business professionals spend as much as twenty percent of 
their time dealing with conflicts (King 1981). 
Section 2.8 summarizes the literature review. Then the section builds a bridge 
between the literature review and the research framework that is presented in Chapter 
Three.
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2.2 The Impact of Electronic Commerce on Supply Chain Management
Over the past two decades, businesses in virtually every industry in the world 
economy have benefited or at least been influenced by the technologies of electronic 
commerce. We are witnessing a revolution in commerce and society, primarily due to an 
explosion in information technology and the resulting rapid emergence of electronic 
commerce. Most transactions and profits in electronic commerce have been realized in 
business-to-business (B2B) commerce and not in business-to-consumer (B2C) 
commerce, which is no surprise, since business-to-business transactions outnumber 
consumer sales ten to one (Westland and Clark 2000). Other researchers estimated the 
business-to-business electronic commerce to be closer to 78% of the overall electronic 
commerce market (Lancioni, Smith, and Oliva 2003). 
Many researchers have focused on the comprehensive effects of the e-commerce 
and Internet revolution on supply chain management practices (e.g. Lancioni, Smith, and 
Oliva 2000), and concluded that the Internet will enable companies to achieve major cost 
efficiencies, besides providing the necessary tools to react quickly to market changes. 
The use of information technologies is critical in supply chains as information 
technologies enable dynamic reconfiguration of organizational structures, add flexibility 
(Chandrachekar and Schary 1999) and prevent the distortion of information as it flows 
upstream (Mason-Jones and Towill 1999). Supply chain management has been literally 
reinvented by the new networked technologies and the practices they facilitate, i.e., e-
procurement, e-marketplaces, e-logistics, collaborative commerce, real-time demand 
forecasting, inventory management, true just-in-time (JIT) production, customer 
interface, and web-based package tracking (Lancioni, Smith, and Oliva 2003). 
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Simchi-Levi et al. (2003) defined supply chain management (SCM) as a set of 
approaches to efficiently integrating suppliers, manufacturers, warehouses and stores, so 
that the merchandise is procured and distributed in the right quantities, to the right 
locations, and at the right time, in order to minimize system wide costs while satisfying
the service level requirement.
Tang, Shee, and Tang (2001) defined the term SCM as a holistic approach for 
organizations to plan, design, control, and facilitate the processes and functions 
performed inside the linkage or network, from procurement, manufacturing, and 
production to distribution, all for the sake of satisfying end customer requirements. The 
goal of SCM is to coordinate and optimize the supply–demand relationship by managing 
the single-direction flow of materials and products and the bi-directional flow of 
information that carries control and feedback mechanisms.
In the supply chain management literature, much attention has been focused on 
online marketplaces and their potential benefit to an organization's supply chain 
capabilities (Bakos 1991, 1997, 1998; Foley and Wallace 2000; Hof 1999; Sehwail and 
Ingalls 2003; Schmid and Lindemann 1998). In an online marketplace environment, a 
partner can participate in any stage of the supply chain, and is able to remove some of the 
inefficiency traditionally associated with supply chains. Thus partners can streamline 
their supply chains, improve coordination, and share information instantaneously. Online 
marketplaces also have the power to create "real time" manufacturing based on demand, 
eliminating unnecessary inventory costs and helping manufacturers turn over their 
inventory at a much quicker rate. However, the ultimate goal, and the main driver for 
online marketplace integration, is to reduce supply chain management costs. 
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Companies are clearly aware of the significant savings that are possible when 
taking their supply chains online, and are generally supportive of the evolution of the 
online marketplace (Murtaza, Gupta, and Carroll 2004). Many companies that are leaders 
in their respective industries have gone as far as creating their own e-marketplaces, for 
example Covisint, a joint venture of the leading manufacturers in the automotive industry
(Tsou and Chen 2004). Covisint was founded (originally under the name of "NewCo") by 
Daimler Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors as the initial three original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) partners. They were later joined by Renault and Nissan in April 
2000, and the venture was renamed "Covisint" in May 2000. At the end of that year, 
Covisint was enhanced by the involvement of its technical partners Commerce One and 
Oracle and, in May 2001, Peugeot-Citroen also joined the initiative (Kandampully 2003). 
 
2.3 Electronic Procurement 
Using information technologies for purchasing activities is not new. Over the past 
several decades, supply managers have sought to increase the strategic role of purchasing 
and supply management in their organizations (Ellram and Carr 1994). Electronic 
procurement (e-procurement) is a vehicle for achieving this goal (Hartley, Lane, and 
Hong 2004), especially since the establishment of online marketplaces that built a new 
dimension for purchasing with reduced personal contact but increased transactional 
focus. 
The term e-procurement refers to the use of the Internet to buy production items, 
services and information (Heizer and Render 2000). According to Neef (2001), “E-
17
procurement means a giant leap forward in the long sought after development of the 
extended enterprise, where the supply chain becomes a continuous, uninterrupted process 
extending from buyer through selling partners.” Neef regarded e-procurement as one of 
the major enablers for supply chain management. Breite and Vanharanta (2001) went a 
step further and stated that “information technology changed the supply chain 
management concept more radically than any other technology.”
E-procurement applications aim to improve the efficiency of purchasing 
personnel, automate the approval cycle, enable negotiation of better contract pricing, 
leverage existing contract more effectively, and reduce off-contract purchases (Croom
2000). Wyld (2000) developed an e-procurement model, presented in Figure 2-1, that 
look at the totality of the e-procurement process, from drivers though impact to 
imperatives. The model demonstrates some of the changes that are affecting the e-
procurement value chain. The author asserted that organizations on the buying and selling 
sides will need to address these challenges to capture both the tactical cost control and the 
more strategic market developments. 
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Figure 2-1: The Wyld (2000) e-Procurement Model
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One of the main objectives for organizations deploying e-procurement initiatives 
is to reduce transaction costs (Croom 2000; Sashi and O’Leary 2002). For instance, 
managers at Covisint estimate that the cost of processing an order can be cut from $150 
to $15 through use of Covisint online marketplace (Meredith 2001). The benefits result 
from reduced paper transactions, shorter order cycle times and subsequent inventory 
reduction resulting from the instantaneous transmission of purchase order related 
information and enhanced opportunities for the buyer-supplier relationship through the 
establishment of a web of business-to-business communication networks.
The supply management and e-procurement literature is rich with estimates of the 
benefits of e-procurement. The key proposition of e-procurement is one of cost 
optimization. Any reduction in the cost of purchased goods, both direct material and 
indirect material, often goes straight to the bottom line (Verespej 2002). To achieve the 
same improvement by increasing revenue or reducing overheads would require 
significantly more effort. 
The potential for savings to be made from e-procurement is beyond dispute
(Eakin 2003). The benefits of electronic procurement have received a lot of attention in 
the business press and among scholars from purchasing and supply management (Blodget 
and McCabe 2000; Detourn 2000; Moser 2002; Essig and Arnold 2001; Sehwail and 
Ingalls 2003). The incentive to reduce purchase prices through aggregate buying was 
what initially caught most buyers’ attention. Online marketplaces help buyers reduce 
maverick spending, since every item is pre-negotiated and catalogued; expensive 
emergency buying by individuals within large organizations is significantly reduced 
(Croom 2000; Barratt and Rosdahl 2002). 
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Online marketplace buyer benefits also include better information management 
through accessing more suppliers, exchanging real-time information with a single point 
of access to assure consistent workflow, reducing processing errors, and reducing 
information technology complexity by reducing the numbers of electronic connections 
established with suppliers (Sehwail and Ingalls 2003). The marketplace also improves the 
procurement process through reducing the amount of paper work required for purchase 
orders and though linking the various decision-making employees with each other 
electronically (Detourn 2000). 
 Buyers are not the only benefactors of online marketplaces. Suppliers’ benefits
include lower transaction costs through simplified order processing, reduced errors, and 
buyer discovery. Market discovery through accessing new buyers is considered by most 
authors the main driver for suppliers to join marketplaces. Other benefits include back-
office facilitation through the possibilities of remote inventory management, 
standardization of specification, easier liquidation of excess inventory using the 
marketplace, and time saving through reducing the bidding cycle time and the time to 
integrate with customers (Sehwail and Ingalls 2003). 
 In 2000, Forrester Research interviewed 55 procurement and sales executives of 
firms involved in B2B online marketplace ventures to uncover their motivation to join 
online marketplaces. Buyers focused on cost savings and improved processes as their 
main motivation, whereas sellers’ main motivation was expanding the market (Favior et 
al. 2000). Figure 2-2 illustrates the Forrester interview results.
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Figure 2-2: Main Motivations for using Online Marketplaces 
Source: Favior et al. (2000)
2.4 Online Marketplace
A marketplace, as a historically evolved institution, allows customers and 
suppliers to meet at a certain place and at a certain time in order to communicate and 
announce buying or selling intentions, which eventually match and may be settled. Today 
the institution market still does the same, but has occasionally been remodeled due to the 
evolution of media. However, owing to the evolution of modern information and 
telecommunication technology, time and space restrictions have weakened and 
cyberspace has become the new meeting point (Grieger 2003).
Online marketplaces (or e-marketplaces) are defined as systems of suppliers, 
distributors, customers, infrastructure, and service providers that use the Internet for 
communication and transactions. Online marketplaces are virtual marketplaces where 
multiple business clients buy or sell goods or services from each other in a “virtual 
sense”, while exchanging product related information and lowering transaction costs in 
the process (Sehwail and Ingalls 2003).  
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Bakos (1991) defined online marketplaces as inter-organizational information 
systems that allow the participating buyer and suppliers to exchange information about 
the prices and product offering. Schmid and Lindemann (1998) defined online 
marketplaces as media which foster market-based exchanges between agents in all 
transaction phases.
In a white paper published by IBM in 2000, an online marketplace is defined as a 
many-to-many, web-based trading and collaboration solution that enables companies to 
more efficiently buy, sell, and collaborate on a global scale. At a basic level, online 
marketplaces can be viewed as information technology (IT) facilitated markets (Bakos 
1998). E-marketplaces cut costs for business buyers through increased choice and price 
competition, while giving sellers a new and potentially lucrative channel for unloading 
inventory (Foley and Wallace 2000). 
 Although online marketplaces’ most often quoted advantage is their potential to 
cut costs of purchased goods and services (Hof 1999), they also provide many value-
added services such as customized product design, quoting, vendor management, order 
processing, and collaborative planning (e.g., forecasting, VMI, supply planning), while 
lowering transaction costs and improving transaction efficiencies for all parties (Bakos 
1997). Online marketplaces have three main functions: matching buyers and sellers; 
facilitating the exchange of information, goods, services and payments associated with 
market transactions; and providing an institutional infrastructure, such as a legal and 
regulatory framework, that enables the efficient functioning of the market (Bakos 1998).  
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2.5 Online Marketplace Classification Dimensions
Commercial transactions between buyers and suppliers have taken place forever. 
In the last decade, these transactions are increasingly being facilitated through online 
marketplaces.  In the literature, the online marketplaces are differentiated along four 
segmentation dimensions: ownership, stakeholder-focus, commerce model, and revenue 
model. 
2.5.1 Ownership Dimension
Over the past decade, a variety of online marketplace models have emerged to 
leverage the opportunities presented by collaborative e-business (Grimes 2001). Online 
marketplaces can be classified according to their ownership into public, consortia, and 
private marketplaces (Sehwail and Ingalls 2003). 
 Public online marketplaces are independently owned, often funded by venture 
capitalists. Public online marketplaces are neutral and have a primary focus on price 
discovery and clearing. They provide a forum for listing supplies of or demand for 
specific products and/or services in an effort to create a transparent market. Public e-
markets are many-to-many exchanges. Examples include FastParts, Medibuy, and 
theoilsite.com.
Industry sponsored e-marketplaces (consortia) are jointly developed and owned 
by two or more industry incumbents, sometimes including a blend of industry-specific 
buyers, suppliers, and distributors. Industry-sponsored e-marketplaces can also address 
industry standards (systems or data) as they comprise a forum of multiple industry 
players. Consortia address many-to-many relationships. However, several consortia are 
23
also now offering hosted private exchange services that allow members to obtain value 
from tailored technology and/or confidential one-to-many relationships. Examples 
include Trade-Ranger, Covisint, and Pantellos.
Finally, independent private exchanges (PTXs) are incumbent-owned
marketplaces with one-to-many information technology platforms used to manage, 
monitor, and/or optimize value chain processes with key trading partners. As with 
consortia, functionality can address any value chain process(es) and can be broad or 
narrow in scope. PTXs require that partners adapt to or integrate with the owner's 
technical applications and/or data management standards in order to participate. 
Examples include Eastman Chemical and Chemconnect.
2.5.2 Stake-Holders Focus Dimension
The online marketplace can either be buyer-oriented, seller oriented or neutral. 
The role of a buyer-oriented marketplace (e.g. Trade-Ranger) is to aggregate buyers. 
Buyer-oriented marketplaces such as CommerceOne’s Marketsite concentrate primarily 
on creating efficiencies for the corporate buyer. Buyer-oriented networks generally have 
several objectives: drive procurement costs down for the participating buyers, allow 
buyers to aggregate their expenditures, reduce administrative costs, increase visibility,
and facilitate global sourcing (Grieger 2003). Buyers have the ability to join forces with 
other large buyers to create procurement syndicates, which can demand more favorable 
pricing and trading terms. All types of relationships in this marketplace type are aligned 
to increase benefits to the buyers.
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The seller-oriented aggregated marketplace concentrates on bringing multiple 
sellers together into a central catalogue and product information repository (e.g. e-Steel). 
Where buy-side marketplaces target the procurement needs of corporations, seller-
oriented marketplace focus on sales. The key to seller-oriented marketplaces is to provide 
multiple sellers a forum to present their catalogues and trade with as many buyers as 
possible. Seller-oriented marketplaces also have the ability to aggregate their sellers, 
acting as a service provider, wrapping products and services together and offering them 
to buyers. All types of relationships in this marketplace type are aligned to increase 
benefits to the suppliers.
Neutral online marketplaces, driven by a third party, are the true market makers 
because of their attractiveness to sellers and buyers equally. Neutral marketplaces often 
face the “chicken-and-egg” problem: buyers do not want to participate unless there are a 
sufficient numbers of sellers, and sellers do not want to participate unless there are a 
sufficient number of buyers. In addition, these neutral marketplaces have to overcome 
channel conflicts to persuade more powerful players to participate. Making deals with 
more powerful players to gain liquidity is a threat to their neutrality (Grieger 2003). 
2.5.3 Commerce Model Dimension
Online marketplaces can be divided generally into five categories according to 
their commerce models (Sehwail and Ingalls 2003): 
1. Forward Auctions: Multiple buyers bid competitively for products from individual 
suppliers. Prices only move up, but buyers can buy below list prices while sellers sell for 
more than a liquidator pays (Wyld 2000).
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2. Reverse Auctions: Also known as downward price auctions, have recently become a 
popular method for reducing the price of purchased materials used in the production of 
durable goods (Tulley 2000). Buyers post their need for a product or service, and then 
suppliers bid to fulfill that need. Unlike a forward auction, prices only move down (Hong 
and Hartley 2001). 
3. Exchanges: Two-sided marketplaces where buyers and suppliers negotiate prices, 
usually with a bid and ask system, and where prices move both up and down. Exchanges 
work best with easily definable products without complicated attributes--commodities, 
perishable items such as food, or intangibles such as electric power. Exchanges produce 
fluctuating, sometimes volatile prices (Wyld 2000). 
4. E-catalogs: Online catalogs are representatives of systematic sourcing of direct 
materials. They automate sourcing of non-commodity manufacturing inputs and create 
value by reducing transaction costs. Industry-specific suppliers publish their content 
using the catalog provided and maintained by the marketplace. Catalogs create value for 
buyers by bringing together many suppliers at one easy-to-use Website (Sawhney and 
Kaplan 2001). 
5. RFx’s:  Delivers the capability to launch an online request for information, quote, or 
proposal with real-time tracking of supplier responses. The three RFx product offerings 
consist of the following (Sehwail and Ingalls 2003):
A. Request for Information (RFI): the request is to gather critical information 
about an item from a selected group of suppliers. This information may be 
returned with extensive attachments to provide supplementary documentation to 
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the person's request. The purpose of an RFI is to gather as much information as 
possible about a particular product or service. 
B. Request for Quotation (RFQ): the request is to gather quotes on particular 
items from a short list of suppliers. Once a buyer sends out an RFQ, a potential 
supplier can provide as much information about a product as it chooses. For some 
suppliers, this may include descriptive product information, shipping rules, and 
other important attributes. 
C. Request for Proposal (RFP): the request is to gather additional information 
about an item and attributes related to price and quantity. A potential supplier will 
send back information in response to this RFP that may lead to negotiation 
between the buyer and supplier over specific details of the proposal. 
2.5.4 Revenue Model Dimension
Revenue models for generating money in the online marketplace business vary 
from company to company. Some companies believe more firmly in the subscription 
model, others prefer the pay-per-use approach, while others rely on product sales margins 
in more traditional retailing. Many marketplaces are not committed to just one revenue 
model and employ multiple strategies at the same time.
The transaction model, in most cases used with the aggregation mechanism, 
calculates a percentage of the transaction volume, which is usually paid by the seller. A 
typical range varies from 0.5% to 8% of the transaction volume. Some online 
marketplaces have opted for standard annual subscription fees, based on assumptions 
about anticipated usage. Similar to the flat subscription fee is the membership or 
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storefront fee, which is charged to a merchant to list its catalog and promotional material 
in a segmented storefront in the marketplace. If the intermediary is offering the software 
package for operating the marketplace, a license fee is charged to the users. Flat fees 
encourage marketplace usage and avoid the tax associated with straight transaction fees 
(Kerrigan et al. 2001; Phillips and Meeker 2000). 
 
2.6 Online Reverse Auctions
The competitive bidding for business is classified as an auction (Kaufmann and 
Carter 2004). Auctions are an “explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and 
prices on the basis of bid from the market participants” (McAfee and McMillan 1987). 
Theoretically, any auction is an attempt to create a pure market with perfect information 
among both buyers and sellers. The term “auction” has been used by several researchers 
to describe both forward auctions (selling auctions) and reverse auctions (purchasing 
auctions). This research studies the online purchasing auction known as the online 
reverse auction.
The forward auction (bidding to buy auction) in which the seller offers a product 
to numerous buyers is the most common type of auction (Bulow and Klemperer 1996). 
The seller “controls” the market because a product is being offered that is in demand by a 
number of buyers. The price offered by the buyer continues to increase until a theoretical 
rational price is met in the market according to supply and demand (Smeltzer and Carr, 
2002). In a reverse auction environment (offering to sell auction), the buyer “controls” 
the market because an item is being auctioned that is offered by a number of sellers. The 
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price offered by the sellers continues to decrease until a theoretical rational market price 
is achieved.
Beam et al.  (1999) described an online reverse auction functioning as an 
intermediary in the auction process. Online reverse auctions are a special case of 
automated negotiations. The auction patterns vary with the trade objects and trade rules. 
Auctions and bidding have been established methods of commerce for generations; these 
methods deal with products and services for which the conventional marketing channels 
are ineffective or inefficient. 
CAPS Research (2003) defined an online reverse auction as an online, real-time 
dynamic auction between a buying organization and a group of pre-qualified suppliers 
who compete against each other to win the business to supply goods or services that have 
clearly defined specifications for design, quantity, quality, delivery, and related terms and 
conditions. These suppliers compete by bidding against each other online over the
Internet using specialized software by submitting successively lower-priced bids during a 
scheduled time period.
Sehwail and Ingalls (2004) defined online reverse auctions as the real-time 
electronic bidding events a company uses to outsource goods or services with bid prices 
descending, and bidders allowed to enter bids once or continuously according to the 
auction format. Carter et al. (2004) defined an online reverse auction as a real-time 
auction between a buying organization and two or more invited suppliers, where 
suppliers can submit multiple bids during the time period of the auction and where some 
degree of visibility exists among suppliers regarding the actions of their competitors. 
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An online reverse auction may result in what is referred to as dynamic pricing. 
Dynamic pricing simply means that the price for the item being auctioned changes on an 
instantaneous basis because of the electronic format (Sparks and Lesoing 2000). As 
sellers observe the price changes in real time, the assumption is that the price will 
continue to decrease until a true market price is established. Tully (2000) described how 
online reverse auctions are increasingly used as an efficient coordination mechanism for 
establishing price near the true market price for an item. 
2.6.1 Reasons for Using Online Reverse Auctions
Online reverse auctions offer a wide range of benefits to buying organizations. 
Lower transaction costs, shorter order cycle times, and competitive purchase prices are 
the obvious benefits of online reverse auctions (Hartley et al. 2004). Moser (2002) 
asserted that online reverse auctions attract buyers with the allure of lower prices, a 
broader supplier base, and a more efficient procurement process. Several large companies 
reported decreases in purchase prices of 10% or more through the use of online reverse 
auctions (Hannon 2004). Other companies, such as Quaker Oats and 
SmithKlineBeecham, reported millions of dollars in savings with online reverse auctions 
compared to traditional purchasing methods (Brunelli 2000). 
 The incentive to reduce purchase prices was what initially caught most buyers’ 
attention. Online reverse auctions lower purchase prices by overcoming some of the 
limitations of traditional competitive bidding (Sashi and O’Leary 2002). Less obvious 
than cost savings are the strategic advantages of online reverse auctions. With online 
reverse auctions, supply managers can identify world-class suppliers, gather and analyze 
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market information, and focus on strategic sourcing rather than on processing 
transactions (Avery 2000; Fitzgerald 2000). 
 Inventory costs for the buyer also may be affected by the use of online reverse 
auctions. The classic economic order quantity model suggests that as ordering costs are 
reduced, it becomes more economical to order in smaller quantities, lowering total 
inventory holding costs. Thus, with the promise of lower ordering costs with the use of
online reverse auctions compared to traditional competitive bidding, organizations should 
have lower inventory costs (Hartley et al. 2004). Just-in-time (JIT) purchasing and having 
small quantities of materials delivered frequently can lower the buyer’s inventory costs 
and purchase prices (Dong, Carter, and Dresner 2001). 
Supply chain integration, which is related to JIT purchasing, may be reduced as 
companies move to online auctions if companies frequently switch suppliers (Dong, 
Carter, and Dresner 2001). Sashi and O’Leary (2002) support these findings and suggest 
that online auctions are compatible with a just-in-time strategy because sourcing can be 
done quickly.
Furthermore, buyers can widen their supplier base using online reverse auctions 
through identifying new suppliers (Moser 2002). The Gartner report (2001) stated that the 
ability to identify new suppliers electronically is valuable, especially in a fragmented 
international industry such as chemicals and plastics. With online reverse auctions, 
buyers can quickly find backup and alternative suppliers. Additional benefits to the buyer 
might include reduction in process costs and accelerated product development, according 
to an IDC study in 2001.
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Buyers are not the only benefactors of online reverse auctions. Suppliers can 
benefit by obtaining market information, having an outlet to better manage excess 
capacity, and competing for business from new customers (Hartley et al. 2004). Online 
reverse auctions help suppliers to gain a better understanding of the buyer’s financial 
goals. Suppliers also gain valuable information about their competitors’ cost structures 
that can help them to become more effective in the long run (Jap 2000). 
 In online reverse auctions, suppliers to alter their bids during an online reverse 
auction event to increase their chances of winning the auction. Suppliers also can bow out 
of the process at any time. In addition, some suppliers have adopted the attitude, "If you 
can't beat them, join them". Such suppliers are increasingly starting to purchase their own 
supplies using online reverse auctions. This approach can produce savings throughout the 
supply chain for buyers and suppliers alike (Moser and Miller 2002). Smeltzer and Carr 
(2002) investigated the benefits of online reverse auctions for suppliers as perceived by 
the buyers. The authors’ listed four items perceived by buyers are reasons for suppliers to 
use reverse auctions: new business, market penetration, cycle time reduction, and 
inventory management. 
2.6.2 Online Reverse Auctions Risks and Conditions
Although online reverse auctions hold much promise, numerous risks still exist.
Smeltzer and Carr (2003) are the only researchers who conducted a comprehensive study 
to research the risks and promises of online reverse auctions; other researchers just 
expressed opinions or personal experiences, so most of this section is based on Smeltzer 
and Carr’s (2003) paper titled “Electronic Reverse Auctions: Promises, Risk and 
Conditions for Success.”
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Most academic journals and business press articles agree that the negative effect 
on the buyer-supplier relationship is the biggest concern related to using online reverse 
auctions (Altman 2003; Emiliani and Stec 2001; Jap 2000; Sehwail and Ingalls 2003; 
Smeltzer and Carr 2003). The buying companies are afraid that using online reverse 
auctions will destroy their relationships with the suppliers. Many companies have spent 
decades building strategic alliance partnerships based on trust and loyalty with their 
suppliers. This fear is especially pronounced when the buyer and the supplier have had a 
long working history. With the announcement that an online reverse auction would be 
used, the buyer was possibly indicating that the supplier was no longer meeting the 
expectations of the buying company (Smeltzer and Carr 2003). 
 Other risks include suppliers’ not participating in the auction. In theory, only two 
competitor firms are required for an auction. But economic game theory indicates that 
when only two competitors exist, they are not inclined to participate in either a reverse or 
forward auction. Even though only two parties may well be involved in the final stages of 
bidding, at least four or five viable, competitive bidders are generally required to begin an 
auction (Cassady 1967). Another risk according to Smeltzer and Carr (2003) is that the 
sellers may get caught up in what may be termed “the race.” Bidders may get so caught 
up in the emotion of the race or competition that they offer unreasonably low prices. 
Suppliers are not the only party that might be affected by the risks of online 
reverse auctions. Buyers might be so blinded by all the promises of online reverse 
auctions that they do not anticipate the hidden costs, those associated with changing and 
approving suppliers, traveling to monitor new suppliers, additional manpower to move 
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products from one supplier to the other, technical assistance, and the fees of the market 
maker.
To maximize the potential of online reverse auctions and avoid the risks 
associated with online reverse auctions, several considerations must be given to the 
specification of the product or service being auctioned. Smeltzer and Carr (2003)
presented four general guidelines to avoid failure risks when implementing an online 
reverse auction event: the buyer must clearly state the commodity specifications, the 
purchase lots must be large enough to encourage suppliers to bid, the appropriate supply 
market conditions must exist, and the correct organizational infrastructure must exist for 
the buying organization.
Jap (2002) presented several factors to minimize the risks associated with online 
reverse auctions: auctioning products or services in which the purchase price constitutes 
the largest component of the product or service value, auctioning products or services that 
are commoditized, and availability of enough capacity on the supply side. If the buying 
company expected to save on the product or service price, the online reverse auction 
should be conducted when there is extra capacity on the supply side (Jap 2002). 
2.6.3 Types of Auctions
The auctioneer or intermediary in an auction has several different types of 
auctions from which to choose. McAfee and McMillan (1987) categorized the different 
types of auctions into four distinct groups: the English auction, the Dutch auction, the 
first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction.
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English auctions, or forward auctions, bring together bidders into one forum 
where they openly compete against one another for the chance to obtain the asset. In an 
English auction, the price is successively raised until only one bidder remains. This can 
be done by having an auctioneer announce bids, or by having bidders call the bids 
themselves, or by having bids submitted electronically with the current best bid posted. 
The essential feature of the English auction is that, at any point in time, each bidder 
knows the level of the current best bid (McAfee and McMillan 1987). 
 The mirror image of the English auction is characterized by falling prices through 
successively lower bids, where each supplier can bid more than once and sees the current 
price (depending on the auction format). The vast majorities of electronic procurement 
auctions today use this basic format and call it an online reverse auction (Kaufmann and 
Carter 2004). 
 The Dutch auction, or reverse auction, is the converse of the English auction. The 
auctioneer calls an initial high price and then lowers the price until one bidder accepts the 
current price. The Dutch auction is used, for example, for selling flowers in the 
Netherlands (McAfee and McMillan 1987). The online business-to-business reverse 
auction usually resembles a descending Dutch auction with limited sharing of 
information.  The information that is not shared with the bidder may include the identity 
of the seller, the identity of other bidders, the reserve price, and the historical piece price 
of the asset (Ruzicka 2000). 
 With the first-price sealed bid auction, potential buyers submit sealed bids and the 
highest bidder is awarded the item(s) for the winning price. The basic difference between 
the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction is that, with the English auction, 
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bidders are able to observe their rival’s bids and accordingly, if they choose, revise their 
own bids. With the sealed-bid auction, each bidder can submit only one bid. First price 
sealed-bid auctions are used for government procurement contracts (McAfee and 
McMillan 1987). 
 Under the second-price sealed-bid auction, also called the Vickrey auction, 
bidders who submit sealed bids have been told that the highest bidder wins the item but 
pays a price equal not to his own bid but the second highest bid (Vickrey 1961).  
2.6.4 Differences between Online and Manual/Physical Auctions 
When organizations decide to buy or sell using an auction, the first decision the 
organization has to make is whether to use an online or a manual/physical auctions. 
According to a senior procurement information technology manager for Conoco-Phillips, 
the first question that companies asked when they were exploring their outsourcing 
options using online reverse auctions was, “Are online reverse auctions different from 
physical manual auctions that have historically been used in sourcing activities, and if 
yes, how?” 
The short answer is yes and no. There are similarities and differences between 
online reverse auctions and physical manual auctions. The similarity of these auctions is 
that they both have the same goal, which is to purchase the goods and/or services at the 
lowest possible price. On the other hand, online auctions differ from manual auction in
several ways. Emiliani (2000a) stated that the main difference is that online auctions 
require less time to organize, while Jap (2000) discussed three major differences: real-
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time information, cost of contact, and amount of time required for finding and qualifying 
suppliers.
First, the speed of information in online auctions is rapid, with instant 
communication and feedback. The suppliers in online auctions bids via a computer 
mediated environment, usually through an online reverse auction provider, with real-time 
update on the bidding prices. Second, the cost of contact among bidders is greatly 
reduced via the use of a service provider. The market maker (online auction service 
provider) introduces qualified new suppliers to the buyer, manages the interaction 
between the buyer and the suppliers, and leverages its own product or industry-specific 
knowledge in the process.
Third, online auctions represent a significant comparison in negotiation time and 
preparation. Instead of protracted negotiations through the phone, fax, and email over 
weeks and months, the negotiation of multiple product lots occurs within a few hours. 
Finally, the online auction preserves bidder anonymity, by not allowing the bidders to 
know the identity or number of other bidders in the auction process.
According to De Ruiter and Van Heck (2004), the most fundamental difference 
between traditional and e-auctions is the communication environment. The 
communication between buyers and sellers in online auctions takes place by means of 
communications technology. Therefore, communication between buyers and sellers in 
online auctions requires Internet communication technologies instead of the direct, face-
to-face communication between buyers and sellers in traditional auctions.
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2.7 Buyer-Supplier Relationships
The character of buyer-supplier relationships has undergone dramatic changes 
over the last couple of decades. Industry observers and researchers have described these 
relationships as “partnerships” or “strategic alliances” as opposed to the traditional 
“arm’s length” type of relationships. The buyer–supplier relationship has evolved 
towards strategic alliances in order to respond to intensified competition in industry. 
These strategic alliances were defined with the intention of integrating key processes and 
enhancing quality in the systems of production, manufacturing, stocking, and distribution 
(Larsen, Kotzab and Grieger 2003). 
 Traditionally, the buyer–supplier relationships as often characterized by falling 
into one of two major types: adversarial and collaborative (Lamming 1986; Imrie and
Morris 1992). The adversarial model has the characteristics of tough negotiation, focus 
on price, short-term contracts and multiple sourcing (Matthyssens and Van den Bulte
1994). This model is in direct contrast with the collaborative (or cooperative) model. But 
the current trend of relationships is evolving towards a more collaborative form based on 
cooperation, mutual benefit, trust, and relational exchange (Gules and Burgess 1996). 
Under the collaborative model, the buyers’ consideration of a preferred supplier is not 
only based on price or cost, but also on factors that contribute more to the suppliers’ 
competence in production, distribution, and post-purchase service (Womack, Jones, and 
Roos 1990). 
Under the collaborative model, suppliers are able to get access to the business 
skill and expertise of their buyer partners (Imrie and Morris 1992). The enormous number 
of strategies in use today, such as cross-functional team decision making, supply base 
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rationalization, and long-term contract and relationship (Lyon et al. 1990) can all be 
categorized as collaborative. 
Even though the literature is rich in the positive evidence of collaboration, some 
research results, however, support the adversarial relationships. One example is research 
in purchasing strategy or the evolution of the relationship. The purchasing strategy for 
multiple-sourcing or single-sourcing is always in debate. Some claim that the buying 
firms are fear of dependence on a single source, and if a buying firm has several options 
for suppliers for a product, then the buying firm is less reliant on a single supplier (Carter, 
Smeltzer, Narasimhan 1998). But several studies show that companies try to limit their 
supply base in order to support lean manufacturing processes (Lamming 1993), increase 
supply chain leverage, and focus buying firm efforts and resources on fewer valued-
added relationships (Carter, Smeltzer, Narasimhan 1998). 
Another argument states that the issue of the evolution of a relationship must 
include the degree of involvement of either party. This is evidenced by some buyers 
questioning the internal workings of their suppliers, deploying sophisticated computer 
systems to monitor their suppliers, or even imposing their own quality standards on 
suppliers (Imrie and Morris 1992). It is common to see suppliers’ being asked to provide
products at the lowest price and with the highest quality and fastest delivery, or even to 
see buyers insist on an internal audit process to evaluate and inspect the manufacturing 
and production process in order to gain insight into quality control. But several 
researchers still assert that the practical, or even old-fashioned adversarial model, will be 
prevalent because of the considerations of cost minimization; the inability of suppliers to 
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control their manufacturing, scheduling and inventory; the continued mistrust between 
buyers and suppliers; and the lack of mutual commitment (Imrie and Morris 1992). 
 
2.8 Summary of the Literature Review
The literature review has revealed many pieces of information about e-
procurement in general and online reverse auctions in particular. Elements from the 
review have been combined to create a proposal model for online reverse auction 
implementation based on the motivation of reducing purchase prices and 
developing/maintaining a collaborative relationship with the suppliers. The model’s
testable hypotheses are presented in Chapter Three.
Because of rapid advances in information technology and online reverse auctions, 
the literature review needs to be updated constantly to capture the latest breakthroughs 
and uses of online reverse auctions are captured. Advancement in information 
technologies appears to be one of the main drivers for these innovations. Lower costs of 
computing and communication have changed the structure and the operation of the 
electronic reverse auction to become economically feasible.
The literature review now leads into the hypotheses in Chapter Three, which
includes the definitions of the variables and the research hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 3:  HYPOTHESES OF THE RESEARCH
3.1 Introduction
Chapter Three provides the research framework, definition of variables in the 
research, and the research questions and hypotheses. The chapter begins by outlining the 
academic research on online reverse auction implementation. In the following sections, 
the research hypotheses are presented and supported with the necessary theoretical and 
logical bases. Dubin (1976) mentioned the importance of establishing a conceptual and a 
theoretical basis for any study exploring new phenomena and understanding a relation of 
a particular study within the overall context.
3.2 Academic Research on Reverse Auctions Implementations
The emergence of online reverse auctions represents a new area of inquiry in the 
development of inter-organizational relationship management theory (Jap 2003). Given 
its relative newness, the phenomenon of online reverse auctions in purchasing has only 
recently received attention among scholars from the fields of purchasing and supply 
management. A limited amount of academic literature about the use of online reverse 
auctions is available. Table 3-1 classifies and summarizes the research available in the 
academic literature. The table updates and expands the literature summary done by 
Wagner and Schwab (2004).
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Develops a model for the appropriateness of acquiring 
products or services through online reverse auctions 





Describes the process for conducting online reverse 
auctions for direct material and related management 
issues (e.g. the task a buyer has to perform, the skill set 
required of a buyer).
Based on the 
author’s prior 




Present a model exploring satisfaction with online 
reverse auctions. The buyer’s competitive priorities 
(cost, quality, delivery, etc.), the nature of the purchase 
(standard versus custom, spend level, market structure) 
and organizational readiness (top management support, 






Touch upon the types of terms and conditions of 
contracts resulting from online reverse auctions but 
primarily discuss the desired terms and conditions under 
lean vs. batch-and-queue production practices. As 70-
90% of costs are determined during design, reverse 
auctions are advisable for “commercially available 
items”.
Based on several 
online reverse 
auctions conducted 
by companies from 




Present benefits of online reverse auctions conducted for 
indirect materials for the buying firm and the supplier 
throughout seven stages of the procurement process 
(“Reverse Auction Stakeholder-Benefit Grid”). The 
authors assert that, in general, online reverse auctions 
can benefit both, the buyer and the supplier.
Preliminary 
interviews with




participated in a 




Elaborate on potential savings and losses as results of 
online reverse auctions (e.g. net gross savings, switching 
costs, direct losses, indirect losses). Examine the use of 
online reverse auctions for custom-designed machine 
parts. Online reverse auctions support “quick hits” and 
local optimization of financial dimensions. Because of
direct and indirect losses, collaborative cost reduction 
methods are more effective in reducing costs 









Examine the consistency of online reverse auctions with 
the “Caux Round Table Principles for Business”, i.e. 
values against which business behavior can be 
measured. Conclude that online reverse auctions, if used 
by buyers to source buyer-designed industrial 
components, can never comply with these principles.
Based on the 
involvement in 
“nearly a dozen” 
reverse auctions at 
a company from 





Describe auction types and potential benefits and 
drawbacks. Provide limited recommendations 
concerning factors to make online reverse auctions 
feasible. Focus on the use and roles of intermediaries in 
online reverse auctions, and the impact on channel 
relationships.
Prescriptive
Jap and Mohr 
(2002)
Develop and interpret a matrix which recommends how 
exchange types (relational versus transactional) are 
related to web-efficiencies (improvement of information 
sharing, increase of reach, dynamic pricing). Conclude 
that online reverse auctions can harm relational 
exchanges because today many auction formats focus 





Examines the ability to adversely affect relationships 
between suppliers and buyers. Buyers have to consider 
relationships with their own companies, existing 
suppliers and new suppliers, building trust and being 
aware of competing objectives. The author considers
how an auction changes the dynamics of these 
relationships, outline the positives for using online 







Describe the integration of online reverse auctions as a 
tool in the sourcing process for direct material. 
Conclude that online reverse auctions should not be 
used in isolation; instead, it must be thoroughly 
integrated.
Single case study 





Describe the move of the firm from face-to-face 
negotiation to becoming an active online reverse auction 
user. Authors provide discussion of outside third-party 
versus in-house solutions.
Single case study 








Meier et al. 
(2002)
Describe the change in the firm’s communication 
practices while moving into online reverse auctions. The 
firm achieved annual savings related to the volume 
auctioned of 34% ($2.4M).
Single case study 





Describe the tasks required to conduct online reverse 
auctions, present the third-party help available and 
possible tasks and fee structures of third-party auction 
services. Both firms used FreeMarkets for technical 
support and as a “market maker”. 






Discuss advantages and disadvantages of using online 
reverse auctions and conditions which have to be 
present in order to maximize the potential on online 
reverse auctions.  








Besides the suppliers’ and buyers’ reasons for using 
online reverse auctions and conditions for success, the 
authors describe potential risks for both parties. Buyers 
were most afraid of destroying the relationship and the 
suppliers’ trust.
41 interviews with 
managers (23 
manufacturing, 12 





Using the Kraljic portfolio as a foundation, the 
researchers conclude that online reverse auctions are 
more suitable for strategic products than for leverage 
products, non-critical items and bottleneck products. 
Important success factors are a high number of 
suppliers, excess supply and changing market prices.





Examine the impact of reverse auctions on buyer-
supplier relationships through six case studies, 
analyzing primarily the supplier perspective through 
participant interviews. The authors identify potential 
benefits for both parties in a reverse auction, through 
tendering and transactional cost advantages.
Six case studies (5 








Jap (2002) Provides an extensive review of the current online 
reverse auctions use. The author discusses and provides 
initial analysis with respect to the difference of online 
reverse auction from physical auctions and from auction 
in the literature. The author also discusses the conditions 





Jap (2003) Investigates the impact of different auction types (open-
bid, sealed bid) on supplier relationships. The author 
concludes that open bid auctions make current and new 
suppliers believe that the buyer will act 
opportunistically. If the buyer uses sealed bid auctions, 
suppliers are more likely to make relationship specific 
investments.
Online survey, 




Examine the relationship between corporate strategy and 
the use of online reverse auctions, and the relationship 
between online reverse auction strategy and supplier 
cooperation. The authors confirm the relationship 
between firms pursuing a differentiation strategy and the 
use of online reverse auctions for supporting long-term 
relationships. The authors also confirm the relationship 
between firms pursuing cost leadership strategy and the 




firms were “known 






Examine the purchasing management related conditions 
which influence the success of online reverse auctions in 
terms of product cost reduction. The researchers 
conclude that it is vital that the product or service to be 
auctioned be properly specified and that the companies 
spend sufficient time and effort to carefully analyze, 
understand and, if possible, increase competition among 






Hartley et al. 
(2004)
Examine differences between online reverse auction 
adopters and non-adopters. The data do not support that 
online reverse auction adopters differ from non-adopters 
on the level of importance placed on cost management 
and supplier collaboration. The data do show that 
adopters have higher annual sales than non-adopters.
Mail survey, 







Examine how aerospace part and sub-component 
suppliers specializing in producing engineered machined 
parts and sub-assemblies react to online reverse 
auctions. The results show that online reverse auctions 
have numerous serious shortcomings as far as 
incumbent suppliers are concerned.
Email Survey, 





A review of the methods underlying these publications reveals that the majority of 
the research is conceptual, prescriptive, and descriptive in nature or is based on 
qualitative interviews and case studies. Furthermore, the small amount of survey research 
is based on rather small sample sizes when compared to "typical" quantitative research. 
This clearly indicates that online reverse auctions are a very recent and hence just an
emerging research area. Ruzarika (2000) was among the first researchers to use surveys 
in studying online reverse auctions. The author proposed a conceptual model of the usage 
of online reverse auctions in negotiations. The author used a telephone survey to examine 
the relationship of the use of online reverse auctions as a tool to improve the negotiation 
process and the characteristics of the auction item. The author also examined whether the 
use of online reverse auctions affects the quality of an agreement for the contract of a 
product or a service. Finally, the author examined the circumstances that drive 
organizations to choose to use online reverse auctions in negotiations with their suppliers.
Hong and Hartley (2001) provided a brief review of the relatively scarce trade 
literature that was available at the time their paper was written, and then advocated that 
online reverse auctions should reduce purchase prices and shorten cycle times. The 
authors examined the differences between online reverse auction adopters and non-
adopters, they also suggested that an insufficient number of suppliers that are able to 
participate in an online reverse auction will reduce auction effectiveness. Pearcy et al. 
(2003 a, b) were among several researchers who advocated the use of a survey 
methodology to examine the reverse auction process. The authors presented the results of 
surveying 142 purchasing professionals to examine the relationship between corporate 
strategy and the use of online reverse auctions and the relationship between the online 
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reverse auction strategy and the supplier’s cooperation. The authors confirmed the 
relationship between a firm pursuing a differentiation strategy and the use of online 
reverse auctions for supporting long-term relationships. The authors also confirmed the 
relationship between a firm pursuing a cost leadership strategy and the use of bid-and-
buy auction strategy. Finally, the authors discovered that a short-term ("bid-and-buy") 
focus predominated when firms bought both direct materials and MRO supplies.
Jap (2002) also advocated the use of a survey methodology in the context of a 
quasi-experiment involving six reverse auctions to examine the relationship between the 
use of open or sealed bid reverse auction, supplier performance, and the attitude of 
incumbent and new suppliers toward the buyer. Smeltzer and Carr (2002) advocated the 
use of a survey methodology in the context of nondirective field interviews format. The 
authors interviewed 41 purchasing professionals who had been involved in more than two 
auctions to examine the promises, risks, and conditions associated with the 
implementation of online reverse auctions.
Parker (2003) presented the results of a survey conducted in the United Kingdom
to examine the consequences of using online reverse auctions on buyer-supplier 
relationships. According to the results of the survey, suppliers are backing online reverse 
auctions as a way to improve long-term relationships with their customers. Almost two-
thirds of suppliers said auctions made purchasers more competent. The authors also 
found that more than half of the suppliers felt confident that auctions gave the buyers no 
more power.
Emiliani and Stec (2004) presented the results of a survey among aerospace part 
and subassembly suppliers to quantitatively assess the suppliers’ reaction to online 
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reverse auctions and its impact on their business policies and practices. The authors also 
compared their findings to the qualitative benefits identified for suppliers by the online 
reverse auction service providers. The authors concluded that both buyers and sellers 
participating in online reverse auctions will likely encounter unfavorable outcomes; thus 
the authors questioned the use of online reverse auctions as a mean of reducing the unit 
price of buyer-designed engineering components. 
Wagner and Schwab (2004) examined the purchasing management-related 
conditions which influence the success of online reverse auctions in terms of product cost 
reduction. After surveying 23 purchasing professionals, the researchers concluded that it 
is vital to properly specify the product or service to be auctioned, and it is equally vital
that the companies spend sufficient time and effort to carefully analyze, understand and, 
if possible, increase competition among suppliers participating in an online reverse 
auction.
Carter et al. (2004) used a survey methodology in the context of a field interview 
format to examine the barriers to implementing online reverse auctions, as well as 
consequences such as cycle time reduction and productivity. The authors also examined 
the parameters that affect the savings that occur during a specific online reverse auction 
event, including lotting (multiple lots as opposed to a single lot) strategies and the degree 
of supplier visibility.
Recently, Hartley, Lane, and Hong (2004) used a survey methodology in the 
context of mail format.  The authors mailed 800 surveys to members of the National 
Association of Purchasing Management (NAPM) who reported that they are Directors or 
Vice Presidents for Purchasing/Supply Management. Based on the 163 usable returned 
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surveys, the authors examined the differences between buying organizations that have 
adopted online reverse auctions and those that have not used online reverse auctions for 
sourcing.
3.3 The Fit between Auction Design and Reduction in Purchase Price
Once the buying organization decides to organize an online reverse auction, the 
buying organization must decide on the auction design. Unfortunately, research related to 
the effect of the auction design on the success of the online reverse auction 
implementation is very limited.  This research studies the auction design from the 
following two dimensions: the auction format and the event organization.
Auction Format
While there are many types of reverse auctions, the research focuses on the use of 
one-sided open and multi-round sealed bid auctions. “One-sided” refers to the presence 
of a single buyer and multiple sellers. The main difference between open-bid and multi-
round sealed bid is the supplier’s ability to view other competitors’ bidding prices and the 
current bidding price.
Under sealed-bid auction conditions, the buyer invites the suppliers to participate 
in the auction. After the bidding process starts, the suppliers are not able to view their 
competitors’ price bids and only the buyer views the bids. The suppliers are only notified 
that they have been outbid by a competitor, so the supplier can submit a lower bid, if 
interested. In the open-bid auction condition, suppliers are able to view the price bids of 
every competitor and have the opportunity to bid against their competitors in real time. In 
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the open-bid auction format, the bids are submitted for the buyer and all the suppliers to 
view and the price falls successively until one bidder remains.
The rapid and dynamic nature of price competition in the open-bid format creates 
a stronger emphasis on price reduction relative to the sealed-bid format. The fast-paced 
bidding along with the need to respond quickly to competitors’ bids produces tension and 
pressure on suppliers to cut prices vigorously, and this tension forces additional price 
concessions from the suppliers (Jap 2002). Hence, the following hypothesis:
H1: Using online reverse auctions, the reduction in purchase prices is more likely 
to be higher in the open-bid auction format than the sealed-bid format.
Event Organization
Companies that provide online reverse auction services are known as “market 
makers.” These companies assist buyers in locating suppliers, set up the auction event, 
provide the technological expertise, and create a comprehensive request for quote (RFQ) 
packages. The RFQ’s are often better structured than those the buyer historically 
produced, which results in a more complete description of the procurement under 
consideration. Sellers thus gain a better understanding of the buyer’s total requirements 
with regard to cost, delivery, and quality (Emiliani and Stec 2001a). 
 The leading providers of online reverse auction services include Ariba, 
Commerce One, eBreviate, Trading Partners, and Frictionless Commerce. The value 
delivered by online market makers is primarily in the RFQ process and joining the buyers 
and the sellers in real-time reverse auctions using proprietary software (Emiliani and Stec
2002b). The market maker does not support implementation of online reverse auction 
results.
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The buyers’ decision as to whether to organize the auction in-house or with the 
help of a market maker primarily depends on the buyer’s experience in using online 
reverse auctions, the dollar value of the purchases made through the auctions, and the 
frequency of using online reverse auctions. The cost of online auction service providers 
can range from a couple of thousand to hundreds of thousands of dollars depending on 
the size of the auction and the effort the market maker spends on organizing the auction. 
For companies that are just starting to use online reverse auctions and companies that do 
not use online reverse auctions frequently, it is more logical to use online service 
providers. But for buyers who have used online reverse auctions more frequently (the 
target sample for the research survey) and have the required technology infrastructure to 
support the online reverse auction, it is expected that they prefer to organize online 
reverse auctions in-house in order to cut the cost associated with the online reverse 
auction provider fees. Hence, the following hypothesis:
H2: With the objective of using online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices, 
buyers are more likely to prefer to organize the auction event in-house than with 
the help of a market maker.
3.4 The Fit between Product Type and Reduction in Purchase Price
Starting with Robinson, Faris, and Wind (1967), many researchers have examined 
the theory, methods, and empirical observations in organizational buyer behavior (OBB), 
including the type of purchases. The three conceptual models in OBB published in the 
1960s and 1970s (Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; S heth 1973; Webster and Wind 1972) 
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were significantly influential in generating academic interest in organizational buying 
behavior. 
Since the early 1980s, research on OBB has exploded (Sheth 1996). This can be 
attributed to at least three reasons. First, the shift from understanding and influencing 
consumers to customers (industrial, institutional, and trade) has led to a greater focus on 
OBB. Second, both the academic journals and business professional organizations, 
including the National Association of Purchasing Management (NAPM), have 
encouraged research and publications on inter-organizational buying behavior (Sheth
1996). Finally, as suggested in Sheth, Gardner, and Garrett (1988), the marketing 
discipline is increasingly influenced by the disciplines of organizational behavior, 
industrial organizations, and transaction cost theories in economics.
Most purchasers and industrial marketing researchers support the notion that 
organizational buying activities vary according to the type of product bought. Davis, 
Eppen, and Mattson (1974) divided purchased products into four categories (raw 
materials, capital goods, components, and supplies) and found that supplier selection for 
raw materials and capital goods is more centralized and is carried out more systematically 
than supplier selection for components and supplies. 
Bradley (1977), in his study of industrial buying concerning public sector 
enterprises in Ireland, classified products as routine buying products, stock buying 
products, and capital buying products. Routine buying products (e.g. raw materials, 
general supplies, office supplies, repair and maintenance services) are frequently ordered 
as a result of a stock control check and pose no significant application problems for the 
buying organization. Stock buying products (e.g. spare machinery parts, components, and 
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small motors) in many cases are bought in conjunction with guaranteed after-sale
technical service. Finally, capital buying products (e.g. plant, equipment, and buildings) 
usually involve large expenditures and decisions are made at the managerial level. Ellram 
(1996) classified organizational purchases as low impact, leverage, or strategic, in terms 
of their cost and impact on the organization and their relationship potential
Kraljic (1983) classified industrial purchases into four categories according to the 
purchases’ profit, impact, and supply risk: strategic (high profit impact, high supply risk), 
bottleneck (low profit impact, high supply risk), leverage (high profit impact, low supply 















Low Complexity of 
supply market
High
Figure 3-1: The Kraljic Purchasing Portfolio Model (Modified from Kraljic 1983)
Mattson (1988) classified purchasing products as capital equipment, product 
essentials, support essentials, and consumption products, suggesting that this type of 
classification is easily determined and directly related to the level of management 
involvement. More specifically, Mattson found that capital equipment is approved at a 
higher level than product essentials, while both of those categories dominate the other 
two.
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The most widely used classification in the business world is production materials, 
components, maintenance materials and supplies, capital equipment, and services (Laios 
and Moschuris 2001). This research focuses on three of the four types of industrial 
purchases identified by Laios and Moschuris (2001). For purposes of this research, 
production materials and components are combined under one category:
1. Production materials and components – items which become part of the final 
product. For retail companies that will include retail items.
2. Maintenance materials and supplies – items consumed by maintenance and repair 
or operating equipment in support of operations, also known as maintenance, 
repair, and operating supplies (MRO). This category also includes office supplies.
3. Services – non-physical purchases in support of operatiosn. Services can be
divided further into routine services, standard services, and customer-specific 
services, each requiring different kinds of purchasing practices. For the purposes
of this research, all different types of services will be considered under the
“Service” industrial purchase type without further classification.
The available literature on testing the relationship between the product type 
(production materials and components, MRO, and services) and the reduction in purchase 
prices using online reverse auctions is very limited. Pearcy et al. (2002) stated that 
companies will be more likely to reduce the purchase prices of direct material and MRO 
supplies through the use of online reverse auctions. In general, the majority of the articles 
published in the business press seem to agree that online reverse auctions will lead to a 
reduction of purchase prices, without going into details about the purchase type. The 
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following hypotheses explore the relationships between the purchase type and the use of
online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices:
H3a: When purchasing production materials and components, a positive, 
significant relationship exists between the type of purchase and the purpose of 
using online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices.
H3b: When purchasing MRO supplies, a positive, significant relationship exists 
between the type of purchase and the purpose of using online reverse auctions to 
reduce purchase prices.
H3c: When purchasing services, a positive, significant relationship exists between 
the type of purchase and the purpose of using online reverse auctions to reduce 
purchase prices.
3.5 The Fit between the Product Type and the Auction Application
The types of relationships that exist between buyers and sellers of products and/or 
services purchased have been well documented by numerous researchers (e.g. Womack, 
Jones, and Roos 1990; Womack and Jones 1996; Humphreys, Shiu, and Shan 2001). 
Their findings can be broadly characterized by buyers’ two basic approaches to the use 
of online reverse auctions for their purchasing perspectives (Emiliani 2003): 
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1. Power-based bargaining (short-term relationships): the online reverse auction 
process is used to award business to suppliers with a transaction-oriented basis 
(i.e., focus on the price only).
2. Collaborative problem solving (long-term relationships): the online reverse 
auction process is not only used to award business to suppliers, but to establish 
and maintain a long-term relationship with the suppliers.
Power-based bargaining is quite common and leads to ongoing conflicts between 
buyers and sellers, while collaborative problem-solving tends to be less common
(Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990). The rules that govern power-based bargaining are 
normally ad hoc, while collaborative problem-solving requires a highly disciplined 
approach supported by stable management principles, policies, and practices (Monden 
1995; Cooper and Slagmulder 1999). 
It is widely accepted by academics that power-based bargaining has many 
shortcomings and generally represents an immature, antiquated, or unsophisticated means 
of conducting business (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990; Cooper and Slagmulder 1999; 
Tracey and Tan 2001). When asked, most practitioners will also acknowledge the 
deficiencies of transactional or exploitative approaches to purchasing, particularly with 
regards to achieving strategic alignment, trust, and long-term commitment. While many 
researchers have outlined the steps to achieve improved supplier relationships (Cooper 
and Slagmulder 1999; Handfield et al. 2000; Liker and Wu 2000), their solutions do not 
typically address the fundamental source of misalignment between buyers and sellers. 
Despite the existence of more effective collaborative purchasing and supply chain 
management processes and widespread recognition of numerous negative consequences 
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(Cooper and Slagmulder 1999), power-based bargaining remains the dominant practice in 
most large purchasing organizations. Further evidence supporting this view includes the 
widespread use of online reverse auctions among Fortune 1,000 businesses to reduce the 
price of purchased goods (Emiliani and Stec 2001a; Richards 2000; Tully 2000; Judge
2001). Recently, some of the large purchasing organizations who have been using online 
reverse auctions for years as a power-based bargaining tool (e.g. General Electric) have 
started using online reverse auctions as a collaborative sourcing tool (Parker 2003; 
Emiliani and Stec 2004). 
 The hypotheses in this section aim at testing the applications of online reverse 
auctions as power-based bargaining or collaborative problem solving tools for sourcing, 
through examining the effect of the type of purchased items. The available literature on 
testing the relationship between the product type (production materials and components, 
MRO, and services) and the online reverse auction application (power-based bargaining 
or collaborative problem solving tools) is very limited.
Several researchers tested the relationship and effectiveness of using online 
reverse auctions to purchase production material, components, and MRO (Pearcy et al.
2002; Emiliani and Stec 2004). Contradictory results are available in the literature about 
the effectiveness of using online reverse auctions to purchase production materials, 
components, and MRO. Pearcy et al. (2002) stated that buying companies will be more 
likely to use online reverse auctions to buy direct material and MRO supplies for short-
term contracts. On the other hand, Emiliani and Stec (2004) questioned the effectiveness 
of online reverse auctions as a tool to outsource components for the short-term and long-
term. 
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The academic literature has no available published research about testing the 
relationship and effectiveness of using online reverse auctions to purchase services. On 
the other hand, the business press and the auction service provider marketing material 
strongly advocate the success of online reverse auctions in reducing purchase prices. 
Based on the above literature and research, the following is hypothesized:
H4a-c: When purchasing X, a negative, significant relationship will exist between 
the use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship and 
for the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.
X: can be production material and components, MROs, or services.
H5a-c: When purchasing X, purchasers will be more likely to use online reverse 
auctions for the purpose of short-term relationships than developing/maintaining 
long-term relationships.
X: can be production material and components, MROs, or services.
3.6 The Fit between Auction Application and Strategic Supplier Alliance
For more than a decade, there has been a growing understanding that supply chain 
management should be built around the integration of trading partners. Christopher 
(1998) proposes that “today's business is increasingly 'boundaryless', meaning that 
internal functional barriers are being eroded in favor of horizontal process management 
and externally the separation between vendors, distributors, customers and the firm is
gradually lessening.” Bowersox, Closs, and Stank (2000) state that companies collaborate 
in the sense of “leveraging benefits to achieve common goals.”
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Anthony (2000) suggests that supply chain collaboration occurs when “two or 
more companies share the responsibility of exchanging common planning, management, 
execution, and performance measurement information.” Blackwell and Blackwell (1999), 
suggest that “the battle commands of today are flexibility, speed, and productivity, all 
amplified by the winds of consumer demand.” Continuing, they suggest that “the new 
competitive realities are causing suppliers, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers alike 
to rethink their strategic initiatives with their supply chain partners.”
The birth and acceptance of online reverse auctions has not been without 
controversy. One of the main concerns with the use of online reverse auctions is that 
buyer-supplier strategic relationships will be negatively affected (Jap 2000; Kwak 2002). 
Since the late 1980’s, the trend in supply chain management has been to move away from 
traditional, competitive, power-based bargaining buyer-supplier relationships toward 
collaborative, problem solving buyer-supplier partnerships (Cusumano and Takeishi 
1991; Hahn et al. 1986; Helper 1991). Power-based bargaining relationships are defined 
as having a primary emphasis on price, using short-term contracts, evaluating suppliers 
based on bids, and using multiple suppliers (Stuart 1993). By design, online reverse 
auctions use many suppliers, evaluate suppliers based on bids, and primarily focus on 
price (Hartley et al. 2004). On the other hand, collaborative problem solving buyer-
supplier partnerships are formed by selecting fewer suppliers and longer-term contracts 
(Cooper and Slagmulder 1999). 
 Online reverse auctions generally increase and leverage competition and thus may 
reduce supplier cooperation when used as a power-bargaining tool (Hartley et al. 2004). 
Jap (2000) suggests that after participation in an online reverse auction, suppliers may
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feel that they have been treated unfairly. Emiliani and Stec (2002b) suggest that online 
reverse auctions lead to a breakdown of cooperation between the buyer and sellers, as the 
buyer seeks to satisfy its own selfish desires.
Alternatively, the buyer may use an online reverse auction as a tool to pursue a 
collaborative strategy as a way to reduce costs (Hartley et al. 2004). Jap (1999) suggests 
that supplier cooperation can be used to achieve lower costs so organizations can pursue 
one objective to achieve the other. By collaborating, buyers and suppliers can be more 
competitive than if either organization worked independently. Parker (2003) suggests that 
some buyers and suppliers are backing online auctions as a way of improving long-term 
relationships by building strategic supplier alliances. 
A strategic supplier alliance involves more than just payments from the buyer in 
exchange for the suppliers’ products or services. Buyers typically do not only buy their 
suppliers’ products and services, but also their suppliers’ systems and capabilities. 
Measures of the success of strategic alliances with the suppliers fall into two categories: 
soft (e.g. competitive technology, supply chain integration) and hard (e.g., cost, quality, 
and cycle time) measures of success (Monczka et al. 1998). These performance measures 
are expected to exceed the performance measures under “regular long-term contracts.”
Online reverse auctions can be used to maintain and develop strategic supplier 
alliances (Parker 2003). Buying organizations can use online reverse auctions to identify 
suppliers and determine contract prices. If the supplier meets the buyer’s requirements, a 
long-term contract is signed. The buying organization has to explain its intensions to use 
the online reverse auction as a tool to work collaboratively with the suppliers through 
establishing long-term contracts. 
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Several researchers have identified the critical attributes associated with strategic
buyer-supplier alliances, including the existence of trust, co -location, asset specificity, 
information sharing, and other conflict management factors (McAllister 1995; Monczka 
and Trent 1991; Yoshino and Rangan 1995). Moher and Spekman (1994) developed and 
tested appropriate measures for the critical attributes associated with collaborative buyer-
supplier relationships within the context of dealer-supplier channel transactions. The 
research focused on behavioral and communication attributes of the buyer-supplier 
relationships. They studied the partnership attributes, communication behavior, and 
conflict resolution techniques in terms of satisfaction and sales volume as indicators to 
the partnership’s success. Figure 3-2 represents Mohr and Spekman’s model.
Figure 3-2: Mohr and Spekman (1994) Model


















Monczka et al. (1998) expanded the Mohr and Spekman (1994) model from the 
buyer’s perspective for industrial purchasing alliances. From the perspective of the 
buying company in the alliance, the following attributes of supplier alliances were found 
to be significantly related to partnership success: trust and coordination, interdependence, 
information quality and participation, information sharing, joint problem solving, 
avoiding the use of severe conflict resolution tactics, and the existence of a formal 
supplier selection process.
For purposes of this study, based on the model developed by Mohr and Spekman 
(1994) and enhanced by Monczka et al. (1998), the hypotheses will test the buyer-
supplier strategic alliance relationship in the context of online reverse auction 
transactions with focus on three dimensions: attribute of the alliance, communication 
behavior, and conflict resolution techniques. Hypotheses 6 and 7 are based on the 
hypotheses established by Monczka et al. (1998) based on Mohr and Spekman’s (1994) 
research.
Attributes of the Alliance
Trust
Several studies confirm the importance of trust as a component of collaborative 
buyer-supplier relationship (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monczka et al. 1998; Pilling and 
Zhang 1992; Smith et al. 1995). Moorman et al. (1992) define trust as “the willingness to 
rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence.” Pruitt (1981) indicates that 
trust is highly related to the buyers’ and suppliers’ desire to collaborate. Anderson and 
Narus (1990) suggest that once trust is established, companies learn that joint efforts will 
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lead to outcomes that exceed what the firm would achieve had it acted solely in its own 
best interests. 
Commitment
Commitment refers to the willingness of buyers and suppliers to exert effort on 
behalf of the relationship (Porter et al. 1974). Commitment suggests a future orientation 
in which partners attempt to build a relationship that can weather unanticipated problems 
(Mohr and Spekman 1994). Commitment to a relationship is most frequently 
demonstrated by committing resources to the relationship, which may occur in the form 
of an organization’s time, money, facilities, etc (Monczka et al. 1998). 
Coordination
Coordination is related to boundary definition and reflects the set of tasks each 
party expects the other to perform. Narus and Anderson (1977) suggest that successful 
working partnerships are marked by coordinated actions directed at mutual objectives 
that are consistent across organizations.
Interdependence
Interdependence exists when one actor does not entirely control all of the 
conditions necessary for achievement of an action or a desired outcome (Monzcka et al.
1998). As organizations join forces to achieve mutually beneficial goals, they 
acknowledge that each is dependent on the other.
In sum, the literature cited above and the literature in Monczka et al. (1998)
suggest that more successful strategic alliances are expected to be characterized by higher 
63
level of commitment, coordination, interdependence, and trust. By applying this 
suggestion to the application of online reverse auctions, the following is hypothesized:
H6a: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving tool is 
associated with high levels of trust, commitment, coordination and 
interdependence.
H7a: Successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of 
commitment, trust, coordination and interdependence.
Communication Behavior
Information Exchange
Information exchange refers to the extent to which critical, often proprietary, 
information is exchanged between the buyer and the supplier (Mohr and Spekman 1994). 
For instance, details of the supplier’s financial health, level of debt, ability to grow, and 
overhead structure are required in order to effectively plan future purchases and grow 
within the alliance (Burt, Norquist, and Anklesaria 1990). Helper (1991) argued that 
increased communication and integrated problem solving are important for improving 
design quality and overall performance. 
Information Quality and Participation
Information quality is a key aspect of information transmission and includes 
aspects such as the accuracy, timeliness, adequacy, and credibility of information 
exchanged. Information participation refers to the extent to which partners engage jointly 
in planning and goal setting (Mohr and Spekman 1994). 
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In sum, the literature cited above suggests that more successful partnerships are 
expected to be characterized by higher levels of exchanging quality information. 
Applying this suggestion to the application of online reverse auctions, the followings are
hypothesized:
H6b: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving tool is 
associated with high levels of buyer-supplier (a) information sharing (b) 
information quality and (c) information participation.
H7b: Successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of (a) 
information sharing and (b) information quality and participation.
Conflict Resolution
Conflict inevitably exists between buyers and suppliers. The manner in which 
conflicts are resolved has a direct implication for the success and continuity of the 
relationship. Organizations in a strategic partnership are motivated to engage in joint 
problem solving to enhance the relationship’s success. Partners might attempt to persuade
each other to adopt particular solutions to the conflict situation. These persuasive 
attempts are more constructive than the use of domination or confrontation destructive 
conflict resolution techniques. In some situations, buyers and suppliers might seek 
outside arbitration to resolve conflicts. Other conflict resolution techniques involve
smoothing over or avoiding the issues. By applying these suggestions to the application 
of online reverse auctions, the following are hypothesized:
H6c: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving tool is 
associated with (a) higher use of buyer-supplier constructive resolution 
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techniques (b) low use of conflict avoidance techniques and (c) low use of 
destructive resolution techniques.
H7c: Successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with (a) high use of 
constructive conflict resolution techniques, (b) low use of conflict avoidance 
techniques and (c) low use of destructive resolution techniques.
3.7 Successful Implementation
In recent years, organizations have adopted management practices and 
technologies designed to reduce costs. Recently, organizations have adopted online 
reverse auctions to lower purchase prices and reduce transaction costs (Brunelli 2000;
Dong, Carter, and Dresner 2001; Hong and Hartley 2001; Moser 2002; Ruzarika 2000). 
Several large companies have reported decreases in purchase prices of 10% or more 
through the use of online reverse auctions (Brunelli 2000; Hannon 2001). Online reverse 
auctions also affect purchase prices, transaction costs, and inventory costs (Hartley, Lane,
and Hong 2004). Carter et al. (2004) observed that buyers consider “successful auctions 
as those that exceed the expected or perceived savings of a face-to-face negotiation or 
traditional bid process.” Wagner and Schwab (2004) used product cost reduction as the 
performance measure of the successful implementation of an online reverse auction 
event. So, based on the literature cited above and the literature cited in the previous 
sections, the following is hypothesized:
H8: A positive, significant relation exists between reducing purchase prices and 
the buyer’s perception of a successful online reverse auction event.
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In recent years, the trend in supply management has been to move away from 
traditional competitive buyer-supplier relationships toward collaborative buyer-supplier 
strategic alliances (Helper 1991; Stuart 1993; Womack and Jones 1996). However, one of 
the main concerns with the use of online reverse auctions is that buyer-supplier strategic 
relationships will be negatively affected (Jap 2000; Kwak 2002). 
Several authors listed destroying buyer-supplier relationship as the main 
disadvantages of online reverse auctions (Emiliani and Stec 2002; Jap 2002), while 
Hartley, Lane, and Hong (2004) saw an opportunity to enhance the buyer-supplier 
strategic alliance and pursue a collaborative strategy as a way to reduce cost. Smart and 
Harrison (2003) studied the impact of reverse auctions on the buyer-supplier relationships 
and concluded that “reverse auctions have the potential to be used in both the 
collaborative and competitive relationships as a means of tendering contracts.” In spite of
the contradicting views of these authors, all agree that if implementing an online reverse 
auction did not have a negative effect on supplier strategic alliances, then they would 
consider the auction event successful, hence the following hypothesis:
H9: A positive, significant relation exists between buyer-supplier strategic 
alliance, and the buyer perception of a successful online reverse auction event.
The research model was developed using multi-disciplinary academic research as well as 
articles and reports in the popular press. Figure 3-3 shows the research model and 
hypotheses.
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Figure 3-3: Research Hypothesized Model
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodological procedures that were used to test the 
research model. Specifically, this chapter presents the research instrument, methodology 
for data analysis, the sample, data collection, and the research timeline. In section 4.2, the 
chapter presents the development of the research instrument that was used to test the 
research model. Section 4.3 presents the research sample which is members of the 
Institute for Supply Management (ISM). Section 4.4 summarizes the data collection 
process. 
4.2 Data Gathering Tool
The author developed a standardized self-administered questionnaire, where all 
participants have the same questionnaire with the same questions in the same order. The 
standardized questionnaire was mailed to the potential participants. The questionnaire
(available in Appendix I) contains ten sections, which are explained in the following 
paragraphs (refer to Table 4-1):
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Basic Information and Reverse Auction Experience
The participants were asked to provide some basic information regarding their 
company and their position within their supply chain. The information involved 
estimating the dollar amount spent on purchases using online reverse auctions, the 
company’s annual sales and purchasing volumes, and the number of employees in the 
company in general and in purchasing in particular.
The participants were asked personal information about their job title, years of 
experience with the company, years of experience using online reverse auctions, the 
number of online reverse auction events organized in-house, and the number of auction 
events organized with the help of an online reverse auction provider. Finally, the 
respondents were asked to provide their email address if they elected to receive a copy of 
this research.
Reduction in Purchase Prices and Auction Design (sections I-III)
The construct “reduction in purchase price” will be evaluated from two different 
dimensions: reduction in purchase prices due to auction design (sections I and II) and 
reduction in purchase prices due to purchase type (section III). A scale to assess the 
“reduction in purchase prices due to auction design” did not exist; therefore the 
researcher developed it. The construct “reduction in purchase prices due to purchase 
type” was also measured by a scale developed by the researcher since one did not 
currently exist.
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Online Reverse Auction Application (section IV)
The scale to assess the “application” construct was developed by Pearcy et al. 
(2002, 2003 a, b) in their study of the impact of the firm’s corporate and e-purchasing 
strategy, purchase type, and relative strategic importance of the buyer-supplier 
relationship on reverse auction implementation. The authors reported scale reliabilities of 
0.75 and 0.8 for short-term application and long-term application scales respectively as 
indicated by the Cronbach coefficient alpha. The authors stated that the reliabilities were 
acceptable according to the guidelines of Nunnally (1967), which considered an alpha of 
0.70 as sufficient in scale development.
Successful Strategic Alliance (section VI-IX)
The measures developed by Mohr and Spekman (1994) were used to assess the 
“successful strategic alliance” (section IX) and its critical antecedents including attributes 
of the relationship (trust, commitment, coordination and interdependence) in section VI, 
communication behavior (information quality, participation, and sharing) in sections VII
and IX, and conflict resolution techniques in section VIII. 
The scales used in this research were patterned after the improvements done by 
Monczka et al. (1998) to test the magnitude of the effect of using online reverse auctions 
on the buyer-supplier strategic alliance. TheMonczka et al. (1998) scale asked the 
respondents to assess the buyer-supplier alliance success by examining several specific 
performance dimensions for their most and least successful alliance experiences. The 
researchers tested their instrument’s face validity using a group of industry executives 
and subject-matter experts. The extent of convergent validity for the four constructs was 
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assessed through the use of principle components factor analysis with Varimax rotation. 
Finally, the reliability of each construct was measured using Cronbach alpha. All of the 
measures had a Cronbach alpha greater than 0.70 as an indication of sufficient reliability. 
Successful Online Reverse Auction Implementation (section V)
The scale to assess the “success of online reverse auction implementation” 
construct was created by the researcher, as one did not exist. The scale was developed 
according to success criteria published in the online reverse auction literature (Brunelli
2000; Carbone 2004; Jap 2000; Emiliani and Stec 2002 a & b, 2004; Hartley et al. 2004; 
Kwak 2002; Pearcy et al. 2003a; Porter 2000; Smart and Harrison 2003; Wagner and 
Schwab 2004). Table 4.1 provides a summary of the components of each scale.
Reverse scoring was used in several sections of the survey as shown in Table 4-1. 
Reverse scoring several questions forces the survey respondent to slow down and think 
about each question, thus minimizing the temptation to score all questions the same 
without reading them. Reverse scoring can also flag surveys that may not be useful 
because all items (questions) are scored the same this suggesting that the survey taker 
was not honestly and thoughtfully completing the survey. These surveys may be 





I. The following refers to the effect of the auction price visibility on 
the efficiency of online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices:
1. Auctions where suppliers can see each other bids are effective in 
reducing purchase prices (Open-bid).
2. Auctions where suppliers can only know they have been outbid are
effective in reducing purchase prices (sealed-bid). (Reverse Scored)
3. Multi-round sealed bid auctions are more effective than multi-round 
open bids in reducing the purchasing prices. (Reverse Scored)
4. Multi-round open-bid auctions are more effective than multi-round 




II. The following refers to the effect of the auction event 
organization on the efficiency of online reverse auction to reduce 
purchase prices:
1. In-house organized online reverse auctions are effective in reducing 
purchase prices.
2. Auctions organized in-house are more effective than auctions 
organized with the help of an online reverse auction service provider 
(market maker) in reducing purchasing prices.
3. Auctions organized with the help of an online auction service provider 
(like Trade-Partners or Freemarkets) are effective in reducing purchase 
prices. (Reverse Scored)
4. Auctions organized with the help of an online reverse auction service 
provider (market maker) are more effective than auctions organized in-
house in reducing the purchasing prices than what we historically used 
to pay. (Reverse Scored)
Reduction in 
Purchase Price
III. The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in the 
purchase price paid for purchasing:
1. Production material and components / Retail Items







IV. The following refers to the effect of different types of purchases 
on the application of online reverse auctions as a power-based 
bargaining tool (short-term contracts) or a collaborative problem 
solving tool (long-term relationships).
1. a) Online reverse auctions are an excellent tool to reduce purchase 
prices on the short term.
2. We use online reverse auctions to achieve multiple sourcing.
3. We use online reverse auctions to identify new long-term partnering 
suppliers. (Reverse Scored)







IV. The following refers to the effect of different types of purchases 
on the application of online reverse auctions as a power-based 
bargaining tool (short-term contracts) or a collaborative problem 
solving tool (long-term relationships).
1. Online reverse auctions are an excellent tool to reduce purchase prices 
on the long term.
2. We use online reverse auctions to achieve multiple sourcing. (Reverse 
Scored)
3. We use online reverse auctions to identify new long-term partnering 
suppliers.
4. We use online reverse auctions to pressure our suppliers to reduce 
prices. (Reverse Scored)
Attribute of the 
Alliance
(Trust)
VI. Please rate your level of agreement about the following 
statements regarding your company relationship with your 
suppliers for the following dimensions:
1. We trust that our strategic supplier alliances will be beneficial to our 
business.
2. We do not get an equitable (fair) deal from our suppliers in these 
alliances. (Reverse Scored)
3. The relationships with our suppliers are marked by a high degree of 
harmony.
Attribute of the 
Alliance
(commitment)
VI. Please rate your level of agreement about the following 
statements regarding your company relationship with your 
suppliers for the following dimensions:
1. We would like to discontinue buying from our current suppliers.
(Reverse Scored)
2. We are very committed to buying from our current suppliers.
3. We have minimal commitment to our suppliers. (Reverse Scored)
Attribute of the 
Alliance
(coordination)
VI. Please rate your level of agreement about the following 
statements regarding your company relationship with your 
suppliers for the following dimensions:
1. Our activities with our suppliers are well coordinated.
2. Programs at our company are well coordinated with our suppliers.
3. We feel like we never know what we are suppose to do for our 
suppliers. (Reverse Scored)
Attribute of the 
Alliance
(interdependence)
VI. Please rate your level of agreement about the following 
statements regarding your company relationship with your 
suppliers for the following dimensions:
1. It would be very easy to terminate the relationship with any supplier 
and establish another strategic supplier. (Reverse Scored)
2. The time to establish another new strategic supplier partnership would 
be extremely long.







VII. To what extent do you feel that your company communication 
with your suppliers:
        a. Timely    (1=Not timely at all, 7=very timely)
        b. Accurate (1=Not accurate at all, 7=very accurate)
        c. Adequate (1=Not adequate at all, 7=very adequate)
        d. Complete (1=Not complete at all, 7=very complete)





IX. Please rate your level of agreement about the following 
statements regarding your company relationship with your 
suppliers:
1. We actively seek advice, counsel, and information from our suppliers.
2. Our strategic suppliers participate in our planning and goal setting 
activities.
3. We participate in our suppliers’ planning and goal setting activities 
that are relevant to our strategic partnership.





IX. Please rate your level of agreement about the following 
statements regarding your company relationship with your 
suppliers:
1. We share proprietary information with our suppliers.
2. Our suppliers share proprietary information with us.
3. We inform our suppliers in advance of changing needs.
4. In this relationship, it is expected that any information which might 
help the other party will be provided.
5. The parties are expected to keep each other informed about events or 
changes that might affect the other party.
6. It is expected that the parties will only provide information according 
to a pre-specified agreement. (Reverse Scored)
7. Our Supplier keep us fully informed about issues that affect our 
business.
Conflict Resolution
VIII. Assuming that some conflict exists over program and policy 
issues and how the relationship with your supplier is executed, how 
frequently are the following methods used to resolve such conflict? 
(1=Never, 7=Occasionally)
a. Smooth over the problem
b. Outside arbitration
c. Persuasive attempts by either party
d. Joint problem solving




X. Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements 
regarding your company’s relationship with your suppliers:
1. In our strategic supplier alliances, the parties work together to solve 
problems.
2. Our suppliers are flexible to requests we make.
3. Our suppliers make an effort to help us during emergencies.
4. When an agreement is made, we can always rely on our suppliers to 
fulfill the requirements.
5. We are satisfied with our company strategic supplier alliances.
Successful Event 
Implementation
V. Please rate your level of agreement about the following 
statements regarding how your company define the success of an 
online reverse auction event:
1. If the prices paid for purchases using reverse auction are less than the 
prices we used to pay, the online reverse auction event is considered 
successful.
2. We are satisfied with our company online reverse auctions results.
3. An online reverse auction event is considered a failure if it results in 
destroying our relationship with one of our suppliers
4. We are likely to reward our current loyal suppliers by continuing 
business with them even if they are not the lowest bidders in the online 
reverse auction event.
5. We are satisfied with our savings using online reverse auctions.
Table 4-1: Construct Measures before Scale Purification
76
4.3 The Sample
The sampling frame consists of members of the Institute for Supply Management 
(ISM). The survey respondents are members who reported themselves to be senior
purchasing professionals, senior executives, vice-presidents, and even owners of the 
supply business who handle large purchases and had the authority to determine major 
investment decisions to make price concessions. 
This sampling frame was chosen because of the likelihood that these purchasing 
professionals would have participated in at least one online reverse auction event and 
would be willing to participate in the survey.
Ideal sample size is contingent upon a number of factors including the confidence 
level, the margin of error (tolerance), and the proportion of individuals in the population. 
For the purpose of this research, a 95% confidence interval with ±4% margin of error is
assumed to yield a sample size of 600. 
Author(s) Sample Size Usable Returns Response Rate
Jap (2002) 54 38 70%
Jap (2003) 154 68 44%
Pearcy et al. (2003 a, b) 1,025 142 14%
Hartley et al. (2004) 800 163 20%
Emiliani and Stec (2004) 43 23 53%
Table 4-2: Online Reverse Auction Surveys Response Rates
The research sampling frame is similar to the frame surveyed in the research done 
by Pearcy et al. (2003 a, b) and Hartley et al. (2004); therefore, the researcher expects a 
similar response rate of 15-20%. Pearcy et al. (2003 a, b) mailed 1,025 surveys to 
members of the Institute of Supply Management (ISM) who reported to be purchasing 
professionals. Hartley et al. (2004) used a survey methodology in the context of mail 
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format.  The authors mailed 800 surveys to members of the National Association of 
Purchasing Management (NAPM) who reported that they are Directors or Vice 
Presidents for Purchasing/Supply Management.
4.4 Data Collection
Survey Preliminary Test
After the development of the survey, a detailed pretest was administered with a 
group of three e-procurement professionals, three faculty members, and five graduate 
students. The survey was also reviewed by two members of the English Writing Center at 
Oklahoma State University. Suggestions were solicited to ensure that the survey is clear 
and comprehensive. Based on the feedback, the appropriate revisions were made to 
improve the research instrument. The major change was in section III in the survey, 
where the suggestion was to change the questions from a Likert scale format to a 
percentage format. Changes were also done on the survey style, and the paper color was 
changed from white to yellow.
Survey Distribution
After modifying and finalizing the initial survey, an email was sent to all the 
participants in the study to introduce the purpose of the study and the importance of their 
participation. The objectives for sending these emails were to check if the participant was
still with the company in a role related to supply management and to insure a higher 
response rate.
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Six hundred and three potential participants were mailed a cover letter explaining 
the purpose of the study, the importance of their participation, a questionnaire, and a 
return envelop with a stamp on it.
Survey Follow-up
An email was sent to participants two weeks later as a follow-up/reminder to 
return the questionnaire. Depending on the response rate, a second mailing of the survey 
might have been required.
Survey Analysis
Various statistical analysis procedures were used to analyze the results of the 
survey including t-test, bi-variate correlation, and multiple linear regression (see Chapter 





H1: Using online reverse auctions, the reduction in purchase prices is 
more likely to be higher in the open-bid auction format than the sealed-
bid format.
One tailed t-test
H2: With the objective of using online reverse auctions to reduce 
purchase prices, buyers are more likely to prefer to organize the auction 
event in-house than with the help of a market maker.
One tailed t-test
H3a-c: When purchasing X, a positive, significant relationship will exist 
between the type of the purchase and the purpose of using online reverse 
auctions to reduce purchase prices.
X can be production material and components, MROs, or services.
Means analysis &
one tailed t-test
H4a-c: When purchasing X, a negative, significant relationship will exist 
between the use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-term 
relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term 
relationships.
X can be production material and components, MROs, or services.
Correlation analysis
H5a-c: When purchasing X, purchasers will be more likely to use online 
reverse auction for the purpose of a short-term relationship than 
developing/maintaining long-term relationships.
X can be production material and components, MRO, or services.
One tailed t-test
H6a: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving 




H6b: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving 
tool is associated with high levels of buyer-supplier (a) information 
sharing (b) information quality and (c) information participation.
Multiple linear 
regression
H6c: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving 
tool is associated with (a) high use of constructive conflict resolution 
techniques, (b) low use of conflict avoidance techniques and (c) low use 
of destructive resolution techniques.
Multiple linear 
regression
H7a: Successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high 
levels of commitment, trust, coordination and interdependence.
Multiple linear 
regression
H7b: Successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high 




H7c: A positive, significant relationship will exist between the success of 
the strategic alliance and (a) high use of constructive conflict resolution 
techniques, (b) low use of conflict avoidance techniques and (c) low use 
of destructive resolution techniques
Multiple linear 
regression
H8: A positive, significant relation exists between reducing purchase 
prices and the buyer perception of a successful online reverse auction 
event.
Correlation analysis
H9: A positive, significant relation exists between buyer-supplier 
strategic alliance, and the buyer perception of a successful online reverse 
auction event.
Correlation analysis
Table 4-3: Hypotheses Statistical Analyses Procedures 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
5.1 Introduction
Chapter five provides analysis of the data and the research results. The chapter is 
divided into six sections. Section 5.2 discusses the survey response rates in general and 
response rates based on the SIC code and geographic location in particular. In section 5.3, 
the chapter presents analysis of early versus late responses; the surveys received in the 
first two weeks are the early responses while the remaining surveys are the late 
responses. Analyses are also provided based on using the first three weeks as early 
responses.
Section 5.4, presents a statistical description of the survey responses based on the 
position of respondents, employment experience, and auction experience. The section 
also provides a statistical description of the surveys based on the annual sales in 2004, the 
annual purchasing volume in 2004, total number of employees, number of purchasing 
employees, position (job title), and/or auction experience. In section 5.5, the reliability 
and validity analyses of the survey instrument are presented.
Finally, scale descriptive statistics and hypotheses tests and are presented in 
section 5.6. Tables in this section summarize the hypotheses supported with the data and 
the hypotheses not supported with the data.
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5.2 Survey Response
Survey instruments were mailed to participants on July 14, 2005 (see Appendix 
A) after getting approval from the Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board 
(see Appendix B). Included with the survey were a stamped return envelop, a cover letter,
and a letter from the Institute of Supply Management (see Appendix A) containing an 
explanation of the importance of the research study and an explanation of the time 
required to complete the survey.
Confidentiality was assured to each participant. Data were to be reported in 
aggregate form so that no individuals would be identified. Participants were informed 
that their participation was voluntary and neither their names nor that of the company 
would be identified and reported in any manner.
Of 603 surveys mailed out, 146 surveys were returned before September 2, 2005. 
Respondents employed by companies that did not use online reverse auctions returned 49
of the 146 surveys. Seven surveys were returned undeliverable for various reasons 
(including moved with no forwarding address, not at this address any more and/or invalid 
mailing zip code). Two surveys were received after the cut-off date of September 2, 2005 
and were not included in the data analysis. One survey was eliminated due to excessive 
missing responses on 5 pages of the 6 pages of the survey. The total number of usable 
surveys was 145 surveys, which brings the response rate to 24%.
According to the SIC division structure, 74% of the surveys were mailed to 
companies from Division D (manufacturing), 16% from Division G (retail trade) and 
10% from Division I (services). Surveys received from manufacturing companies 
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represent 77% of the total while retail/trade and service companies represent 16% and 6% 
respectively. Figure 5-1 summarizes the surveys sent out by division number and the 
corresponding response percentage for each division. Table 5-1 details the surveys sent 
out and received by the SIC major group number.
According to the geographic location, based on the U.S. Census Bureau division 
of the United States, surveys received from companies in the West had the highest 
response rate of 43%, while companies from the Midwest, South and Northeast had 
response rates of 27%, 23% and 21% respectively (for more details on the response by 
state refer to Appendix C.1).



































Major Group 20: Food & Kindred Products 49 12 24%
Major Group 28: Chemicals And Allied Products 92 24 26%
Major Group 29: Petroleum Refining & Related 
Industries
8 1 13%
Major Group 33: Primary Metal Industries 15 5 33%
Major Group 34: Fabricated Metal Products, 
Except Machinery & Transportation Equipment
37 10 27%
Major Group 35: Industrial And Commercial 
Machinery & Computer Equipment
47 17 38%
Major Group 36: Electronic & Other Electrical 
Equipment & Components, Except Computer 
Equipment
115 23 20%















Major Group 38: Measuring, Analyzing, & 
Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical and 
Optical Goods; Watches & Clocks
30 6 20%
Major Group 52: Building Materials, Hardware, 
Garden Supply, and Mobile Home Dealers
14 3 21%
Major Group 53: General Merchandise Stores 12 4 33%
Major Group 54: Food Stores 15 6 40%
Major Group 56: Apparel And Accessory Stores 19 7 37%
















Major Group 58: Eating And Drinking Places 24 3 13%
Major Group 70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, 
Camps, and Other Lodging Places
5 0 0%
Major Group 73: Business Services 25 3 12%
Major Group 80: Health Services 14 1 7%











Major Group 87: Engineering, Accounting, 
Research, Management, and Related Services
5 3 60%
Table 5-1: Summary of Industries Surveyed by SIC Code
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5.3 Early versus Late Response
In studying the non-response bias in anonymous surveys, Venkatraman (1989) 
found that late respondents’ profiles tend to match those of non-respondents. Therefore, 
using this approach, the profiles of early and late respondents were compared using a t-
test on each of the scales.
The early respondents for this research are those who responded within two weeks 
of the first return while late respondents are those who returned later than two weeks of 
the first return but before the cut-off date of September 2, 2005.
The data indicate that a statistically significant difference existed only between 
early and late respondents on the auction application (collaborative problem solving)
scale at (α=0.05, p=0.047). The p-values for the remaining scales ranged from 0.10 to 
0.96 (see Appendices C.3 and C.4).
Further analysis was conducted by assuming early respondents to be those who 
responded within three weeks of the first return while late respondents are those who 
returned later than three weeks of the first return but before the cut-off date of September 
2, 2005. The data indicate that no statistically significant difference exists between early 
and late respondents for any scale. The p-value for the scales ranged from 0.09 to 0.95
(see Appendices C.5 and C.6).
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5.4 Sample Descriptive Statistics
The majority of the respondents hold mid-to-senior management positions. More 
than half of the respondents (53%) reported being managers, 35% reported to be holding 
an upper management position (vice president, director or senior manager) and 12% 
































Figure 5-2: Respondents' Job Titles
The mean number of years of employment with the current company for 
respondents in purchasing/supply management role is just over 10 years (10.3), with 1/2
year of experience as the minimum, and 42 years of experience as the maximum. The 
average number of auctions in which the respondents’ company participated during the 
last 3 years was 146 auctions (ranging from 1 to 5,000 auctions). The average number of 
auctions completed in-house in year 2004 was greater than the average number of 
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auctions completed with the help of an online reverse auction service provider in 2004. 
Also, the median number of auctions completed in-house in 2004 was 5, which was 
greater than the median number of two auctions completed with the help of an online 
reverse auction service provider in 2004. For more details see Appendix C.2.
In terms of responding companies’ financial descriptive statistics, a majority of 
the survey respondents (57%) represented companies with annual sales of more than one 
billion US dollars in 2004; Figure 5-3 shows the annual sales for the respondents’
companies.  On the other hand, the annual purchasing volume for the year 2004 exhibited 
substantial variation with half of the respondents’ reporting annual purchasing volume 
less than $500 million and the other half reporting an annual purchasing volume of more 
than $500 million. Figure 5-4 summarizes annual purchasing volume for the responding 
companies in 2004.
Similarly, a majority of these companies (60%) reported their number of 
employees to exceed 1,000. More than half of the responding companies reported having 
a purchasing staff of 20 or more employees, with 39% having more than 50 employees.
Figure 5-5 summarizes the total number of employees and Figure 5-6 summarizes the 
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Figure 5-4: Frequency Data on Year 2004 Annual Purchasing Volume
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Figure 5-5: Frequency Data on Total Number of Employees























Figure 5-6: Frequency Data on Number of Purchasing Employees
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5.5 Reliability and Validity Analysis
The theoretical part of this study has developed concepts to express theoretical 
constructs, such as auction format. These constructs have been expressed by various 
items in the survey. For evaluating theoretical constructs, indicators have been generated. 
The quality of these indicators, how well the indicators describe the theoretical construct, 
can be tested by two tests: the reliability test and the validity test. 
5.5.1 Reliability Analyses
Stainback and Stainback (1988) defined reliability as “the consistency and 
stability of data and findings”. Hayes (1997) defined reliability as “the extent to which 
measurements are free from random errors”. A reliability test describes the probability of 
random errors influencing the test results of a study. A low impact of random errors is 
reflected in a high reliability. The reliability of the construct is assessed using factor 
analysis and by assessing the Cronbach alpha (Cronbach 1951). Factor analysis is a 
statistical procedure used to reduce the number of variables by combining highly 
correlated variables with each other (Gall, Borg, and Gall 1996). Subsequent to the initial 
factor analysis, which revealed the number of factors for each subscale, Varimax rotation 
was used to clarify the solution if more than one factor was present (Pearcy 2002). The 
items with low loading were deleted. According to Comrey and Lee (1992), a factor 
loading of 0.45 is considered fair; therefore only items with loading of 0.45 or more were 
retained. 
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Next, the remaining sets of items were subject to assessments of the scale 
reliabilities as indicated by Cronbach alpha (Cronbach 1951). This allowed the research 
study to identify additional items whose deletion would increase Cronbach alpha. The 
minimum acceptable “cut-off” value for alpha was determined to be 0.65 (Nunnally 1978 
and DeVellis 1991). Devellis (1991) suggested the following alpha ranges: below 0.60 is 
unacceptable; between 0.6 and 0.65 is undesirable; between 0.65 and 0.7 is minimally 
acceptable; between 0.7 and 0.8 is respectable; and above 0.8 is very good. 
Accordingly, if a scale had a coefficient alpha that was less than 0.65, one or more 
items were deleted in order to achieve an acceptable level. Factor analysis was then 
conducted to verify that the original factor structure was still intact as suggested in 
previous scale development research (Flynn and Goldsmith 1999; Derbaix and Pecheux 
1999). This process was conducted in an iterative manner until the reliability could not be 
improved by deleting items, unless the increase in coefficient alpha was minimal. Table 
5-2 summarizes the acceptable “cut-off” criteria that were used in the reliability analysis 






Table 5-2: Summary of Reliability Criteria
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For each of the following tests of scale reliability using factor analysis (FA), 
KMO and Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that factor analysis was justified with 
P<0.0001 in each case (Pearcy, 2002). 
The factor analysis conducted for the auction design (format) scale revealed one 
factor. Table 5-3 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the auction design 
(format) construct (the scores for Q2 and Q3 have been reversed to assure uniformity in 
positive factor loading across the construct). Each of the five items exhibited high factor 
loading, ranging from 0.66 to 0.83. The items explained 56.7% of the variance in the data 
(see Appendix D.1). The factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, which 
indicated the scale was indeed reliable with coefficient alpha of 0.73. Improvement in 
coefficient alpha was not possible with the deletion of any item; therefore all the items 







Q1. Auctions where suppliers can see others’ bids are effective in 
reducing purchase prices (open-bid).
0.421 0.658
Q2. Auctions where suppliers only know they have been outbid 
are effective in reducing purchase prices (sealed-bid). 
(Reverse Scored)
0.603 0.802
Q3. Multi-round sealed bid auctions are more effective than multi-
round open bids in reducing the purchasing prices. (Reverse 
Scored)
0.513 0.716
Q4. Multi-round open-bid auctions are more effective than multi-
round sealed bids in reducing the purchasing prices.  0.627 0.826
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.729
Explained Variance 56.75%
Table 5-3: Reliability Analysis: Auction Design (Format) Scale
The factor analysis conducted for the auction design (event organization) scale 
revealed two factors (see Appendix D.3); questions 6-8 loaded on one factor and question 
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5 loaded on another factor (the scores for Q7 and Q8 have been reversed). Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2000) warned of factors consisting of one item; therefore Q5 was deleted (see 
Appendix D.4). The factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, which 
indicated the scale was indeed reliable with coefficient alpha of 0.747. Improvement in 
coefficient alpha was minimal with the deletion of Q7; therefore all the items were 
retained (see Appendix D.5). Table 5-4 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the 
auction design (format) construct. Each of the three items exhibited high factor loading, 
ranging from 0.76 to 0.84. The items explained 66.26% of the variance in the data. 
Factor





Q6. Auctions organized in-house are more effective than auctions 
organized with the help of an online reverse auction service 
provider (market maker) in reducing purchasing prices.
0.648 0.840
Q7. Auctions organized with the help on an online auction service 
provider (like Trade-Partners or Freemarkets) are effective in 
reducing purchase prices. (Reverse Scored)
0.497 0.760
Q8. Auctions organized with the help on an online auction service 
provider (like Trade-Partners or Freemarkets) are more effective 





Table 5-4: Reliability Analysis: Auction Design (Event Organization) Scale
The factor analysis conducted for the reduction in purchase price scale revealed 
one factor (see Appendix D.6). The factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis 
using Cronbach’s alpha, which indicated the scale to be reliable with coefficient alpha of 
0.861 (see Appendix D.7). Table 5-5 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the 
reduction in purchase price construct. Each of the three items exhibited high factor 









EPMC: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in 
the purchase price paid for purchasing production material and 
components.
0.471 0.766
EMRO: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in 
the purchase price paid for purchasing MRO.
0.540 0.740
ESER: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in 
the purchase price paid for purchasing services.
0.430 0.744
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.660 
Explained Variance 56.22%
Table 5-5: Reliability Analysis: Reduction in Purchase Price Scale
The factor analysis conducted for the auction application (power based 
bargaining) scale revealed two factors (see Appendix D.8), questions 9-11 and Q19
loaded on one factor while questions 15 and 17 loaded on another factor. According to 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2000): “If two variables load on a factor, then whether or not it is 
reliable depends on the pattern of correlations of these two variables with each other and 
with other variables. If the two variables are highly correlated with each other (say, 
r>0.7) and relatively uncorrelated with other variables, the factor maybe reliable.”
Bivariate correlation was conducted on Q15 and Q17 (see Appendix D.9). The 
analysis showed that Q15 and Q17 are not highly correlated with each other (r=0.22, 
p=0.026); therefore, Q15 and Q17 were deleted. Reliability analysis was re-conducted 
using Q9, Q10, Q11 and Q19 (see Appendix D.10). Table 5-6 summarizes the reliability 
analysis results for the auction application (power based bargaining) construct. The items 
loading ranged between 0.58-0.92 and explained 56.7% of the variance in the data (see 
Appendix D.10). The coefficient alpha is 0.852 with an opportunity of improvement to 
0.905 by deleting Q19, but since the current value of the coefficient alpha is considered 
very good, the deletion was not necessary (see Appendix D.11).
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Factor





Q9. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we 
buy production material and components.
0.739 0.858
Q10. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we 
buy MRO.
0.846 0.912
Q11. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we 
buy services.
0.829 0.921





Table 5-6: Reliability Analysis: Auction Application (Power Based Bargaining) Scale
As indicated in Appendix D.12, the factor analysis conducted for the auction 
application (collaborative problem solving) scale revealed two factors. Questions 12-14 
and Q18 loaded on one factor while question 16 loaded on another factor. Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2000) warned of factors consisting of one item; therefore Q16 was deleted
(see Appendix D.13). The factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, which 
indicated the scale was reliable with coefficient alpha equal to 0.737. The opportunity to 
improve coefficient alpha by deleting Q12 was minimal (<0.05) so the item was kept (see 
Appendix D.14). The items explained 56.6% of the variance in the data.
Factor





Q12. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we 
buy production material and components.
0.306 0.508
Q13. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we 
buy MRO.
0.691 0.873
Q14. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we 
buy services.
0.693 0.883
Q18. We use online reverse auctions to identify new long-term 
partnering suppliers. 0.453 0.682
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.737
Explained Variance 56.616%
Table 5-7: Reliability Analysis: Collaborative Problem Solving Scale
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The factor analysis conducted for the successful event implementation scale 
revealed two factors (see Appendix D.15). Questions 20, 21 and 25 loaded on one factor 
while questions 22 and 23 loaded on another factor. Bivariate correlation was conducted 
on Q22 and Q23 (see Appendix D.16). The analysis showed that Q22 and Q23 are not 
highly correlated with each other (r=0.408, p=0.000); therefore, Q22 and Q23 were 
deleted. Reliability analysis was re-conducted using Q20, Q21 and Q24. The factor 
analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, which indicated the scale was indeed 
reliable with coefficient alpha of 0.712. Major improvement in coefficient alpha was 
possible with the deletion of Q20; therefore, the item was deleted (see Appendix D.18).
Table 5-8 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the auction application 
(power-based bargaining) construct. The item loadings were high (0.938) and explained 







21. We are satisfied with our savings using online reverse 
auctions. 0.758 0.938





Table 5-8: Reliability Analysis: Successful Event Implementation Scale
The factor analysis conducted for the attribute of the alliance (trust) scale revealed 
one factor. Table 5-9 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the attribute of the 
alliance (trust) construct (the scores for Q26 were reversed to assure uniformity in 
positive factor loading across the construct). Each of the three items exhibited high factor 
loading, ranging from 0.739 to 0.796. The items explained 59.5% of the variance in the 
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data (see Appendix D.21). The factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, 
which indicated the scale was indeed reliable with coefficient alpha of 0.646. 
Improvement in coefficient alpha was not possible with the deletion of any item; 
therefore, all the items were retained (see Appendix D.22).
Factor





Q25. We trust that our strategic supplier alliances will be 
beneficial to our business. 0.433 0.739
Q26. We do not get an equitable (fair) deal from our suppliers in 
these alliances. (Reverse Scored) 0.481 0.777
Q27. The relationships with our suppliers are marked by a high 
degree of harmony. 0.501 0.796
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.646
Explained Variance 59.472%
Table 5-9: Reliability Analysis: Attribute of the Alliance (Trust)
The factor analysis conducted for the attribute of the alliance (commitment) scale 
revealed one factor. Table 5-10 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the attribute 
of the alliance (commitment) construct. Each of the three items exhibited high factor 
loading, ranging from 0.748 to 0.801. The items explained 61% of the variance in the 
data (see Appendix D.23). The factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, 
which indicated the scale was indeed reliable with coefficient alpha of 0.656. 
Improvement in coefficient alpha was not possible with the deletion of any item; 
therefore, all the items were retained (see Appendix D.24).
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Factor





Q28. We would like to discontinue buying from our current 
suppliers. (Reverse Scored) 
0.455 0.748
Q29. We are very committed to buying from our current suppliers. 0.499 0.793





Table 5-10: Reliability Analysis: Attribute of the Alliance (Commitment)
The factor analysis conducted for the attribute of the alliance (interdependence)
scale revealed one factor; Table 5-11 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the 
construct. Each of the three items exhibited high factor loading, ranging from 0.696 to 
0.890. The items explained 76.7% of the variance in the data (see Appendix D.25). The 
factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, which indicated the scale was 
indeed reliable with coefficient alpha of 0.754. While the deletion of Q31 would increase 
the coefficient alpha, the increase was rather minimal, and since the value of alpha of 
0.754 is considered respectable (DeVellis 1991); the item was retained.
Factor





Q31. It would be very easy to terminate the relationship with any 
supplier and establish another strategic supplier. (Reverse Scored) 0.440 0.696
Q32. The time to establish another new strategic supplier 
partnership would be extremely long. 0.637 0.868
Q33. The cost to establish another new strategic supplier 
partnership would be extremely high. 0.689 0.890
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.754
Explained Variance 76.699%
Table 5-11: Reliability Analysis: Attribute of the Alliance (Interdependence)
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The factor analysis conducted for the attribute of the alliance (coordination) scale 
revealed one factor (see Appendix D.27). The factor analysis was followed by a 
reliability analysis that revealed a coefficient alpha of 0.71. Improvement in coefficient 
alpha to a value of 0.901 was possible with the deletion of Q36; therefore Q36 was 
deleted and the remaining two items had a high inter-correlation of r=0.821 (see 
Appendix D.30). A second factor analysis was conducted where the items formed one 
factor with loadings of 0.955 for both items. The factor explained 91.253% of the 
variance in the data (see Appendix D.29). Table 5-12 summarizes the reliability analysis 
results for the attribute of the alliance (coordination) construct. 
Factor





Q34. Our activities with our suppliers are well coordinated. 0.825 0.955
Q35. Programs at our company are well coordinated with 
our suppliers. 0.825 0.95
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.901
Explained Variance 91.253%
Table 5-12: Reliability Analysis: Attribute of the Alliance (Coordination)
The factor analysis conducted for the communication behavior (information 
quality) scale revealed one factor. Table 5-13 summarizes the reliability analysis results 
for the communication behavior (information quality) construct. Each of the five items 
exhibited high factor loading, ranging from 0.77 to 0.93. The items explained 74.3% of 
the variance in the data (see Appendix D.32). The factor analysis was followed by a 
reliability analysis, which indicated the scale was indeed reliable with coefficient alpha of 
0.911. While the deletion of Q41 increased coefficient alpha, the increase was rather 
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minimal (0.02), and since the value of coefficient alpha of 0.911 is considered “very 
good” (DeVellis, 1991); therefore, the item was retained (see Appendix D.33).
Factor





Q37. To what extent do you feel that your company 
communication with your suppliers is timely? 0.765 0.851
Q38. To what extent do you feel that your company 
communication with your suppliers is accurate?
0.811 0.887
Q39. To what extent do you feel that your company 
communication with your suppliers is adequate?
0.784 0.866
Q40. To what extent do you feel that your company 
communication with your suppliers is complete?
0.878 0.928
Q41. To what extent do you feel that your company 




Table 5-13: Reliability Analysis: Information Quality Scale
The factor analysis for the communication behavior (information participation) 
scale revealed one factor. Table 5-14 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the 
communication behavior (information participation) construct. Each of the four items 
exhibited high factor loading, ranging from 0.70 to 0.905. The items explained 64.1% of 
the variance in the data (see Appendix D.35). The factor analysis was followed by a 
reliability analysis, which indicated the scale was indeed reliable with coefficient alpha of 
0.807. While the deletion of Q47 increased the coefficient alpha, the increase was rather 
minimal (0.04), and since the coefficient alpha value of 0.807 is considered “very good”
(DeVellis 1991), the item was retained (see Appendix D.36).
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Factor





Q47. We actively seek advice, counsel, and information 
from our suppliers. 0.512 0.700
Q48. Our strategic suppliers participate in our planning 
and goal setting activities. 0.904 0.905
Q49. We participate in our suppliers’ planning and goal 
setting activities that are relevant to our strategic 
partnership.
0.690 0.833





Table 5-14: Reliability Analysis: Information Participation Scale
The factor analysis conducted for the communication behavior (information 
sharing) scale revealed two factor s: Q51 and Q52 loaded on one factor and Q53-Q57 
loaded on another factor (see Appendix D.37). 
Bivariate correlation was conducted on Q51 and Q52 (See Appendix D.38). The 
analysis showed that Q51 and Q52 are not highly correlated with each other (r=0.67); 
therefore, the items were deleted. A second factor analysis was conducted using Q53-
Q57, which revealed that Q56 had a low factor loading (0.27); therefore, the item was 
deleted. Table 5-15 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the communication 
behavior (information sharing) construct. Each of the four items exhibited high factor 
loading, ranging from 0.794 to 0.717. The items explained 64.4% of the variance in the 
data (see Appendix D.39). The factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, 
which indicated the scale was indeed reliable with a coefficient alpha of 0.80. 
Improvement in the coefficient alpha was not possible with the deletion of any item; 
therefore, all the items were retained (see Appendix D.40).
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Factor





Q53. We inform our suppliers in advance of changing needs. 0.641 0.794
Q54. In this relationship, it is expected that any information 
which might help the other party will be provided. 0.632 0.817
Q55. The parties are expected to keep each other informed 
about events or changes that might affect the other party. 0.617 0.797
Q57. Our Supplier keep us fully informed about issues that 
affect our business. 0.641 0.800
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.800
Explained Variance 64.375%
Table 5-15: Reliability Scale: Information Sharing
The factor analysis for the conflict resolution scale revealed three factors as 
expected: Q44 and Q45 loaded on a factor which represents the constructive conflict 
resolution techniques (persuasion and joint problem solving), Q43 and Q46 loaded on a
factor that represents destructive conflict resolution techniques (outside arbitration and 
harsh words), and Q42 loaded on a factor by itself that represents the conflict avoidance 
techniques (see Appendix D.34). The factor analysis results of having three factors agree 
with the findings of previous research (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Monczka et al. 1998). 
The measures for conflict resolution included five modes by which conflict could 
be resolved. These items were designed to cover a spectrum of conflict resolution modes 
as described in Chapter 3. Howell (1987) refers to this type of measurement as a “check 
list,” or composite scale, in which each item taps a different dimension of the construct. 
Hence, traditional reliability analysis is not appropriate (Mohr and Spekman 1994). 
Therefore, the five items (smooth over the problem, outside arbitration, persuasion, joint 
problem solving and harsh words) are treated as unitary items with no inter-correlation 
among these factors.
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The factor analysis conducted for the strategic supplier alliance scale revealed one 
factor. Table 5-16 summarizes the reliability analysis results for the strategic supplier 
alliance construct. Each of the five items exhibited high factor loading, ranging from 0.70 
to 0.83. The factors explained 61% of the variance in the data (see Appendix D.41).
The factor analysis was followed by a reliability analysis, which indicated the scale was 
indeed reliable with coefficient alpha of 0.832. Improvement in coefficient alpha was not 








Q58. In our strategic supplier alliances, the parties work together to 
solve problems. 0.703 0.830
Q59. Our suppliers are flexible to requests we make. 0.639 0.793
Q60. Our suppliers make an effort to help us during emergencies. 0.643 0.785
Q61. When an agreement is made, we can always rely on our 
suppliers to fulfill the requirements. 0.547 0.696
Q62. We are satisfied with our company strategic supplier alliances. 0.668 0.796
Cronbach’s Alpha 0.832
Explained Variance 61.023%
Table 5-16: Reliability Analysis: Strategic Supplier Alliance Scale
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5.5.2 Validity Analyses
Construct validity, which is defined broadly as “the extent to which an 
operationalization measures the concept it is supposed to measure” (Cook and Campbell
1979), has been singled-out by many researchers as a central issue in organizational 
research (Mitchell 1985; Webb and Weick 1979). The validity test describes the 
correctness of the data-gathering tool that, is if it is able to measure what it should 
measure. Hayes (1997) defines validity as “the degree to which evidence supports the 
inferences made from scores derived from measures, or the degree to which the scale 
measures what it is designed to measure.” Although validity has a broad definition 
(Jacoby 1978), for the purpose of this study, the convergent validity, the discriminate 
validity, and the validity of the content will be the only ones in focus.
Bagozzi, Phillips, and Lynn (1982) define convergent validity as “the degree to 
which two or more attempts to measure the same concept are in agreement”. The authors 
also define the discriminate validity as “the degree to which measures of distinct concepts 
differ”. Convergent and discriminate validity were assessed through correlation analyses, 
and since no objective criteria exist for measuring the validity of the content, it can be 
assumed based on the pre-test of the instrument. High correlations were expected to exist 
between items that are intended to measure the same construct and those items were 
expected to exhibit low correlations with items intended to measure different constructs
(Pearcy 2002).
The Pearson Product Moment correlations among items for each scale on the 
survey are presented in Appendix E. The correlations for the “auction design-format”
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scale were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.233 to 0.529 except the 
correlation between Q1 and Q3, which was significant with a value of 0.233 at α=0.05
(see Appendix E.1). The correlations for the “auction design - event organization” scale 
were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.45 to 0.58 (see Appendix 
E.2). The correlations for the “reduction in purchase” scale were all statistically 
significant at α=0.05 and ranged from 0.32 to 0.36 (see Appendix E.3). The correlations 
for the “auction application-power based bargaining” scale were all statistically 
significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.30 to 0.85 (see Appendix E.4). The correlations 
for the “auction application-collaborative problem solving” scale were all statistically 
significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.23 to 0.81 (see Appendix E.5). As illustrated in 
Appendix E.6, the correlations for the “successful event implementation” two-item scale 
was statistically significant with a value of 0.76 at α=0.01. The correlations for the 
“attribute of the alliance-trust” scale were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged 
from 0.35 to 0.44 (see Appendix E.7). The correlations for the “attribute of the alliance-
commitment” scale were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.38 to 
0.47 (see Appendix E.8). The correlations for the “attribute of the alliance-
interdependence” scale were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.38 to 
0.71 (see Appendix E.9). The correlation between the “attribute of the alliance-
coordination” scale two items was statistically significant with a value of 0.83 at α=0.01 
(see Appendix E.10). The correlations for the “communication behavior - information 
quality” scale were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.52 to 0.72 (see 
Appendix E.11). 
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The correlations for the “communication behavior - information participation” 
scale were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.38 to 0.75 (see 
Appendix E.12). The correlations for the “communication behavior – information 
sharing” scale were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.48 to 0.62 
(see Appendix E.13). Finally, the correlations for the “strategic supplier alliance” scale 
were all statistically significant at α=0.01 and ranged from 0.37 to 0.60 (see Appendix 
E.14).
The inter-correlations between scales are shown in Appendix E.15. As expected, 
the correlations between different scales were below 0.7 except for the correlations 
between the “auction application-power based bargaining” and the “auction application-
collaborative problem solving” scales (-0.73). With respect to this high negative 
correlation, it would be expected that a company would use online reverse auctions either 
as a power based bargaining tool or as a collaborative problem-solving tool. 
The steps to assure reliability and validity of the measures resulted in the deletion 
of some items of the survey. Table 5-17 summarizes the components of each scale after 
the scale purification through reliability and validity testing.
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Q1. Auctions where suppliers can see others’ bids are effective in 
reducing purchase prices (open-bid).
Q2. Auctions where suppliers only know they have been outbid are 
effective in reducing purchase prices (sealed-bid). (Reverse Scored)
Q3. Multi-round sealed bid auctions are more effective than multi-
round open bids in reducing the purchasing prices.
Q4. Multi-round open-bid auctions are more effective than multi-
round sealed bids in reducing the purchasing prices.  (Reverse Scored)
Auction Design
(Event Organization)
Q6. Auctions organized in-house are more effective than auctions 
organized with the help of an online reverse auction service provider 
(market maker) in reducing purchasing prices.
Q7. Auctions organized with the help on an online auction service 
provider (like Trade-Partners or Freemarkets) are effective in reducing 
purchase prices. (Reverse Scored)
Q8. Auctions organized with the help on an online auction service 
provider (like Trade-Partners or Freemarkets) are more effective than 




EPMC: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in the 
purchase price paid for purchasing production material and 
components.
EMRO: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in the 
purchase price paid for purchasing MRO.
ESER: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in the 




Q9. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we buy 
production material and components.
Q10. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we buy 
MRO.
Q11. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we buy 
services.





Q12. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we buy 
production material and components.
Q13. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we buy 
MRO.
Q14. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we buy 
services.





Q21. We are satisfied with our savings using online reverse auctions.
Q24. We are satisfied with our company online reverse auctions 
results.
Attribute of the 
Alliance
(Trust)
Q25. We trust that our strategic supplier alliances will be beneficial to 
our business.
Q26. We do not get an equitable (fair) deal from our suppliers in these 
alliances. (Reverse Scored)
Q27. The relationships with our suppliers are marked by a high degree 
of harmony.
Attribute of the 
Alliance
(Commitment)
Q28. We would like to discontinue buying from our current suppliers. 
(Reverse Scored)
Q29. We are very committed to buying from our current suppliers.
Q30. We have minimal commitment to our suppliers. (Reverse 
Scored)
Attribute of the 
Alliance
(Interdependence)
Q31. It would be very easy to terminate the relationship with any 
supplier and establish another strategic supplier. (Reverse Scored)
Q32. The time to establish another new strategic supplier partnership 
would be extremely long.
Q33. The cost to establish another new strategic supplier partnership 
would be extremely high.
Attribute of the 
Alliance
(Coordination)
Q34. Our activities with our suppliers are well coordinated.





Q37. To what extent do you feel that your company communication 
with your suppliers is timely?
Q38. To what extent do you feel that your company communication 
with your suppliers is accurate?
Q39. To what extent do you feel that your company communication 
with your suppliers is adequate?
Q40. To what extent do you feel that your company communication 
with your suppliers is complete?
Q41. To what extent do you feel that your company communication 
with your suppliers is credible?
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Conflict Resolution
VIII. Assuming that some conflict exists over program and policy 
issues and how the relationship with your supplier is executed, 
how frequently are the following methods used to resolve such 
conflict? (1=Never, 7=Occasionally)
Q42. Smooth over the problem
Q43. Outside arbitration
Q44. Persuasive attempts by either party
Q45. Joint problem solving





Q47. We actively seek advice, counsel, and information from our 
suppliers.
Q48. Our strategic suppliers participate in our planning and goal 
setting activities.
Q49. We participate in our suppliers’ planning and goal setting 
activities that are relevant to our strategic partnership.





Q53. We inform our suppliers in advance of changing needs.
Q54. In this relationship, it is expected that any information which 
might help the other party will be provided.
Q55. The parties are expected to keep each other informed about 
events or changes that might affect the other party.




Q58. In our strategic supplier alliances, the parties work together to 
solve problems.
Q59. Our suppliers are flexible to requests we make.
Q60. Our suppliers make an effort to help us during emergencies.
Q61. When an agreement is made, we can always rely on our suppliers 
to fulfill the requirements.
Q62. We are satisfied with our company strategic supplier alliances.
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5.6 Hypotheses Testing
5.6.1 Scale Descriptive Analyses
Descriptive statistics for each scale were obtained before hypotheses testing; 
Appendix F summarizes the minimums/maximums, means, standard deviations, and 
variances for each scale. 
The respondents’ companies appeared to prefer to use open-bid auctions more 
than sealed bid-auctions. The means for the open-bid auction format items were 6.07 and 
5.41, while the means for the items intended to measure the preference of the sealed-bid 
format auction were 2.92 and 4.41. Similarly the respondents seemed to prefer to 
organize auctions with the help of online auction service providers (like TradingPartners 
or Freemarkets). The mean for the item measuring the preference to use online auction 
service providers was 5.78 while those for the items that measure the preference to 
organize auctions in-house were 3.56 and 4.51.
The data provided clear support for the published literature that online reverse 
auctions result in price reduction. The average of savings range was 12.9%-16.9% with a 
minimum of 0% and maximum of 71%.
The respondents gave mixed responses about the use of the online reverse auction 
as a power-based bargaining tool or a collaborative problem solving tool. With respect to 
production material and components, respondents obviously preferred to use the auctions 
as a collaborative tool. The mean of the item measuring using auction as a collaborative 
problem solving tool was 5.18, while it was 3.90 for the item measuring the auction as a 
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power based bargaining tool. With respect to MROs and services, respondents did not 
seem to have a preference on the use of online reverse auctions application. The means of 
the items measuring the use of auctions as a power based bargaining tool were (4.35 and 
4.2) for MROs and services while those for the items measuring the use of auctions as a 
collaborative problem solving tool were (4.1 and 4.1) for MROs and services. But 
respondents gave clear support (mean of 5.94) to the notion that companies use online 
reverse auctions to pressure their suppliers to reduce purchase prices (an indication of the 
auction’s use as a power based bargaining tool). 
The data provided clear satisfaction with respect to the savings from using online 
reverse auctions. The mean for the items measuring the successful event implementation 
ranged between 5.70 and 5.84.
The data provided positive support for the importance of the attributes of the 
relationship. The means for items which comprised the trust scale ranged from 5.34-6.26.
The means for items which comprised the commitment scale ranged from 4.49-5.14. The 
means for items which comprised the interdependence scale ranged from 4.46-5.30. The 
means for items which comprised the coordination scale ranged from 5.18-5.43.
The data provided positive support for the importance of the communication 
behavior (information quality, participation, and sharing) in the strategic alliance. The 
means for items which comprised the information quality scale ranged from 5.23-5.77. 
The means for items which comprised the information participation scale ranged from 
4.57-5.89. The means for items which comprised the information sharing scale ranged 
from 5.07-6.03.
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The data also provided positive support for the importance of using constructive 
conflict resolution techniques and clear support for not using destructive and avoidance 
conflict resolution techniques. The means for the items measuring constructive conflict 
resolution techniques ranged from 4.74-6.03. The means for the items measuring 
destructive conflict resolution techniques ranged from 1.54-2.23. The respondents’ were 
indifferent about the use of avoidance conflict resolution techniques (mean of 4.16).
Finally, respondents appeared to be satisfied with their strategic supplier alliances. The 
means of the items measuring strategic supplier alliance scale ranged from 5.51-6.25.
5.6.2 Hypotheses Tests
Eleven of the nineteen hypotheses were supported by the data. A summary of the
results of the hypotheses tests appears in Tables 5-18 and 5-19.
Various statistical procedures were used to analyze the results of the survey, 
including t-test, bi-variate correlations, and multiple linear regressions. Bi-variate 
correlation allows the researcher to determine the size and direction of the association 
between two variables (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996). A t-test assesses the statistical 
significance of the difference between two sample means for a single dependent variable
(Hair et al. 1998). Multiple linear regression assesses the relationship between one 
dependent variable and the independent variables. The objective is to predict the changes 
in the dependent variable in response to changes in the independent variables. More 
details of the various statistical techniques that were used to analyze each hypothesis are 
provided with each test.
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Table 5-18: Summary of Hypotheses Tests Supported by the Data
H1: Using online reverse 
auctions, the reduction in 
purchase prices is more 
likely to be higher in the 
open-bid auction format 
than the sealed-bid format.
H3a: When purchasing 
production material and 
components, a positive, 
significant relationship will 
exist between the type of 
the purchase and the 
purpose of using online 
reverse auctions to reduce 
purchase prices.
H3b: When purchasing 
MROs, a positive, 
significant relationship will 
exist between the type of 
the purchase and the 
purpose of using online 
reverse auctions to reduce 
purchase prices.
H3c: When purchasing 
services, a positive, 
significant relationship will 
exist between the type of 
the purchase and the 
purpose of using online 
reverse auctions to reduce 
purchase prices.
H4a: When purchasing 
production material and 
components, a negative, 
significant relationship will 
exist between the use of 
online reverse auctions for 
the purpose of a short-term 
relationship and the purpose 
of developing/maintaining 
long-term relationships.
H4b: When purchasing 
MROs, a negative, 
significant relationship will 
exist between the use of 
online reverse auctions for 
the purpose of a short-term 
relationship and the purpose 
of developing/maintaining 
long-term relationships.
H4c: When purchasing 
services, a negative, 
significant relationship will 
exist between the use of 
online reverse auctions for 
the purpose of a short-term 
relationship and the purpose 
of developing/maintaining 
long-term relationships.
H7a: Successful strategic 
supplier alliances are 
associated with high levels 
of commitment, trust, 
coordination and
interdependence.
H7b: Successful strategic 
supplier alliances are 
associated with high levels
of (a) information sharing 
and (b) information quality 
and (c) information 
participation.
H7c: A positive, significant 
relationship will exist 
between the success of the 
strategic alliance and (a) 
high use of constructive 
conflict resolution 
techniques, (b) low use of 
conflict avoidance 
techniques and (c) low use 
of destructive resolution 
techniques
H9: A positive, significant 
relation exists between 
buyer-supplier strategic 
alliance, and the buyer 
perception of a successful 
online reverse auction 
event.
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Table 5-19: Summary of Hypotheses Tests not Supported by the Data
H2: With the objective of 
using online reverse 
auctions to reduce 
purchase prices, buyers are 
more likely to prefer to 
organize the auction event
in-house than with the 
help of a market maker.
H5a: When purchasing 
production material and 
components, purchasers will 
be more likely to use online 
reverse auction for the 




H5b: When purchasing 
MROs, purchasers will be 
more likely to use online 
reverse auction for the 




H5c: When purchasing 
services, purchasers will 
be more likely to use 
online reverse auction for 




H6a: Using online reverse 
auctions as a collaborative 
problem solving tool is 
associated with high levels 
of trust, commitment, 
coordination and 
interdependence.
H6b: Using online reverse 
auctions as a collaborative 
problem solving tool is 
associated with high levels 
of buyer-supplier (a) 
information sharing (b) 
information quality and (c) 
information participation.
H6c: Using online reverse 
auctions as a collaborative 
problem solving tool is 
associated with (a) high 
use of constructive 
conflict resolution 
techniques, (b) low use of 
conflict avoidance 
techniques and (c) low use 
of destructive resolution 
techniques.
H8: A positive, significant 
relation exists between 
reducing purchase prices and 
the buyer perception of a 
successful online reverse 
auction event.
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The Fit between Auction Design and Reduction in Purchase Price
H1 was supported by the data; the hypothesis stated that “using online reverse 
auctions, the reduction in purchase prices is more likely to be higher in the open-bid 
auction format than in the sealed-bid format.” For statistical analysis, the null hypothesis 
stated that “using online reverse auctions, there is no difference in the reduction in 
purchase prices between the open-bid auction format and the sealed-bid format,” while 
the alternative hypothesis is the hypothesis stated earlier. The data rejected the null 
hypothesis (P<0.05) and therefore the data claim support for the alternative hypothesis.
As illustrated in Table 5-20, a one-tailed t-test revealed significant mean 
difference between the reduction in purchase prices in the open-bid auction format and 
the sealed-bid format through evaluating the difference (QTEST) between the sum of Q1
and Q4 (open bid) and Q2 and Q3 (sealed bid).
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
N Mean StDev SE Mean 95% Lower Bound T P
QTEST 85 4.32 4.63 0.50 3.48 8.59 0.000
QTEST=(Q1+Q4)-(Q2+Q3)
Table 5-20: Test of H1
Further analyses of hypotheses H1-H5 and H8-H9 were conducted through 
filtering the data into groups as shown in Table 5-21. The data were divided into two 
groups by the annual sales volume, annual purchasing volume, number of employees in 
the company, number of purchasing employees in the company, and the job title 
(position) of the respondent. Table 5-22 illustrates the online reverse auction experience 
associated with each group identified in Table 5-21. As illustrated in Appendix G.1, a 
one-tailed t-test supported H1 for all the different groups.
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Several other alternative approaches for analysis were possible but not 
implemented in this study. The data could have been clustered into more than two groups 
for each criterion. For example, the annual sales volume could have been clustered into 
four groups (less than 100 million, 100-499 million, 500-999 million, and one billion 
dollars or above), but due to the low number of data points that might show up in some of 
these categories, the researches elected to cluster the data into two groups. 
Similarly, for certain hypotheses (as shown later in this chapter), the clustering 
criteria (annual sales volume, annual purchasing volume, number of employees in the 
company, number of purchasing employees in the company, and the job title/position of 
the respondent) were not included as variables in the regression models for several 
reasons: (1) the researcher did not find enough support in the published literature to 
justify such activity, (2) the research followed the Crown (1998) guidelines in splitting 
and analyzing the data for each group instead of using these criteria as independent 
variables within the regression model. 
Criteria Code
Annual sales
(Year 2004 in US Dollars)
Less than One Billion Dollars




(Year 2004 in US Dollars)
Less than $500 Million
Equal or More than $500 Million
1
2
No. of Employees Less than 1000 Employees
Equal or More than 1000 Employees
1
2
No. of Purchasing Employees Less than 20 Purchasing Employees
Equal or More than 20 Purchasing Employees
1
2
Job title Director or VP
Manager or Senior Manager




Table 5-21: Filtering Data Criteria for Further Analysis
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Criteria N Mean Min Median Max
Less than One Billion Dollars 31 15 1 6 100Annual Sales 
Volume (2004) Equal or More than One Billion 
Dollars
61 212 1 20 5000
Less than $500 Million 37 14 1 6 100Annual Purchasing 
Volume Equal or More than $500 Million 55 234 1 20 5000
Less than 1000 Employees 32 13 1 8 100
No. of Employees Equal or More than 1000 
Employees
60 217 1 20 5000
Less than 20 Purchasing 
Employees
34 59 1 6 1600
No. of Purchasing 
Employees Equal or More than 20 
Purchasing Employees
58 197 1 20 5000
Table 5-22: Companies’ Experience in Using Reverse Auctions
H2 was not supported by the data; the alternative hypothesis stated that “with the 
objective of using online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices, buyers are more 
likely to prefer to organize the auction event in-house than with the help of a market 
maker.” The null hypothesis stated that “with the objective of using online reverse 
auctions to reduce purchase prices, there is no difference in the buyers’ preference to 
organize the auction event in-house or with the help of a market maker.” Since the P-
value is below 0.05, the data rejected the null hypothesis and therefore the research data
claim support for the alternative hypothesis (but in the opposite direction).
As illustrated in Table 5-23, a one tailed t-test revealed a significant mean 
difference between organizing auctions in-house and with the help of a market maker, but
in the opposite direction of the hypothesis. The negative mean of the difference between 
the in-house item (Q6) and the average of the market maker items (Q7 and Q8) indicates 
that buyers prefer organizing online reverse auction events with the help of market maker 
than organizing the auction event in-house.
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Test Value = 0 versus > 0
N Mean StDev SE Mean 95% Lower Bound T P
QTEST 85 -1.65 2.77 0.30 -2.15 -5.49 1.000
Test Value = 0 versus <0 
N Mean StDev SE Mean 95% Lower Bound T P
QTEST 85 -1.65 2.77 0.30 -1.15 -5.49 0.000
Table 5-23: Test of H2
Further analysis of hypothesis H2 was conducted through dividing the data into 
groups as shown in Table 5-21. The analysis failed to support H2 for any group, but the 
results revealed that buyers prefer to organize auction events with the help of a market 
maker rather than organizing them in-house (see Appendices G.2 and G.3). 
The Fit between Purchase Type and Reduction in Purchase Price
H3a-c was supported by the data; the alternative hypothesis stated that “when 
purchasing X, a positive, significant relationship will exist between the type of the 
purchase and the purpose of using online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices,
where X can be production material and components, MROs, or services.” As illustrated 
in Table 5-24, a one tailed t-test revealed a significant positive mean difference between 
the type of the purchase and the purpose of using online reverse auctions to reduce 
purchase prices.
For the purpose of the statistical analysis, the null hypothesis stated that “when 
purchasing X, no significant relationship will exist between the type of the purchase and 
the purpose of using online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices, where X can be 
production material and components, MROs, or services.” While the alternative 
hypothesis stated that ““when purchasing X, a positive, significant relationship will exist 
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between the type of the purchase and the purpose of using online reverse auctions to 
reduce purchase prices, where X can be production material and components, MROs or 
services”. Since the P-value is less than 0.05, the data rejected the null hypotheses and 
claim support for the alternative hypotheses.
The mean for question EPMC - “the use of online reverse auctions has led to a 
decrease in the purchase price paid for purchasing production material and components” 
was 12.86%. The mean for question EMRO – “the use of online reverse auctions has led 
to a decrease in the purchase price paid for purchasing MRO” was 16.86%. The mean for 
question ESER, “the use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in the purchase 
price paid for purchasing services” was 13.45%.
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
N Mean StDev T P
EPMC 81 0.1286 0.0653 17.73 0.000
EMRO 79 0.1688 0.1058 12.95 0.000
ESER 76 0.1345 0.0825 12.85 0.000
Table 5-24: Test of H3
Further analysis of hypotheses H3a-c was conducted through clustering the data 
into groups as shown in Table 5-21. The data was divided into groups by the annual sales 
volume, annual purchasing volume, number of employees in the company, number of 
purchasing employees in the company, and the job title (position) of the respondent. As 
illustrated in Appendix G.4-G.6, a one-tailed t-test supported H3a-c for all the different 
groups.
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The Fit between the Product Type and the Auction Application
H4a was supported by the data; the hypothesis stated that “when purchasing 
production material and components, a negative, significant relationship will exist 
between the use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship 
and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.” As illustrated in 
Table 5-25, a negative significant correlation exists between the use of online reverse 
auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of 
developing/maintaining long-term relationships when purchasing production material and 
components.
For statistical analysis, the null hypothesis stated that “when purchasing 
production material and components, a positive, significant relationship will exist 
between the use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship 
and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.” While the 
alternative hypothesis state that “when purchasing production material and components, a 
negative, significant relationship will exist between the use of online reverse auctions for 
the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-
term relationships.” Since the Pearson correlation value was significant and negative, the 
data rejected the null hypothesis and supported the alternative hypothesis.
Table 5-25: Test of H4a
Q9 Q12
Q9 Pearson Correlation 1 -.510(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 94 94
Q12 Pearson Correlation -.510(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 94 94
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
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Further analysis of hypothesis H4a was conducted through dividing the data into 
groups as shown in Appendix G.7. The hypothesis was supported regardless of the sales 
volume, purchasing volume, number of employees, or number of purchasing employees. 
When the data were analyzed based on the job title (position) of the respondent within the 
company, respondents at the middle and senior management level supported the 
hypothesis while buyers and senior buyers did not support the hypothesis.
H4b was supported by the data; the hypothesis stated that “when purchasing 
MROs, a negative, significant relationship will exist between the use of online reverse 
auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of 
developing/maintaining long-term relationships.” As illustrated in Table 5-26, a negative 
significant correlation exists between the use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of 
a short-term relationship and for the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term 
relationships when purchasing MROs. The hypothesis was also supported for all different 
groups when the data was divided according to Table 5-21 (see Appendix G. 8). 
 For statistical analysis, the null hypothesis stated that “when purchasing MROs, a 
positive, significant relationship will exist between the use of online reverse auctions for 
the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-
term relationships.” While the alternative hypothesis state that “when purchasing MROs, 
a negative, significant relationship will exist between the use of online reverse auctions 
for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining 
long-term relationships.” Since the Pearson correlation value was significant and 
negative, the data rejected the null hypothesis and supported the alternative.
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Table 5-26: Test of H4b
Q10 Q13
Q10 Pearson Correlation 1 -.798(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 91 90
Q13 Pearson Correlation -.798(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 90 90
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
H4c was supported by the data; the hypothesis stated that “when purchasing 
services, a negative, significant relationship will exist between the use of online reverse 
auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of 
developing/maintaining long-term relationships.” As illustrated in Table 5-27, a negative 
significant correlation exists between the use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of 
a short-term relationships and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term 
relationships when purchasing services. The hypothesis was also supported for all 
different groups when dividing the data according to Table 5-21 (see Appendix G.9).
For the purpose of the statistical analysis, the null hypothesis stated that “when 
purchasing services, a positive, significant relationship will exist between the use of 
online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of 
developing/maintaining long-term relationships.” While the alternative hypothesis state 
that “when purchasing services, a negative, significant relationship will exist between the 
use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose 
of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.” Since the Pearson correlation value 
was significant and negative, the data rejected the null hypothesis and supported the 
alternative.
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Table 5-27: Test of H4c
Q11 Q14
Q11 Pearson Correlation 1 -.887(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 85 83
Q14 Pearson Correlation -.887(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 83 84
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
H5a was not supported by the data; the hypothesis (for statistical analysis 
purposes, this is the alternative hypothesis) stated that “when purchasing production 
material and components, purchasers will be more likely to use online reverse auctions 
for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining 
long-term relationships.” For statistical purposes, the null hypothesis stated that “when 
purchasing production material and components, purchasers are equally likely to use 
online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the purpose of 
developing/maintaining long-term relationships.”
As illustrated in Table 5-28, a one tailed t-test revealed a significant mean 
difference between the use of online reverse auction for the purpose of a short-term 
relationships, and developing/maintaining long-term relationships, but in the opposite 
direction of the hypothesis. The negative mean of the difference (QTEST), between the 
short-term contract goal (Q9) and the long-term contract goal (Q12) when buying 
production items and material, indicates that buyers will be more likely to use online 
reverse auctions for the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships than 
short-term relationships. Further analysis of the hypothesis by dividing the data into 
groups according to Table 5-21 failed to support the hypothesis (H5a) for any group (see 
Appendix G.10). Further analysis (see Appendix G.11) showed that all groups based on 
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the company size and all levels of employees within the purchasing organization support 
the opposite direction of the hypothesis which is “when purchasing production material 
and components, purchasers will be more likely to use online reverse auctions for the 
purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships rather than short-term 
relationships”. 
Table 5-28: Test of H5a
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
N Mean StDev SE Mean 95% Lower Bound T P
QTEST 94 -1.27 3.13 0.323 -1.81 -3.95 1.000
Test Value = 0 versus <0 
N Mean StDev SE Mean 95% Lower Bound T P
QTEST 94 -1.27 3.13 0.323 -0.74 -3.95 0.000
**  QTEST=Q9-Q12
H5b was not supported by the data; the hypothesis (for statistical analysis 
purposes, this is the alternative hypothesis) stated that “when purchasing MROs, 
purchasers will be more likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-
term relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.” 
For statistical purposes, the null hypothesis stated that “when purchasing MROs, 
purchasers are equally likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-
term relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.”
As illustrated in Table 5-29, the research failed to reject the null hypothesis
(QTEST=0) since P>0.05. The one tailed t-test did not reveal any significant mean 
difference between the use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of short-term 
relationship and developing/maintaining long-term relationships when buying MROs. 
The buyers’ responses indicated an equal likelihood of using online reverse auctions for 
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the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships and short-term 
relationships when purchasing MROs.
Further analysis of the hypothesis by filtering the data into groups according to 
Table 5-21 supported the hypothesis for smaller size companies (less than one billion
dollars in sales volume, less than $500 million in purchasing volume, less than 1,000 
employees, and/or less than 20 purchasing employees). Respondents from larger size 
companies failed to support the hypothesis H5b (see Appendix G.12 and G.13).
Table 5-29: Test of H5b
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
N Mean StDev SE Mean 95% Lower Bound T P
QTEST 90 0.256 3.69 0.389 -0.39 0.66 0.256
**  QTEST=Q10-Q13
H5c was not supported by the data; the hypothesis (for statistical analysis 
purposes, this is the alternative hypothesis) stated that “when purchasing services, 
purchasers will be more likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-
term relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.”
For statistical purposes, the null hypothesis stated that “when purchasing services, 
purchasers are equally likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-
term relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.”
As illustrated in Table 5-30, the research failed to reject the null hypothesis
(QTEST=0) since P>0.05. The one tailed t-test did not reveal any significant mean 
difference between the use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of short-term 
relationships and developing/maintaining long-term relationships when buying services.
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The buyers’ responses indicated an equal likelihood of using online reverse auctions for 
the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships and short-term 
relationships when purchasing services.
Table 5-30: Test of H5c
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
N Mean StDev SE Mean 95% Lower Bound T P
QTEST 83 0.096 3.88 0.426 -0.613 0.23 0.411
**  QTEST=Q11-Q14
Further analysis of the hypothesis by dividing the data into groups (according to 
Table 5-21) failed to support the hypothesis (H5c) for most of the groups except for 
respondents that reported to be working for small companies. As shown in Appendix 
G.14, the hypothesis (H5c) was supported for companies with annual sales less than one 
billion dollars, purchasing volume less than $500 million, total number of employees less 
than 1000 and with less than 20 employees in purchasing.
The Fit between Strategic Supplier Alliance and Auction Application
Multiple linear regressions were used as the statistical analysis techniques for H6 
a-c and H7a-c. Before proceeding to the final regression analysis for these hypotheses, 
the data were examined for outliers and assumptions. The following is an explanation of 
the criteria and methods used to validate the regression assumptions.
Outliers
Demaris (2004) defined outliers as extreme observations that are noticeably “out 
of step” with the trend shown by the majority of the data points. The study used both 
graphical and statistical measures to identify outliers. The graphic inspection using the 
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residual plots was coupled with examination of the assumptions. The study applied four 
diagnostic measures simultaneously in order to achieve the best results: the leverage 
statistic (h), Cook’s distance (D), residuals plot analysis, and Casewise diagnostic for 
outliers if its standard score is ±3.0 or beyond. 
The leverage statistic, h, also called the hat-value, is used to identify cases which 
influence the regression model more than others. The leverage statistic varies from 0 (no 
influence on the model) to 1 (completely determines the model). A rule of thumb is that 
cases with leverage under 0.2 are not a problem, but if a case has leverage over 0.5, the 
case has undue leverage and should be examined for the possibility of measurement error 
or the need to model such cases separately.
Cook's distance, D, is another measure of the influence of a case. Cook's distance 
measures the effect of deleting a given observation. Observations with larger D values 
than the rest of the data are those which have unusual leverage. A rule of thumb is to 
identify observations with a Cook’s distance of 1.0 or greater (Hair et al. 1998).
Assumptions
The major assumptions for multiple linear regression analysis were checked for 
each hypothesis: linearity, normality of the residuals, homoscedasticity, independence of 
the residuals and non-multicollinearity. Both graphical analysis and statistical tests (when 
applicable) were used in this study to assess whether a group of independent variables 
met these assumptions. 
The linearity of the relationship between dependent and independent variables 
represents the degree to which the change in the dependent variable is associated with the 
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independent variable (Hair et al. 1998). The linearity assumption was confirmed by 
plotting the residuals against the predictor variables and against the fitted values. The 
normality of the error term assumption was confirmed visually with a check of the 
histogram of the residuals and normal probability plot of the residuals, and statistically 
using the Kolmogorov-Smimov normality test.
The diagnosis for homoscedasticity (examining the constancy of the variance of 
the error terms) was made using a plot of the residuals against the fitted values and a plot 
of the absolute residuals against the fitted values. A homoscedastic model will display a 
cloud of dots, whereas lack of homoscedasticity will be characterized by a pattern such as 
a funnel shape, indicating greater error as the dependent increases. If nonconstancy is 
detected, a plot of the absolute residuals against each of the predictor variables may 
identify one or several of the predictor variables to which the magnitude of the error 
variability is related (Kutnerm, Nachtsheim, and Neter 2004 - Page 234). Also, if 
nonconstancy is detected, a formal statistical test, like White’s test, Barlett’s test or 
Levene’s test, is necessary to conclusively prove the existence of heteroscedasticity. If 
heteroscedasticity (the presence of unequal variances) is present, two remedies are 
available. If the violation can be attributed to one or more independent variable, the 
procedure of weighted least squares can be employed. Another solution is to follow 
variance stabilizing transformations that allow the transformed variables to be used 
directly in the regression model: inverse, square root, square, and logarithm (Hair et al. 
1998).
The assumption of the independence of the error terms was assessed through a 
plot of the residuals against the identification number that represents the order in which 
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the data were collected. The Pearson correlation coefficient (r) was also calculated 
between the predictors and the residuals to assure that residuals are uncorrelated with the 
independent variables.
Multicollinearity is defined as the extent to which a variable can be explained by 
other variables in the analysis (Hair et al. 1998). High correlations among two or more 
explanatory variables create the multicollinearity problem. Multicollinearity makes it 
impossible for the regression model to decompose the variation of the dependent variable 
that is due to one variable versus another. As a consequence, one gets highly unstable 
coefficients and t-statistics that fluctuate widely in magnitude (and even sign) depending 
upon which variables are included in the regression model (Crown 1998).
The non-multicollinearity assumption was assessed through the values of the 
Tolerance, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), Eigenvalue, Condition Index, Variance 
proportions and the correlation between the predictors. A rule of thumb is that the 
correlation between the independent variables should not exceed 0.7.
Tolerance is 1 - R2 for the regression of that independent variable on all the other 
independents, ignoring the dependent. There will be as many tolerance coefficients as 
there are independents. The higher the intercorrelation of the independents, the closer the 
tolerance will be to zero. As a rule of thumb, if a tolerance is less than 0.20, a problem 
with multicollinearity is indicated. When tolerance is close to 0, there is high 
multicollinearity of that variable with other independents and the regression coefficients 
will be unstable. The more the multicollinearity, the lower the tolerance, which leads to 
an increase in the standard error of the regression coefficients.
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Variance Inflation Factor, VIF is simply the reciprocal of tolerance: when VIF 
is high there is high multicollinearity. VIF >= 4 is an arbitrary but common cut-off 
criterion for deciding when a given independent variable displays "too much" 
multicollinearity: values above 4 suggest a multicollinearity problem. Some researchers 
use the more lenient cutoff of 5.0 or even 10.0 to signal when multicollinearity is a 
problem. It might be necessary to drop the variable with the highest VIF if 
multicollinearity is indicated and theory warrants.
Eigenvalue is a measure of the amount of variance contained in the correlation 
matrix so that the sum of the Eigenvalues is equal to the number of variables. Multiple 
Eigenvalues close to 0 indicate there may be a problem with multicollinearity and the 
condition indices should be examined as described below.
Condition indices and variance proportions: condition indices are used to flag 
excessive collinearity in the data. A condition index over 30 suggests serious collinearity 
problems and an index over 15 indicates possible collinearity problems. If a factor 
(component) has a high condition index, one looks in the variance proportions column. 
Criteria for "sizable proportion" vary among researchers, but the most common criterion 
is whether two or more variables have a variance partition of 0.50 or higher on a factor 
with a high condition index. If this is the case, these variables have high linear 
dependence and multicollinearity is a problem, with the effect that small data changes or 
arithmetic errors may translate into very large changes or errors in the regression 
analysis. It is possible for the rule of thumb for condition indices (no index over 30) to 
indicate multicollinearity, even when the rules of thumb for tolerance >0.20 or VIF < 4 
suggest no multicollinearity. Computationally, a "singular value" is the square root of an 
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Eigenvalue, and "condition indices" are the ratio of the largest singular values to each 
other singular value. Table 5-31 provides a summary of the visual and statistical tools 
used to test the regression model assumptions.
Table 5-31: Tests to Validate Regression Assumptions
Regression Assumption Testing Tool Comments (No problems)
Outliers Plot of residuals against fitted values
Cook’s Distance Below 1.0
Leverage statistic Below 0.2
Standard score value Below ±3.0
Normality of the 
Residuals
Histogram of the residuals
Normal probability plots
Kolmogorov-Smimov normality test
Independence of the error 
term
A plot of residuals versus order
Pearson correlation between the 
predictor(s) and the residuals
Should have no correlation
Multicollinearity Tolerance Greater than 0.2
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Less than 4.0
Eigenvalue Greater than 0.1
Condition Index Less than 30
Variance proportions Less than 0.5 for factors that 
has high condition index
Correlation between IVs Below 0.7
Linearity Plot residuals against predictor 
variables
Model will display a cloud of 
dots, whereas lack of linearity 
will be characterized by a 
pattern
Homoscedasticity Plot of residuals against fitted values 
Plot of absolute residuals against 
fitted values
Homoscedastic model will 
display a cloud of dots, whereas 
lack of homoscedasticity will 
be characterized by a pattern
Absolute residuals against each of 
the predictor variables
If nonconstancy is detected
Statistical test like White’s test, 
Barlett’s test or Levene’s test
If nonconstancy is detected
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Hypothesis 7a is used to illustrate the detailed investigation of the assumption of 
the regression model. Hypothesis 7a stated that “successful strategic supplier alliances are 
associated with high levels of commitment, trust, coordination, and interdependence.” 
There are four independent variables (trust, commitment, interdependence and 
coordination) and one dependent variable (supplier strategic alliance). The outliers’ 
analysis revealed two data points with a standard score beyond ±3, as shown in Figure 5-
























Figure 5-7: Plot of Residuals against Predicted Values for H7a
Table 5-32: H7a Outliers
Case Number Std. Residual SSA Predicted Value Residual
61 -3.742 4.20 6.2370 -2.03698
130 3.496 7.00 5.0969 1.90314
Further investigation of these two data points (see Table 5-33) revealed no error in coding 
the data and no error in measure. Since the Cook’s distance and the leverage value
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(measures of outliers’ influence on the regression model) were low, the two data points 
were deleted. 
Table 5-33: Cook's Distance and Leverage Stastic Value for H7a Outliers
Case Number Cook’s Distance Leverage Value
61 0.00011 0.01541
130 0.44540 0.12912
The normality of the error term assumption was confirmed visually with a check 
of the histogram of the residuals and the normal probability plot of the residuals, and 
statically using the Kolmogorov-Smimov normality test (shown in Table 5-34). As shown 


















Std. Dev. = 0.986
N = 143
Dependent Variable: SSA






















Figure 5-9: Normal P-P Plot of H7a Regression Standardized Residuals
Table 5-34: K-S Normality Test for H7a Regression Residuals
Kolmogorov-Smirnov(a)
Statistic df Sig.
Unstandardized Residual 0.072 143 0.07
The assumption of the independence of the error terms was assessed through a 
plot of the residuals against the identification number that represents the order in which 
the data was collected (shown in Figure 5-10). The Pearson correlation coefficient (r) 
were also calculated between the predictors and the residuals to assure that residuals are 















Residuals Versus the Order of the Data
(response is SSA)
 
Figure 5-10: H7a Test for Independence of the Residuals























**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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The non-multicollinearity assumption was assessed through the values of the 
Tolerance, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), Eigenvalue, Condition Index, and the 
Variance Proportions (shown in Table 5-36). The linearity assumption was confirmed 
using the residual plot against the predictor variables (shown in Figure 5-11).




























































































Figure 5-11: Plot of Residuals vs. IVs to Assess Linearity for H7a
The homoscedasticity assumption was tested using a plot of the residuals against 
the fitted values and a plot of the absolute residual against the fitted values (shown in 
Figure 5-12). The plot of the residuals against the fitted values indicated













































Figure 5-12: Homoscedasticity Visual Tests for H7a
The White test (White, 1980) is accomplished by first estimating the model with 
OLS and then saving the residuals. One then regresses the squares of the residuals on all
of the independent variables, their squares and cross products. The R-square (0.196) of 
this regression model is used to calculate n*R2=143*0.265=37.90, and this value is
compared to χ2(0.95, 14)=23.68 obtained from χ2 table. Since n*R2 > 2 )14,(αχ , the 
conclusion is that there is heteroscedasticity. 
Based on the above analysis, the study launched several remedies to correct the 
heteroscedasticity violation. First, transformations were done on the dependent variable 
and/or each independent variable. Such transformation methods as inverse, square root, 
square, and logarithms were tried on each variable but little or no improvement was 
found. Then, the study implemented Weighted Least Square (WLS) to re-estimate the 
regression function. The WLS procedure can be summarized in the following steps 
(DeMaris 2004):
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1. Run the regression of Y on X1, X2, X3, X4 and save the residuals, ei
2. Create the variable log 2ie
3. Regress log 2ie on X1, X2, X3, X4 and get the fitted values, 
2ˆlog ie
4. Exponentiate 2ˆlog ie  to recover 
2ˆie
5. Regress Y on X1, X2, X3, X4 via WLS using as weights 
2ˆ/1 ii ew =
Model Summaryb,c
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0.737a 0.544 0.531 0.84861
a. Predictors: (Constant), COORD, INTERDEP, TRUST, COMM
b. Dependent Variable: SSA
c.  Weighted Least Squares Regression – Weighted by W
ANOVAb,c
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a. Predictors: (Constant), COORD, INTERDEP, TRUST, COMM
b. Dependent Variable: SSA






Model B St. Error Beta t Sig.
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a.  Dependent Variable: SSA
b. Weighted Least Squares Regression – Weighted by W
Figure 5-13: H7a WLS Regression Output
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Figure 5-13 shows the WLS regression model for hypothesis H7a, which is 
similar to the non-weighted regression model (shown in Figure 5-14). A comparison of
the two models in Figure 5-13 and 5-14 revealed little difference between correspondent 
regression coefficients, suggesting that there was no need to re-estimate the standard 
deviation function and the weights based on the residuals for the weighted regression and 
that heteroscedasticity did not have a big impact on the estimated model in this research 
study.
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0.698a 0.487 0.473 0.49047
a. Predictors: (Constant), COORD, INTERDEP, TRUST, COMM
b. Dependent Variable: SSA
ANOVAb
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Model B St. Error Beta t Sig.
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a.  Dependent Variable: SSA
Figure 5-14: H7a OLS Regression Output
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H7a was partially supported by the data. As illustrated in Figure 5-13, all the 
independent variables are significant except interdependence. Based on the survey 
responses, successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of 
commitment, trust, and coordination.
Further analysis of H7a was conducted by grouping the data according to the 
number of online reverse auctions the responding company completed in the last 3 years.
Table 5-37 represents the regression coefficients for the different groups. The first 3
columns from the left represent all the respondents, respondents with auction experience
in general, and respondents with no auction experience. The last 2 columns represent
splitting the data from respondents with auction experience into two groups: no more
than 15 auctions in the last 3 years and more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years.  For 
further details of the regression models refer to Appendices G.15-G.18.







No More than 
15 Auctions
More than 15 
Auctions
Trust 0.249 *** 0.254 *** 0.249* --- 0.380***
Commitment 0.271*** 0.275*** 0.224* 0.281* 0.389***
Interdependence --- --- --- --- ---
Coordination 0.370*** 0.305*** 0.438*** 0.414*** ---
df 142 94 47 44 45
R2 0.544 0.527 0.432 0.526 0.549
    * p<0.10
  ** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
--- Not statistically significant
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As shown in Table 5-37, H7a was partially supported when splitting the data into 
2 groups: companies with auction experience and companies with no auction experience. 
All the independent variables are significant except interdependence. Based on the survey 
responses, successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of 
commitment, trust, and coordination regardless of the auction experience.
When splitting the responses from companies with auction experience into two 
groups, less than 15 auctions in the last 3 years and more than 15 auctions in the last 3
years, mixed results were obtained. Companies who completed less than 15 auctions in 
the last 3 years reported that successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with 
high levels of commitment and coordination while trust and interdependence were 
insignificant. Companies with experience of more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years 
reported that successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of trust 
and commitment while coordination and interdependence were insignificant.
H7b was fully supported by the data. As indicated in Figure 5-15, multiple linear 
regression supported the hypothesis that successful strategic supplier alliances are 




Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0.753a 0.568 0.558 5.14238
a. Predictors: (Constant), Quality, Participation, Sharing
b. Dependent Variable: SSA_SQUARE
Coefficientsa
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a. Predictors: (Constant), Quality, Participation, Sharing
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a. Dependent Variable: SSA_SQUARE
Figure 5-15: H7b Multiple Regression Output
The regression model was tested for outliers and assumptions. The visual and 
statistical tests revealed that there are no outliers and that all assumptions were met 
except the homogeneity of variances. 
Further analysis using Levene’s test revealed that two of the three independent 
variables (sharing and quality) do not have equal variances of residuals.  Transformation 
of the dependent variable by squaring it solved the heteroscedasticity problem.
Appendix G.19 shows the regression model for hypothesis H7b before 
transforming the dependent variable, which is similar to the regression model after 
transforming the dependent variable (shown in Figure 5-15). A comparison of the two 
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models in Figure 5-15 and Appendix G.19 revealed little difference between 
correspondent regression coefficients, suggesting that heteroscedasticity did not have a 
big impact on the estimated model in this research study.
As shown in Table 5-38, further analysis of H7b was conducted by clustering the 
data according to the number of online reverse auctions the responding company 
completed in the last 3 years. For further details of the regression models refer to 
Appendices G.20-G.23.
H7b was fully supported by companies who reported having organized auctions in 
the last three years. Companies with no auction experience reported that successful 
strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of (a) information sharing and 
(b) information quality, while information participation was insignificant. 











Sharing 0.411 *** 0.424 *** 0.434* 0.434*** 0.350**
Participation 0.232*** 0.297*** --- 0.250* 0.467***
Quality 0.229*** 0.166** 0.227* 0.232* ---
df 144 95 48 45 42
R2 0.568 0.630 0.453 0.648 0.758
    * p<0.10
  ** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
--- Not statistically significant
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When splitting the responses from companies with auction experience into 2
groups, no more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years and more than 15 auctions in the last 
three years, mixed results were obtained (see Table 5-38). Companies who completed no 
more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years have fully supported H7b and reported that 
successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of (a) information 
sharing, (b) information quality and (c) information participation. Companies with 
experience of more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years reported that successful strategic 
supplier alliances are associated with high levels of (a) information sharing and (b) 
information participation while information quality was insignificant.
H7c was fully supported by the data. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2000),
based on the value of the R-square, it is considered a poor fit. As indicated in Figure 5-
16, the multiple linear regression model supported the hypothesis that “a positive, 
significant relationship will exist between the success of the strategic alliance and (a) 
high use of constructive conflict resolution techniques, (b) low use of conflict avoidance 
techniques and (c) low use of destructive resolution techniques.” The regression model 
was tested for outliers and assumptions. The visual and statistical tests revealed that there 
are no outliers and that all assumptions were met.
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Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0.395a 0.156 0.138 0.64155
a. Predictors: (Constant), Avoidance, Destructive, Constructive
b. Dependent Variable: SSA
ANOVAb
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a. Predictors: (Constant), Avoidance, Destructive, Constructive






Model B St. Error Beta t Sig.























a. Dependent Variable: SSA
Figure 5-16: H7c Multiple Regression Output
As shown in Table 5-39, further analysis of H7c was conducted by grouping the 
data according to the number of online reverse auctions the responding company 
completed in the last 3 years. For further details of the regression models refer to 
Appendices G.24-G.27. 
H7c was fully supported by companies who reported having organized auctions in 
the last 3 years. No conclusions can be made on companies that had no auction 
experience due to the low value of R2. 
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More than 15 
Auctions
Constructive 0.196*** 0.255*** --- 0.383*** ---
Destructive -0.321*** -0.364*** --- -0.393*** -0.269*
Avoidance -0.157*** -0.163* --- --- -0.335**
df 144 94 48 45 45
R2 0.156 0.238 0.062 0.325 0.229
* p<0.10
  ** p<0.05
*** p<0.01
--- Not statistically significant
When splitting the responses from companies with auction experience into 2
groups, no more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years and more than 15 auctions in the last 
3 years, mixed results were obtained (see Table 5-39). Results from companies who 
completed no more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years partially supported H7c, that 
successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with (a) high use of constructive 
conflict resolution techniques, and (b) low use of conflict avoidance techniques while
destructive resolution techniques were insignificant. Companies with experience of more 
than 15 auctions in the last 3 years reported that successful strategic supplier alliances are 
associated with low use of conflict avoidance techniques and low use of destructive 
resolution techniques while constructive conflict resolution techniques were insignificant.
H6a was not supported by the data. As indicated in Figure 5-17, multiple linear 
regression did not supported the hypothesis that “using online reverse auctions as a 
collaborative problem solving tool is associated with high levels of trust, commitment, 
coordination and interdependence.” All the independent variables were insignificant 
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except the independent variable “Interdependence,” which was significant but in the 
opposite direction.
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0.378a 0.143 0.106 1.28638
a. Predictors: (Constant), COORD, INTERDEP, TRUST, COMM
b. Dependent Variable: COLLAB
ANOVAb
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a. Dependent Variable: COLLAB
Figure 5-17: H6a Regression Output
The regression model was tested for outliers and assumptions. The visual and 
statistical tests revealed that there were no outliers and all assumptions were met except 
the normality of the error term. Crown (1998) stated that “although the regression 
residuals are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance, 
the assumption of normality is not needed to derive the formulas for the regression 
coefficients and standard errors. Consequently, even if the residuals are not normally 
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distributed, the regression coefficients are still the best linear unbiased estimators
(BLUE). ”
Crown (1998) also stated that although the t-tests for the significance of the 
coefficients do depend on the assumption of normality, it can be shown that the sampling 
distribution for the least squares estimators approaches the normal distribution for large 
samples. Even in such samples, the least squares estimates may not be too seriously 
affected if the distribution of the residuals is not too different from the normal 
distribution.
Although not part of the formalized hypothesis, regression analysis was 
conducted on hypothesis 6a by replacing the use of online reverse auction from “as a
collaborative problem solving technique” to “as a power based bargaining technique.” 
The WLS regression analysis also revealed that all of the independent variables were 
insignificant and also failed to support the (see Figure 5-18).
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Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0.182a 0.033 -0.010 1.52109
a. Predictors: (Constant), COORD, INTERDEP, TRUST, COMM
b. Dependent Variable: Power
c. Weighted Least Squares Regression – Weighted by w
ANOVAb
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a. Predictors: (Constant), COORD, INTERDEP, TRUST, COMM
b. Dependent Variable: COLLAB
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a. Dependent Variable: COLLAB
b. Weighted Least Squares Regression – Weighted by w
Figure 5-18: H6a Regression Output - Power based Bargaining Assumption
H6b was not supported by the data. As indicated in Figure 5-19, multiple linear 
regression did not supported the hypothesis that “using online reverse auctions as a 
collaborative problem solving tool is associated with high levels of buyer-supplier (a) 
information sharing, (b) information quality, and (c) information participation.” As 
shown in Figure 5-19, the regression analysis revealed that two independent variables 
(participation and sharing) are insignificant while the third independent variable was 
significant but in the opposite direction.
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Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0.355a 0.126 0.097 1.2924
a. Predictors: (Constant), Sharing, Quality, Participation
b. Dependent Variable: COLLAB
ANOVAb
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a. Predictors: (Constant), Quality, Participation, Sharing
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1         (Constant)
          Quality
          Participation




















a. Dependent Variable: COLLAB
Figure 5-19: H6b Regression Output
Although not part of the formalized hypothesis, regression analysis was 
conducted on hypothesis 6b by replacing the use of online reverse auction from “as a 
collaborative problem solving technique” to “as a power based bargaining technique.” 
The WLS regression analysis also revealed that all of the independent variables were 
insignificant and also failed to support the hypothesis.
H6c was not supported by the data. As indicated in Figure 5-20, multiple linear 
regression did not support the hypothesis that “using online reverse auctions as a 
collaborative problem solving tool is associated with (a) high use of constructive conflict 
resolution techniques, (b) low use of conflict avoidance techniques, and (c) low use of 
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destructive resolution techniques.” As shown in Figure 5-20, the regression analysis 
revealed that the three independent variables are insignificant.
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted 
R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0.331a 0.109 0.060 1.3188
a. Predictors: (Constant), HARSH, SMOOTH, ARBT, PERS, JOINT
b. Dependent Variable: COLLAB
ANOVAb
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a. Dependent Variable: COLLAB
Figure 5-20: H6c Regression Output
Successful Online Reverse Auction Event
H8 was not supported by the data; the hypothesis stated that “a positive, 
significant relationship exists between reducing purchase prices and the buyer’s
perception of a successful online reverse auction event.” As illustrated in Table 5-40, the 
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correlation that exists between reducing purchase prices and the buyer’s perception of a 
successful online reverse auction event is not significant (p>0.05).
For the purpose of the statistical analysis, the null hypothesis stated that “no
significant relationship exists between reducing purchase prices and the buyer perception 
of a successful online reverse auction event.” While the alternative hypothesis state that 
“a positive, significant relationship exists between reducing purchase prices and the buyer 
perception of a successful online reverse auction event.” Since the Pearson correlation 
value was not significant (P>0.05), the data fail to reject the null hypothesis and therefore 
fail to support the alternative hypothesis.
Table 5-40: Test of H8
IMPLT
RED Pearson Correlation 0.209**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.053
N 86
**  Corelation i s significant at the 0. 10 level
     RED: Reduction in Purchase Prices
     IMPLT: Successful Online Reverse Auction Event
Further analysis of H8, through grouping the survey responses based on the 
criteria listed in Table 5-21, failed to support the hypothesis for most of the groups. As 
shown in Appendix G.28, the calculated correlations for the survey responses for each 
group show no correlation between the auction objective of reducing purchase prices and 
the buyer’s perception of a successful online reverse auction event for all of the groups 
except companies with sales volume above a billion dollars. Also, filtering the data based 
on the number of auction completed within the last 3 years failed to support the 
hypothesis for either of the 2 groups shown in Table 5-41.
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Table 5-41: Test of H8 Based on Auction Experience
Successful Online Reverse Auction Event
No more than 15 
auctions in last 3 years
More than 15 auctions in 
the last 3 years
Pearson Corr. 0.143 0.265Reduction in 
Purchase Prices Sig. (2-tailed) 0.343 0.113
N 46 37
H9 was supported by the data; the hypothesis stated that “a positive, significant 
relationship exists between buyer-supplier strategic alliance and the buyer’s perception of 
a successful online reverse auction event.” As illustrated in Table 5-44, a positive
significant correlation exists between buyer-supplier strategic alliance, and the buyer’s
perception of a successful online reverse auction event.
For the purpose of the statistical analysis, the null hypothesis stated that “no
significant relationship exists between buyer-supplier strategic alliance and the buyer’s
perception of a successful online reverse auction event.” While the alternative hypothesis 
state that “a positive, significant relationship exists between buyer-supplier strategic 
alliance and the buyer perception of a successful online reverse auction event.” Since the 
Pearson correlation value was not significant (P<0.05), the data reject the null hypothesis 
and support the alternative hypothesis.
Table 5-42: Test of H9
IMPLT
SSA Pearson Correlation 0.369**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 96
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
     SSA: Strategic Supplier Alliance
     IMPLT: Successful Online Reverse Auction Event
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Further analysis of H9, through grouping the survey responses based on the 
criteria listed in Table 5-21, supported the hypothesis for every group. As shown in 
Appendix G.29, regardless of the sales volume, purchasing volume, number of 
employees, number of purchasing employees, and job title, all groups supported the 
hypothesis that “a positive, significant relation exists between buyer-supplier strategic 
alliance and the buyer’s perception of a successful online reverse auction event”. Also, 
filtering the data based on the number of auctions completed within the last 3 years 
supported the hypothesis for the two groups shown in Table 5-43.
Table 5-43: Test of H9 Based on Auction Experience
Successful Online Reverse Auction Event
Less than 15 auctions in 
the last 3 years
More than 15 auctions in 






Sig. (2-tailed) 0.002 0.010
N 51 41
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE 
RESEARCH
6.1 Introduction
Previous chapters have addressed the relevance of the research problem, the focus 
of this research study, the supporting literature, the conceptual model, the research design 
methodology, and the data analysis.
This chapter summarizes the research outcomes of this study. The chapter 
contains a discussion based on the data supplied by 145 respondents. In Section 6.2, the 
chapter summarizes the research conclusions and managerial implications based on the 
test results of nineteen hypotheses presented in Chapter Three. The findings of the 
research are divided into six general groups, and conclusions related to each group are 
presented.  
Section 6.3 summarizes the hypotheses and their test results. The objective of this 
section is to interpret the data, explain how the data related to the hypothesized model, 
explain how the findings relate to previous research and/or provide suggestions for 
application of the research findings in practice. Finally, in Section 6.4, the chapter 
concludes with the limitations of the study and addresses guideline for future research.
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6.2 Research Conclusions
The goal of this research is to address the gap in the academic literature by 
developing and testing a model to successfully implement online reverse auctions with 
respect to (1) reducing purchase prices, and (2) developing/maintaining buyer-supplier 
strategic alliance relationships in the business-to-business online reverse auction 
environment.
The managerial implications to be drawn from this research relate to the manner 
in which the buyers (1) design auctions to reduction purchase prices, (2) use online 
reverse auctions for the short-term and/or the long term according to the purchase type, 
(3) define successful online reverse auction events, and (4) attempt to manage the future 
scope and tone of their buyer-supplier relationships.
The research study goals were systematically addressed and successfully achieved 
through the testing of nineteen hypotheses, defined in Chapter Three, and the 
accomplishment of the six research objectives, defined in Chapter One, through 
analyzing the responses of 145 companies. Table 6.1 summarizes the results of the 
hypotheses tests.
A model to successfully implement business-to-business online reverse auctions 
(from the buyer’s perspective) can be divided into two parts: strategic and operational. 
From the strategic dimension, a successful model focuses on the importance of the 
strategic buyer-supplier alliance more than the promised reduction in purchase prices. 
Companies should use online reverse auctions as a procurement negotiation tool within 




H1: Using online reverse auctions, the reduction in purchase prices is more likely to 
be higher in the open-bid auction format than the sealed-bid format.
Yes
H2: With the objective of using online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices, 
buyers are more likely to prefer to organize the auction event in-house than with the 
help of a market maker.
No
H3a-c: When purchasing X, a positive, significant relationship will exist between the 
type of the purchase and the purpose of using online reverse auctions to reduce 
purchase prices (X can be production material and components, MROs, or services).
Yes
H4a-c: When purchasing X, a negative, significant relationship will exist between the 
use of online reverse auctions for the purpose of a short-term relationship and the 
purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships (X can be production 
material and components, MROs, or services).
Yes
H5a-c: When purchasing X, purchasers will be more likely to use online reverse 
auction for the purpose of a short-term relationship than developing/maintaining long-
term relationships (X can be production material and components, MRO, or services). 
No
H6a: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving tool is 
associated with high levels of trust, commitment, coordination and interdependence.
No
H6b: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving tool is 
associated with high levels of buyer-supplier (a) information sharing (b) information 
quality and (c) information participation.
No
H6c: Using online reverse auctions as a collaborative problem solving tool is 
associated with (a) high use of constructive conflict resolution techniques, (b) low use 
of conflict avoidance techniques and (c) low use of destructive resolution techniques.
No
H7a: Successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of 
commitment, trust, coordination and interdependence.
Yes
H7b: Successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of (a) 
information sharing and (b) information quality and (c) information participation.
Yes
H7c: A positive, significant relationship will exist between the success of the strategic 
alliance and (a) high use of constructive conflict resolution techniques, (b) low use of 
conflict avoidance techniques and (c) low use of destructive resolution techniques
Yes
H8: A positive, significant relationship exists between reducing purchase prices and 
the buyer perception of a successful online reverse auction event.
No
H9: A positive, significant relationship exists between buyer-supplier strategic 
alliance, and the buyer perception of a successful online reverse auction event.
Yes
Table 6-1: Hypothesis Testing Results
Firms who have established long-term relationships with key suppliers are still 
required to check on market prices from time to time, or to invite new or alternative 
sources of supply to bid. The model to be a successful buyer in implementing online 
reverse auctions uses reverse auctions as the mechanism for such activity because of their 
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ability to reduce time, cost, and resources. From this perspective, the model states that the 
buyer should use online reverse auctions as a process improvement tool. 
A model of successful implementation of online reverse auctions emphasizes the 
importance that the buyer company should not lose sight of the importance of trust, 
coordination, commitment, information participation, information quality, information 
sharing, and joint problem solving to achieve a win-win buyer-supplier strategic alliance. 
Buyers should not let the use of online reverse auctions drive the buyer-supplier 
partnership, but reverse auctions should be used as a tool to improve the negotiation 
process. 
With respect to the model’s operational details of successful online reverse 
auctions, buyers should use an open-bid format rather than sealed-bid format to achieve a 
higher reduction in purchase prices. Also, buyers should organize online reverse auctions 
with the help of an online reverse auction service provider. The reduction in purchase 
prices is likely to be higher when organizing auctions with the help of a market maker 
than when organizing the event in-house because of the market maker’s expertise in 
conducting thousands of auctions.
Online reverse auctions will help reduce purchase prices regardless of the 
purchase type (production material and components, MROs, or services). An average of 
14.4% is the reduction in purchase prices when using online reverse auctions to outsource 
products, as reported by the survey respondents. With respect to the model’s operational 
details of successful online reverse auctions, buyers should focus on the long-term 
objective when outsourcing production material and components. 
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The model (research findings) has led the researcher to believe that the way 
companies are using online reverse auctions is changing. Published research in the early 
use of online reverse auctions reported the abuses and the negative effects of reverse 
auctions on the buyer-supplier relationships. With maturity and experience in the use of 
online reverse auctions, and buyers’ realization of the importance of their supplier 
strategic alliances, buyers have changed the way they are implementing and viewing 
online reverse auctions. 
Finally, the model to successfully implement online reverse auctions (based on 
survey respondents) emphasizes the need for companies to understand the use of 
business-to-business online reverse auctions as a process improvement tool in their 
negotiation process (price audit) with the suppliers within the effort to develop/maintain 
the buyer-supplier alliance.
6.3 Summary of the Research Study
The increasing pressure on companies to reduce the expense of products and 
services has caused the procurement organizations to seek out and experiment with new 
electronic procurement tools. Procurement professionals’ desire to reduce the total cost of 
their companies’ purchases has led them to use online reverse auctions without fully 
understanding the effect on their buyer-supplier relationships and without fully 
understanding whether online reverse auctions have helped other companies reduce 
purchase prices and if so, what is the reduction percentage of the overall price.
This section summarizes the hypotheses and their test results. The objective of 
this section is to interpret the data, explain how the data relate to the hypothesized model, 
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explain how the findings relate to previous research and/or provide suggestion for 
application of the research findings in practice.
Auction Design-Format
The data provided support for the hypothesized relationship between reduction in 
purchase price and the open-bid auction format. While there are several different bidding 
formats of online reverse auctions, the research focused on the use of one-sided multi-
round open and sealed-bid auctions. Respondents were asked to evaluate and compare the 
reduction in purchase prices between the open-bid format and the sealed-bid format. The 
buying companies (respondents) clearly supported the open-bid format. This finding is 
similar to Jap (2002); the fast-paced bidding nature of the open-bid format and the need 
to respond quickly to competitors’ bids yields tense and pressure on suppliers to cut 
prices vigorously and thus force additional price concessions from the suppliers, and that 
in turn will result in higher price reductions for the buyers. 
The data also provided support for the hypothesized relationship between 
reduction in purchase price and the open-bid auction format for all companies regardless 
of the sales volume, purchasing volume, or number of employees. The hypothesis was 
also supported by all different management levels.
Auction Design-Event Organization
The data did not provide support for the hypothesized relationship between 
reduction in purchase price and the buyers’ preference to organize the auction event in-
house rather than with the help of a market maker. On the contrary, the data clearly
supported the opposite hypothesis: “with the objective of using online reverse auctions to 
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reduce purchase prices, buyers are more likely to prefer to organize the auction event 
with the help of a market maker than in-house.” 
The hypothesis was initially constructed based on the logic that the target sample 
for this research was companies who have used online reverse auctions frequently, and 
these companies have the required technology infrastructure to support and organize
online reverse auctions; therefore, it was expected that these buyers would prefer to 
organize online reverse auctions in-house in order to avoid the cost associated with the 
fees of the online reverse auction service provider. But because the survey respondents 
reported a median of only fifteen auctions completed by their company in the last 3 years, 
the online reverse auction experience of the companies participating in the survey was 
below expectations. Therefore, the assumption that the target sample of the research was 
companies who have used online reverse auctions frequently was no longer valid.  
Because the survey responding companies are not using online reverse auctions, as 
frequently as initially thought, it makes perfect sense that these companies would prefer 
to use online reverse auction service providers like Tradingpartners rather than 
organizing the events in-house.
Another possibility is that buyers did not want to get involved in the online 
reverse auction business since auctions are outside their core competencies. The finding 
also implies that the companies appreciate the value that the market makers bring to the 
auction event organization process. Through the market maker’s experiences in 
conducting thousands of auctions, market makers are more efficient than buyers in 
organizing the event, locating new suppliers, providing the technological expertise, and 
creating comprehensive RFQ packages. Online reverse auction providers usually are 
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better in structuring the RFQ than what the buyer historically produced, which results in a 
more complete description of the procurement under consideration. Sellers thus gain a 
better understanding of the buyer’s total requirements with regard to cost, delivery, and 
quality.
The data also provided support for the hypothesized relationship between 
reduction in purchase price and the event organization by a market maker for all 
companies regardless of the sales volume, purchasing volume, or number of employees. 
The hypothesis was also supported by all different management levels. While the data 
was analyzed based on categorizing the respondents into three levels within the 
purchasing organization (senior management, middle management, and buyers), all 
different categories supported the alternative hypothesis that “with the objective of using 
online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices, buyers are more likely to prefer to 
organize the auction event with the help of a market maker than in-house.” 
Reduction in Purchase Price
The data provided support for the hypothesized positive relationship between the
type of purchase (production items and components, MROs, and services) and the 
purpose of using online reverse auctions to reduce purchase prices. Companies reported 
that online reverse auctions helped in reducing the purchase prices by an average of 
12.9% when purchasing production material and components, 16.9% when purchasing 
MROs, and 13.5% when purchasing services. 
The data also provided support for the hypothesized relationship between 
reduction in purchase prices and the type of the purchase (production items and 
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components, MROs, and services) for all companies regardless of the sales volume, 
purchasing volume or number of employees. The hypothesis was also supported by all 
different management levels. The data were analyzed based on the position (job title) of 
the respondent and all the different categories supported the hypothesis.
The findings agree with the majority of the articles published in the business press 
that online reverse auctions will lead to reduction in purchase prices. This finding is 
similar to the conclusion of previous research that senior managers of many Fortune 2000 
companies continue to believe in the efficiency of online reverse auctions to reduce 
purchase prices (e.g. Judge 2001; Grant 2003; Emiliani and Stec 2005). The findings are 
also similar to Pearcy (2002), who stated that companies will be more likely to reduce the 
purchase prices of direct material and MRO supplies through the use of online reverse 
auctions. 
Auction Application
The data suggest that the type of purchase (production materials and components, 
MROs, or services) is an important factor when deciding the manner is which the reverse 
auction will be used for short-term or long-term objectives. 
Production material and components
The data supported the hypothesized model that “when purchasing production 
material and components, a negative significant relationship will exist between the 
purpose of short-term relationships and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term 
relationships.” At the same time, the data failed to support the hypothesized relationship 
that “when purchasing production material and components, purchasers will be more 
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likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of short-term relationships rather 
than developing/maintaining long-term relationships.”
But the data supported the opposite hypothesis of the model: “when purchasing 
production material and components, purchasers will be more likely to use online reverse 
auctions for the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships rather than 
short-term relationships.”
Further analysis of the data showed that larger companies (sales volume greater 
than one billion dollars, purchasing volume greater than $500 million, total number of 
employees greater than 1000, and more than 20 purchasing employees) support the 
model’s opposite hypothesis at a 95% confidence interval and all the smaller companies 
categories supported that hypothesis at the 95% confidence interval except companies 
with less than 1000 employees supported the model’s opposite hypothesis at 90% 
confidence interval. Grouping the data also showed that all different levels of employees
within the purchasing organization (buyers, managers, and directors) advocate the 
importance of using online reverse auctions to outsource production material and 
components for the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships rather 
than short-term relationships.
This finding that companies are using online reverse auctions to outsource production 
material and components for the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term 
relationships is unexpected and counter to the hypothesized model. One possibility for 
explaining this finding is that companies believe the purchasing price of production 
material and components is not the only determinant factor in outsourcing these items.
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Other factors (such as quality, on-time delivery, and reliability) are more important and 
achieving the acceptable desired level requires time. Taking that into consideration, 
buyers view online reverse auctions as any other procurement negotiation tool to identify 
and negotiate with the supplier for the purpose of purchasing/outsourcing to this supplier 
for a long time and not a one-time shot.
Another possibility is based on the nature of production items and components. 
Such products require a high level of collaboration and coordination between the buyer 
and the supplier in terms of engineering design, quality, replenishment, and delivery and 
this is usually a time consuming process (usually years). Therefore, switching suppliers 
frequently is not an option.
This finding is counter to previous research conclusions (e.g. Emiliani and Stec 
2004; Jap 2002; Pearcy et al. 2002). Pearcy et al. (2002) stated that buying companies 
will be more likely to use online reverse auctions to buy direct material and MRO 
supplies for short-term contracts. On the other hand, Emiliani and Stec (2004) questioned 
the effectiveness of using online reverse auction as a tool to outsource components for the 
short-term and the long-term.
Maintenance materials and supplies (MROs)
The data supported the hypothesized model that “when purchasing MROs, a 
negative significant relationship will exist between the purpose of short-term 
relationships and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationships.” At the 
same time, the data failed to support the hypothesized relationship that “when purchasing 
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MROs, purchasers will be more likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of 
short-term relationships rather than developing/maintaining long-term relationships.”
Further analysis of the data showed that smaller size companies (sales volume less 
than one billion, purchasing volume less than $500 million, total number of employees 
less than 1000, and/or less than 20 purchasing employees) support the model hypothesis. 
Respondents’ who reported to work for smaller size companies appear to subscribe to the 
premise that online reverse auctions are used to outsource MROs for the purpose of short-
term relationships rather than developing/maintaining long-term relationships. This 
finding is similar to Pearcy (2002), who stated that buying companies will be more likely 
to use online reverse auctions to buy MRO supplies for short-term contracts. 
Respondents who reported to work for larger size companies (sales volume greater than 
1000, purchasing volume greater than $500 million, total number of employees greater 
than 1000, and more than 20 purchasing employees) reported no difference in using 
online reverse auctions for the short-term or long-term objective when buying MRO 
supplies.  When grouping the data based on the employment level within the purchasing 
organization (buyers, middle management, and upper senior management), respondents 
reported no difference in using online reverse auctions for the short-term or long-term 
objective when buying MRO supplies.
The finding that a negative relationship exists between the purpose of short-term 
relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationship was 
expected and according to the hypothesized model. The finding that the data failed to 
completely support the hypothesized relationship, “when purchasing MROs, purchasers 
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will be more likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of short-term 
relationships rather than developing/maintaining long-term relationships,” is unexpected 
and counters to the hypothesized model. The hypothesis was supported for smaller size 
companies but larger size companies reported no difference in using online reverse 
auctions for the short-term or long-term objective when buying MRO items. 
One possible explanation is that larger size companies have more experience in 
using online reverse auctions (median of 20 auctions in the last 3 years) while smaller 
size companies have less experience (median of 6 auctions in the last 3 years). When a 
smaller size company organizes an auction to outsource MROs, a hit-and-run scenario is 
the motive behind using online reverse auctions. Smaller size companies, due to their 
lack of experience in using online reverse auctions, believe reducing purchase prices in 
the short-term can be achieved through the use of online reverse auctions to switch 
suppliers or force their current suppliers to reduce their prices. On the other hand, larger 
size companies use online reverse auctions as a procurement negotiation tool or as an 
audit tool of their current supplier to assure competitive purchasing prices. In either 
scenario, larger size companies assume that online reverse auctions will help reduce 
purchase prices regardless of the short-term or long-term objectives.
Services
With respect to the services product category, the data supported the hypothesized 
model that when purchasing services, a negative significant relationship will exist 
between the purpose of short-term relationships and the purpose of 
developing/maintaining long-term relationships. At the same time, the data failed to 
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support the hypothesized relationship that “when purchasing services, purchasers will be 
more likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of short-term relationships 
rather than developing/maintaining long-term relationships.”
Further analysis of the data showed that smaller size companies (sales volume less 
than one billion, purchasing volume less than $500 million, total number of employees 
less than 1000, and/or less than 20 purchasing employees) support the model hypothesis. 
Respondents’ who reported to work for smaller size companies appear to subscribe to the 
premise that online reverse auctions are used to outsource services for the purpose of 
short-term relationships rather than developing/maintaining long-term relationships. 
Comparison of this finding to previous research is not possible due to the lack of the 
research in the area of the outsourcing services using online reverse auctions. 
Respondents who reported working for larger size companies (sales volume 
greater than 1000, purchasing volume greater than $500 million, total number of 
employees greater than 1000, and more than 20 purchasing employees) reported no 
difference in using online reverse auctions for the short-term or long-term objective when 
buying services.  When grouping the data based on the employment level within the 
purchasing organization (buyers, middle management, and upper senior management), 
respondents reported no difference in using online reverse auctions for the short-term or 
long-term objective when buying services.
The finding that a negative relationship exists between the purpose of short-term 
relationship and the purpose of developing/maintaining long-term relationship was 
expected and according to the hypothesized model. The finding that the data failed to 
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support the hypothesized relationship, “when purchasing services, purchasers will be 
more likely to use online reverse auctions for the purpose of short-term relationships 
rather than for developing/maintaining long-term relationships”, is unexpected and 
counter to the hypothesized model. The hypothesis was supported for smaller size 
companies but larger size companies reported no difference in using auctions for the 
short-term or long-term objective when buying services. 
The same explanation that was used for MROs also applies for services. Due to 
the experience in using auctions, the objective and the expected outcome between 
different sizes of companies vary. Smaller size companies use online reverse auctions to 
reduce purchase prices on the short-term and assume to use reverse auctions to outsource 
the service(s) whenever required. Simply, smaller size companies use online reverse 
auctions due to their ability to provide immediate cost savings in the short-term. On the 
other hand, larger size organizations use auctions to either audit their current suppliers to 
assure competitive prices or as a negotiation tool that will help reduce purchase prices 
regardless of the short-term or long-term objectives. Larger size companies believe that 
online reverse auctions will yield immediate savings in the short-term and/or can be used 
as a screening device for long-term relationships.
Successful Strategic Supplier Alliances
For more than two decades, the formation of partnerships became an increasingly 
common way for companies to find and maintain a competitive advantage. The following 
summarizes the results of testing the hypotheses related to the success of the buyer-
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supplier strategic alliances from the following three dimensions (discussed earlier in 
Chapter Three):
Attribute of the Relationship
The data provided support for the hypothesized positive relationship between 
successful strategic supplier alliances and the attribute of the relationship (commitment, 
trust, and coordination were significant while interdependence was insignificant). 
Further analyses of the hypothesized relationship between successful strategic 
supplier alliances and attributes of the relationship (commitment, trust, coordination, and 
interdependence) were conducted by filtering the data according to the number of online 
reverse auctions the respondent’s company completed in the last 3 years. The data was 
initially clustered into two groups: companies without any online reverse auction 
experience as a buyer and companies with experience in using online reverse auctions to 
purchase products and/or services. The two groups had similar results where trust, 
commitment, and coordination emerged as significant predictors of the success of the 
supplier strategic alliance, while interdependence was insignificant. 
For further analysis, the survey responses were clustered into three groups: 
companies with no auction experience, companies with experience of no more than 15 
auctions in the last 3 years, and companies who completed more than 15 auctions in the 
last 3 years. Companies that had completed no more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years 
reported that successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of 
commitment and coordination while trust and interdependence were insignificant. On the 
other hand, companies that had completed more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years 
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reported that successful strategic supplier alliances are associated with high levels of trust 
and commitment, while coordination and interdependence were insignificant. 
Interestingly, interdependence was insignificant across the three groups. But 
further examination of the other three predictor variables (trust, commitment, and 
coordination) across the maturity of companies’ experiences in using reverse auctions, 
revealed that the value of the commitment predictor increases with auction experience 
while the value of the coordination variable decreases until it becomes insignificant.
An examination of Table 5-37 shows that commitment emerged as a significant 
predictor of the success of the supplier strategic alliance for all three groups. 
Commitment had the lowest significance value with respect to the other predictors for 
companies with no auction experience, but the value of commitment kept increasing with 
the auction experience until it became the most significant predictor of the success of the 
supplier strategic alliance. 
On the other hand, coordination emerged as a significant predictor of the success 
of the supplier strategic alliance for all the three groups. Coordination was the most 
significant predictor variable, with its value decreasing until it became insignificant for 
companies with experience of more than 15 auctions. 
Trust emerged as a significant predictor of the success of the supplier strategic 
alliance for 2 of the 3 groups: companies with no auction experience and companies that 
had completed more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years. 
One possible explanation of the behavior of trust, commitment, and coordination 
as predictor variables of the success of the supplier strategic alliance is that companies 
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are using online reverse auctions as an audit tool for their current suppliers and/or a 
procurement negotiation tool. When companies start to use auctions, the buyer and the 
suppliers are in a learning process. Commitment and coordination are the significant 
predictors of the success of the strategic alliance while trust is insignificant due to its 
nonexistence. 
In the initial experiences of using online reverse auctions, the buyers do not 
believe they are getting a fair deal from their suppliers (might be the buyers’ main reason 
for using online reverse auctions). The buyer is still committed to buying from the current 
supplier (commitment is a significant predictor with a moderate weight) if provided with 
good prices, but coordination is the significant predictor of the success of the supplier 
strategic alliance (coordination has more weight than commitment).
Trust has been established with the buyer’s current suppliers as a significant 
predictor of their relationship, but when the buyer companies start to use reverse auctions 
it might be due to a lack of trust that their suppliers are giving them fair/good deals. With 
time and experience in using online reverse auctions, the trust in the relationship between 
the buyer and the supplier increases to be one of the most important predictors of the
success of the relationship. Buyers, due to the continuous participation of their strategic 
suppliers in the online reverse auctions, trust that (a) the strategic supplier alliances are 
beneficial to their business; (b) they are getting an equitable deal from their suppliers in 
these alliances; and (c) the strategic supplier alliance/partnership is marked by a high 
degree of harmony.
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Commitment has a moderate weight in the strategic alliance for companies with 
no auction experience. While gaining more experience in using online reverse auctions, 
the buyers become more committed to buying from their current suppliers and online 
reverse auctions become similar to any other price negotiation tool/methodology. 
On the other hand, coordination has a moderate weight in the strategic alliance for 
companies with no auction experience. While gaining more experience in using online 
reverse auctions, coordinating activities with the supplier does not become a significant 
element in determining the success of the alliance while the trust and commitment are the 
most important elements. The experience in organizing auctions helped the buyers in 
coordinating their activities with their suppliers.
The general findings of this hypothesis, before filtering the data based on auction 
experience, are consistent with those of Monczka et al. (1998) and Mohr and Spekman 
(1994) with some minor exceptions. Monczka et al. (1998) defined trust and coordination 
as one single predictor while this study and the study by Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
defined trust and coordination as two separate predictors. 
Commitment emerged as a significant predictor of the success of the strategic 
supplier alliances for this study and for the study by Mohr and Spekman (1994) but had 
little effect on industrial purchasing alliance success according to the study by Monczka 
et al. (1998).
Interdependence emerged as an insignificant predictor of the success of strategic 
supplier alliances in this study and the market channel relationships study by Mohr and 
Spekman (1994). Interdependence emerged as a significant predictor in the Monczka et 
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al. (1998) study but not as a critical antecedent due to the small β value of 0.107, while 
trust and coordination β value was 0.751.
Communication Behavior
The data provided support for the hypothesized positive relationship between 
successful strategic supplier alliances and high levels of information sharing, information 
quality, and information participation. 
Further analyses of the hypothesized relationship between successful strategic 
supplier alliances and communication behavior (information sharing, information quality,
and information participation) were conducted by filtering the data according to the 
number of online reverse auctions the responding company had completed in the last 3 
years. The data was initially clustered into two groups: companies without any online 
reverse auction experience (as buyers) and companies with experience in using online 
reverse auctions to purchase products and/or services.
The two groups had similar results with one exception. Information sharing, 
information quality, and information participation emerged as positive significant 
predictors of the success of the supplier strategic alliance for companies with auction 
experience.  Companies without any experience in using online reverse auctions to 
outsource products and/or services revealed information sharing and information quality 
as positive significant predictors of the success of the supplier strategic alliance while 
information participation was insignificant (an explanation is discussed later). 
For further analysis, the data was clustered into three groups (see Table 5-38): 
companies with no auction experience, companies with experience of no more than 15 
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auctions in the last 3 years, and companies who had completed more than 15 auctions in 
the last 3 years. Companies that had completed no more than 15 auctions in the last three 
years reported that successful strategic supplier alliances were associated with high levels 
of information sharing, information quality and information participation. On the other 
hand, companies that had completed more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years reported 
that successful strategic supplier alliances were associated with high levels of information 
sharing and information participation, while information quality was insignificant. 
The insignificance of the predictor “information quality” is difficult to explain. 
One possibility is that, with the maturity in using online reverse auctions, companies are 
assuring the quality of the communication with the suppliers (timely, accurate, adequate, 
complete, and credible) through the auction process. Companies that have wide 
experience in using online reverse auctions, are using auctions as any other purchasing 
negotiation tool/methodology. Through the auction process and with the help of the 
market maker, who is usually better than the buyers in organizing RFQs, the buyer’s 
communication with the supplier is assured to be timely, accurate, adequate, complete,
and credible. Therefore, information quality can be an insignificant predictor of the 
success of the strategic supplier alliance.
On the other hand, information participation (seeking advice and counsel from 
suppliers, having the supplier participate in the buyer’s planning activities, having the 
buyer participate in the supplier’s planning activities, and soliciting improvement 
suggestions from the suppliers) started as an insignificant predictor of the supplier 
strategic alliance. With time and experience in using online reverse auctions, the 
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information participation between the buyer and the suppliers becomes the most 
significant predictor of success.
The results of this research study, without filtering the data according to the 
auction experience, are consistent with those of Monczka et al. (1998) and Mohr and 
Spekman (1994), with some minor exceptions. Monczka et al. (1998) defined information 
quality and participation as one single predictor while this research study and the study 
by Mohr and Spekman (1994) defined Information quality and information participation 
as two separate predictors. Information sharing was negatively related to the success of 
the strategic supplier alliances according to the Mohr and Spekman study (although 
predicted to be positively related). This research study and the study by Monczka et al. 
(1998) found that information sharing was positively related to the success of the 
strategic supplier alliance.
Conflict Resolution
The data provided support for the hypothesized positive relationship between 
successful strategic supplier alliances and (a) high use of constructive conflict resolution 
techniques, (b) low use of conflict avoidance techniques, and (c) low use of destructive 
resolution techniques. 
Further analyses of the hypothesized relationship between successful strategic 
supplier and conflict resolution were done in two steps as in the previous two sections. 
Companies with online reverse auction experience revealed positive significant 
relationships between successful strategic supplier alliances and (a) high use of 
constructive conflict resolution techniques, (b) low use of conflict avoidance techniques, 
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and (c) low use of destructive resolution techniques. The research study was unable to 
give any conclusions for companies with no auction experience due to the low proportion 
of variation in the dependent variable (success of strategic supplier alliance) explained by 
the regression model (R2=0.06). 
Companies with experience of no more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years had 
reported avoidance resolution techniques to be insignificant. Companies with experience 
of more than 15 auctions in the last 3 years have reported constructive conflict resolution 
techniques to be insignificant. The research failed to provide any logical explanation for 
these results.
The results of this research study, without filtering the data according to reverse 
auction experience, are consistent with those of Monczka et al. (1998) and Mohr and 
Spekman (1994) with some minor exceptions. The study by Monczka et al. (1998) found 
a negative relationship between one of the two items measuring constructive conflict 
resolution techniques and successful strategic supplier alliances (although hypothesized 
to be positive). The study by Monczka et al. (1998) also reported the use of conflict 
avoidance techniques to be insignificant. The study by Mohr and Spekman (1994) 
reported a positive relationship between one of the two items measuring destructive 
conflict resolution techniques and successful strategic supplier alliances (although 
hypothesized to be negative).
Successful Online Reverse Auction Event
The research evaluated the success of online reverse auction events from two 
perspectives: ability to reduce purchase prices and the success of the strategic buyer-
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supplier alliance. Two hypotheses were developed that linked the reduction in purchase 
prices and the success of the supplier alliance to the perceived success of the online 
reverse auction event.
Interestingly, no significant relationship was found between reduction in purchase 
prices and the buyer’s perception of a successful online reverse auction event. On the 
other hand, the data strongly supported the hypothesized positive relationship between 
the success of supplier strategic alliances and the buyer’s perception of successful online 
reverse auction events. This finding emphasizes the buying companies’ appreciation of 
the importance of the value of the strategic supplier alliance success. This finding is 
encouraging, considering the emphasis that has been (and should be) placed on the 
importance of cooperative strategic alliances with the suppliers to achieve prosperity for 
all the supply chain members.
The relationship between the success of an auction event and the reduction in 
purchase price was not significant for any group of data even after grouping the data 
based on the annual purchasing volume, number of employees, number of purchasing 
employees, and/or respondent’s job position. Similar results were obtained when 
clustering the data based on the number of auctions the respondents had completed in the 
last three years. On the other hand, the relationship between the success of an auction 
event and the success of the strategic alliance was significant for all the different groups.
The insignificant relationship between reduction in purchase prices and the 
buyer’s perception of a successful online reverse auction event could be simply explained 
by the companies’ belief that the importance of the  successful strategic alliances 
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overshadows the importance of a short-term reduction in purchase prices. One possibility 
is that companies use auctions as audit tools for their current suppliers to assure the best 
prices and/or as a procurement negotiation tool with the intention to work collaboratively 
with the suppliers to establish and/or develop the relationship. Under this possibility, 
buyers know that with time and cooperation, reduction in purchase prices will be achieve 
sooner or later.
The finding of no significant relationship between reduction in purchase prices 
and the buyer’s perception of a successful online reverse auction event is unexpected and 
counter to the hypothesized model. The hypothesized relationship was based on previous 
research which reported a strong positive relationship between successful implementation 
and the reduction in purchase price (e.g. Carter et al. 2004; Hartley et al. 2004; Wagner 
and Schwab 2004), especially the fact that many researchers reported that organizations 
adopt online reverse auctions to lower purchase prices and reduce transaction costs 
(Brunelli 2000; Hong and Hartley 2001; Moser 2002; and Ruzarika 2000).
One possibility for the contradiction between this research study and the previous 
research is the age of online reverse auctions. Freemarkets was the first online reverse 
auction service provider that introduced online reverse auctions less than a decade ago, 
and most other companies started introducing and using reverse auctions less than five 
years ago. It is possible that companies started to use reverse auctions with the sole 
purpose of reducing purchase prices, and that explains the findings of the previous 
research that was based on surveys and case studies in the early use of online reverse 
auctions (years 2000-2002). 
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With maturity and experience in the use of online reverse auctions, and buyers’ 
realization of the importance of their supplier strategic alliances, buyers changed the way 
they are implementing and viewing online reverse auctions. From the buyers’ experiences 
in using online reverse auctions, they figured out that the importance of the strategic 
alliances overshadows the expected quick reduction in purchase prices that will be 
achieved eventually.
The finding of the positive significant relationship between perceived successful 
implementation of an online reverse auction event and the success of strategic buyer-
supplier alliances was expected and agrees with previous research, which emphasized 
that destroying buyer-supplier relationships was the main disadvantage of online reverse 
auctions (Emiliani and Stec 2002; Jap 2002). The finding also agrees with previous 
researchers (e.g. Hartley et al. 2004; Smart and Harrision 2003) who saw an opportunity 
in using online reverse auctions to enhance the strategic alliance and pursue a 
collaborative strategy as a way to reduce costs. 
6.4 Limitations of the Study and Future Research Guidelines
The research has extended previous research in the area of online reverse auctions 
in several ways, by building on past theoretical and empirical research. This research 
study also opens a window for further research in this new emerging area. Each of the 
limitations of this study is an opening to an area of new research for future studies. 
Therefore, in this section, the researcher discusses some of the limitations of this research 
and recommendations for future research. The research was limited by:
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(1) The type of companies surveyed: This research study focused mainly on 
manufacturing companies, with less than 25% of the respondents representing 
companies from retail and services companies.
(2) The size of the companies surveyed and the sample size: Due to the small sample 
size it was only viable to cluster the responses into two groups that represented 
smaller size companies and larger size companies. With a bigger sample size, the 
researcher recommends clustering the data into three groups and adding another 
group called medium-sized companies. 
(3) The type of purchases made by the respondents companies: This study has 
classified purchased items into three categories. Other purchase types like capital 
equipment and resale items were not considered.
(4) The online reverse auction design elements: This study has only looked at the 
effects of two auction design elements (event organization and bidding format) 
on the reduction in purchase prices. Other possible online reverse auction design 
criteria include the opening price, bid decrement, closing rule (soft versus hard), 
and reserve price policy (with or without).
(5) The way buyers view online reverse auctions: The researcher assumed that online 
reverse auctions are used as a power-based bargaining tool or as a collaborative 
problem solving tool. The research revealed that the relationship between the 
auction application and the predictors of the success of the strategic alliances was 
insignificant. One future research possibility is investigating how companies
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view auction applications when considering the online reverse auction effect on 
the predictors of the success of the strategic alliances.
(6) The geographic location: This research study focused on companies within the 
United States only. Other possibilities are to extend the research concept, 
methodology, and survey tool to companies in Western Europe and Japan. 
(7) The buyer perspective: This research study has surveyed companies from the 
buyer’s perspective only. An interesting possibility is to survey these companies 
from the suppliers’ perspective. 
(8) The elements of a successful online reverse auction event.  This research study 
has defined a successful reverse auction event in terms of reduction in purchase 
price and supplier partnership. An interesting research possibility is to consider 
other criteria like service, quality, and delivery time.
(9) The filtering (grouping) criteria: For hypotheses 1-5 and 8-9, the data was 
clustered based on the annual sales volume, the annual purchasing volume, 
number of purchasing employees, total number of employees, and respondents’ 
position. Similarly, for hypotheses 6-9 the data were grouped based on the 
auction experience. Further analysis can be done by grouping H1-H5 based on 
the auction experience, H6-H9 based on the company size, and/or H1-H9 based 
on the SIC codes in two categories (manufacturing companies versus retail and 
service companies).
Klemperer (1999) concluded his guide to auction theory literature by stating that 
“auction theory has been among the most successful branches of economics in recent 
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years. The theory has developed rapidly, and is increasingly being looked at for 
assistance in practical applications. Testing auction-theoretic models is seen as one of the 
brightest spots in applied economics.” The following are some other suggestions for 
future online reverse auction related research studies. It should be noted that several of 
these suggestions are a continuation of this research study:
1. A research study to determine why respondents prefer to organize online reverse 
auctions with the help of a market maker. An important question is whether, when 
a company is using auctions as a tool to reduce prices, should the company not 
also eliminate the fees of the market maker by organizing the reverse auction in-
house? The real question is how market makers are adding value to the auction 
process.
2. A research study that tailors this study toward a specific industry like the 
petroleum industry.
3. A research study that compares the auction theory literature to the behavior and 
economics of online reverse auctions.
4. A research study on investigating when buyers are willing to switch suppliers. 
What is the expected percentage in the reduction in purchase prices in order to 
switch suppliers by purchase type using an online reverse auction? When should 
the company switch to a new supplier and when should it not?
5. This research study provides an interesting set of results worthy of future studies. 
There is a need to understand how online reverse auctions have affected the 
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evolution of trust in strategic alliances, and how this process can be managed 
through information sharing and participation.
6. There are several issues related to the buyer-supplier relationship dimension such 
as understanding the nature of conflict between collaborative supply chain 
management practices and online reverse auctions. Suppliers participate with the 
expectation that if they win business, they are awarded a long-term agreement that 
places them in a favorable position for renewal of the agreement when it expires. 
But will buyers that rely on cost reduction to meet financial goals stop seeking 
cost reduction at the end of the long-term agreement? Will the product/service be 
put up for bid again? Will it be re-bid during the term of the contract, thus 
effectively breaking the contract? Then what good is a contract? And what will be 
the impact upon trust, either implicit or explicit, in the buyer-supplier 
relationship? Does trust in business relationships matter anymore? If it does, then 
does re-bidding the work make sense? Will buyers and sellers ever revert to 
traditional, off-line, human negotiation processes?
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A Survey on  
Business-to-Business Online Reverse Auctions Implementation 
by 
Oklahoma State University - School of Industrial Eng. & Mgmt  
in collaboration with the Institute of Supply Management (ISM)
Business-to-business online reverse auctions are the electronic procurement auctions hosted by a 
buying company to buy goods and/or services, in which multiple pre-qualified suppliers bid prices 
downward. Under the direction of Dr. Ricki Ingalls of Oklahoma State University-School of 
Industrial Engineering and Management, I am conducting my doctoral dissertation research using 
this questionnaire to examine how to use and implement online reverse auctions (procurement 
auctions) to achieve the buying organizations’ simultaneous goals of cost management and 
cooperative buyer-supplier strategic alliances. 
Electronic reverse auctions have been getting more attention in the areas of purchasing and supply 
management due to their controversy. All participants will receive a copy of the research findings, 
upon completion, if desired. You will get a chance to know the “best in-class” criteria for assuring 
successful auction events, how the “best-in-class” companies implement reverse auctions in order to 
reduce purchase prices while maintaining/developing the buyer-supplier relationships. 
 
The completion of this survey would typically take 15 minutes and your response is vital. All 
information regarding participants is confidential. If you have any questions or concerns about the 
study, please contact Louie Sehwail at Sehwail@okstate.edu or (405) 269-1010 or Dr. Ricki 
Ingalls at Ingalls@okstate.edu or (405) 744-9129. 
Please return the survey before August 15, 2005 in the enclosed-paid envelop. Thank you for your 
participation. If you personally have not been involved in an online reverse auction event, please 
forward this questionnaire to the person in your organization with experience in online reverse 
auction. Even if your company did not use online reverse auctions, you can provide valuable 
information about the nature of the buyer-supplier relationships by answering the survey 
(please skip pages 3 & 4). 
 
Thank you for your assistance and cooperation. 
 
Sincerely,        Sincerely,  
 
Louie Sehwail        Ricki G. Ingalls, Ph.D. 















APPENDIX C.1 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: EXPERIENCE AND NUMBER 
OF AUCTION COMPLETED
State Sent Rec'd % State Sent Rec'd % State Sent Rec'd %
AL 18 2 11% LA 1 0 0% OH 56 16 29%
AR 3 0 0% MA 32 3 9% OK 3 2 67%
AZ 3 1 33% MD 11 3 27% PA 54 15 28%
CA 11 6 55% ME 2 1 50% RI 3 0 0%
CT 22 2 9% MI 22 5 23% SC 10 1 10%
DE 5 1 20% MN 18 5 28% SD 2 0 0%
FL 32 2 6% MO 2 2 100% TN 18 6 33%
GA 28 6 21% MS 7 1 14% TX 25 10 40%
IA 8 5 63% NC 26 10 38% VA 13 2 15%
IL 11 4 36% NE 3 0 0% VT 2 0 0%
IN 18 3 17% NH 4 1 25% WA 7 2 29%
KS 5 2 40% NJ 31 9 29% WI 26 5 19%
KY 15 4 27% NY 45 9 20% WV 1 0 0%
APPENDIX C.2 - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: EXPERIENCE AND NUMBER 
OF AUCTION COMPLETED
Item N Min. Max. Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Years of experience with the 
company
143 0.5 42 10.3 7 9.295
Number of online reverse 
auctions your company 
completed in the last 3 years
92 1 5000 145.9 14.5 569
Number of online reverse 
auctions completed in-house in 
2004
93 0 1800 56.45 5 221.9
Number of online reverse
auctions completed with the help 
of an online auction provider in 
2004
93 0 500 13.56 2 54.86
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FOR Early 61 4.07 0.95 0.12
Late 35 3.91 0.70 0.12
EVENT Early 60 3.13 1.26 0.16
Late 35 2.82 1.36 0.23
RED Early 58 0.15 0.08 0.01
Late 28 0.14 0.05 0.01
POWER Early 61 4.46 1.43 0.18
Late 35 4.94 1.48 0.25
COLLAB Early 61 4.63 1.35 0.17
Late 35 4.05 1.31 0.22
IMPLT Early 61 5.71 1.13 0.14
Late 35 5.87 1.07 0.18
TRUST Early 102 5.70 0.75 0.07
Late 43 5.75 0.95 0.15
COMM Early 102 4.61 1.13 0.11
Late 43 4.54 1.41 0.22
INTD Early 102 4.83 1.21 0.12
Late 43 4.81 1.32 0.20
COORD Early 102 5.24 1.14 0.11
Late 43 5.47 1.29 0.20
INFOQ Early 102 5.39 0.90 0.09
Late 43 5.59 1.00 0.15
Conflict Early 102 3.70 0.65 0.06
Late 43 3.83 0.47 0.07
INFOP Early 102 5.17 1.08 0.11
Late 43 5.39 1.14 0.17
INFOS Early 102 5.53 0.81 0.08
Late 43 5.69 0.75 0.12
SSA Early 102 5.70 0.69 0.07
Late 43 5.91 0.68 0.10
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APPENDIX C.4 – T-TEST FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS: EARLY (FIRST 2 




t-test for Equality of Means





95% CI of the 
Diff.
Lower Upper
FOR Equal variances 
assumed
2.24 0.14 0.82 94 0.41 0.15 0.18 -0.21 0.52
Equal variances 
not assumed
0.89 88 0.37 0.15 0.17 -0.19 0.49
EVENT Equal variances 
assumed
0.89 0.35 1.10 93 0.27 0.30 0.28 -0.25 0.85
Equal variances 
not assumed
1.08 67 0.29 0.30 0.28 -0.26 0.87
RED Equal variances 
assumed
2.57 0.12 0.848 84 0.40 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.05
Equal variances 
not assumed
0.969 75 0.34 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04
POWER Equal variances 
assumed 0.39 0.53 -1.56 94 0.12 -0.48 0.31 -1.09 0.13
Equal variances 
not assumed
-1.55 69 0.13 -0.48 0.31 -1.10 0.14
COLLAB Equal variances 
assumed
0.00 0.98 2.01 94 0.05 0.57 0.28 0.01 1.13
Equal variances 
not assumed
2.03 73 0.05 0.57 0.28 0.01 1.13
IMPLT Equal variances 
assumed
0.01 0.94 -0.67 94 0.50 -0.16 0.23 -0.62 0.31
Equal variances 
not assumed
-0.68 74 0.50 -0.16 0.23 -0.62 0.30
TRUST Equal variances 
assumed
1.35 0.25 -0.34 143 0.74 -0.05 0.15 -0.34 0.24
Equal variances 
not assumed
-0.31 65 0.76 -0.05 0.16 -0.38 0.28
COMM Equal variances 
assumed
3.42 0.07 0.36 143 0.72 0.08 0.22 -0.36 0.52
Equal variances 
not assumed
0.33 66 0.74 0.08 0.24 -0.41 0.56
INTD Equal variances 
assumed
2.00 0.16 0.06 143 0.95 0.01 0.23 -0.43 0.46
Equal variances 
not assumed
0.06 73 0.96 0.01 0.23 -0.45 0.48
COORD Equal variances 
assumed
0.18 0.67 -1.06 143 0.29 -0.23 0.22 -0.66 0.20
Equal variances 
not assumed -1.01 71 0.32 -0.23 0.23 -0.68 0.22
INFOQ Equal variances 
assumed
0.50 0.48 -1.19 143 0.23 -0.20 0.17 -0.54 0.13
Equal variances 
not assumed
-1.14 72 0.26 -0.20 0.18 -0.56 0.15
Conflict Equal variances 
assumed
6.84 0.01 -1.13 143 0.26 -0.12 0.11 -0.34 0.09
Equal variances 
not assumed





t-test for Equality of Means





95% CI of the 
Diff.
Lower Upper
INFOP Equal variances 
assumed
0.20 0.66 -1.12 143 0.27 -0.22 0.20 -0.62 0.17
Equal variances 
not assumed
-1.09 75 0.28 -0.22 0.20 -0.63 0.18
INFOS Equal variances 
assumed 0.05 0.82 -1.10 143 0.27 -0.16 0.14 -0.44 0.13
Equal variances 
not assumed -1.14 84 0.26 -0.16 0.14 -0.44 0.12
SSA Equal variances 
assumed
0.47 0.49 -1.66 143 0.10 -0.21 0.12 -0.45 0.04
Equal variances 
not assumed
-1.68 81 0.10 -0.21 0.12 -0.45 0.04
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FOR Early 80 4.04 0.91 0.10
Late 16 3.88 0.62 0.15
EVENT Early 79 3.03 1.29 0.14
Late 16 2.94 1.41 0.35
RED Early 73 0.15 0.08 0.01
Late 13 0.13 0.05 0.01
POWER Early 80 4.59 1.45 0.16
Late 16 4.87 1.51 0.38
COLLAB Early 80 4.52 1.35 0.15
Late 16 3.89 1.30 0.33
IMPLT Early 80 5.76 1.09 0.12
Late 16 5.81 1.20 0.30
TRUST Early 125 5.70 0.78 0.07
Late 20 5.80 1.02 0.23
COMM Early 125 4.60 1.18 0.11
Late 20 4.53 1.45 0.33
INTD Early 125 4.82 1.23 0.11
Late 20 4.87 1.35 0.30
COORD Early 125 5.30 1.13 0.10
Late 20 5.33 1.52 0.34
INFOQ Early 125 5.40 0.92 0.08
Late 20 5.76 1.00 0.22
Conflict Early 125 3.75 0.62 0.06
Late 20 3.67 0.48 0.11
INFOP Early 125 5.19 1.09 0.10
Late 20 5.51 1.15 0.26
INFOS Early 125 5.56 0.79 0.07
Late 20 5.68 0.85 0.19
SSA Early 125 5.73 0.70 0.06
Late 20 6.00 0.63 0.14
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APPENDIX C.6 – T-TEST FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS: EARLY (FIRST 3 




t-test for Equality of Means





95% CI of the 
Diff.
Lower Upper
FOR Equal variances 
assumed
1.00 0.32 0.68 94 0.50 0.16 0.24 -0.31 0.63
Equal variances 
not assumed 0.88 29 0.39 0.16 0.19 -0.22 0.54
EVENT Equal variances 
assumed
0.37 0.55 0.26 93 0.79 0.09 0.36 -0.62 0.81
Equal variances 
not assumed 0.25 20 0.81 0.09 0.38 -0.70 0.89
RED Equal variances 
assumed 2.66 0.11 0.619 84 0.54 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.06
Equal variances 
not assumed 0.846 24 0.41 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.05
POWER Equal variances 
assumed
0.05 0.83 -0.71 94 0.48 -0.28 0.40 -1.08 0.51
Equal variances 
not assumed -0.69 20 0.50 -0.28 0.41 -1.14 0.57
COLLAB Equal variances 
assumed 0.02 0.88 1.72 94 0.09 0.63 0.37 -0.10 1.36
Equal variances 
not assumed 1.76 21 0.09 0.63 0.36 -0.11 1.38
IMPLT Equal variances 
assumed
0.20 0.66 -0.16 94 0.87 -0.05 0.30 -0.65 0.55
Equal variances 
not assumed -0.16 20 0.88 -0.05 0.32 -0.72 0.62
TRUST Equal variances 
assumed 0.58 0.45 -0.49 143 0.62 -0.10 0.20 -0.48 0.29
Equal variances 
not assumed -0.41 22 0.69 -0.10 0.24 -0.59 0.40
COMM Equal variances 
assumed
0.25 0.62 0.23 143 0.82 0.07 0.29 -0.52 0.65
Equal variances 
not assumed 0.20 23 0.85 0.07 0.34 -0.64 0.77
INTD Equal variances 
assumed 1.02 0.31 -0.17 143 0.87 -0.05 0.30 -0.64 0.54
Equal variances 
not assumed -0.16 24 0.88 -0.05 0.32 -0.71 0.61
COORD Equal variances 
assumed
0.49 0.49 -0.09 143 0.93 -0.03 0.29 -0.59 0.54
Equal variances 




of Variances t-test for Equality of Means





95% CI of the 
Diff.
INFOQ Equal variances 
assumed 0.13 0.72 -1.62 143 0.11 -0.36 0.22 -0.80 0.08
Equal variances 
not assumed -1.52 24 0.14 -0.36 0.24 -0.85 0.13
Conflict Equal variances 
assumed 1.37 0.24 0.56 143 0.57 0.08 0.15 -0.21 0.37
Equal variances 
not assumed 0.68 30 0.50 0.08 0.12 -0.17 0.33
INFOP Equal variances 
assumed 0.01 0.93 -1.23 143 0.22 -0.32 0.26 -0.85 0.20
Equal variances 
not assumed -1.18 24 0.25 -0.32 0.28 -0.89 0.24
INFOS Equal variances 
assumed 0.46 0.50 -0.61 143 0.54 -0.12 0.19 -0.50 0.26
Equal variances 
not assumed -0.58 24 0.57 -0.12 0.20 -0.53 0.30
SSA Equal variances 
assumed 0.97 0.33 -1.64 143 0.10 -0.27 0.17 -0.60 0.06
Equal variances 





APPENDIX D.1 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: AUCTION DESIGN (FORMAT)
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues











1 2.270 56.750 56.750 2.270 56.750 56.750
2 .798 19.946 76.696
3 .493 12.337 89.034
4 .439 10.966 100.000








Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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APPENDIX D.3 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: AUCTION DESIGN 
(EVENT ORGANIZATION)
Total Variance Explained
Component Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 1.986 49.644 49.644
2 1.028 25.692 75.337
3
4








Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a  Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
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APPENDIX D.4 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: AUCTION DESIGN 
(EVENT ORGANIZATION) After deleting Q5
Total Variance Explained
Component Initial Eigenvalues










1 1.988 66.261 66.261 1.988 66.261 66.261
2 .596 19.859 86.120
3 .416 13.880 100.000






Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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APPENDIX D.6 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: REDUCTION IN PURCHASE PRICE
Total Variance Explained
Component Initial Eigenvalues










1 1.686 56.216 56.216 1.686 56.216 56.216
2 .680 22.663 78.879
3 .634 21.121 100.000






Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
APPENDIX D.7 – RELIABILITY ANALYSIS:

















APPENDIX D.8 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: AUCTION APPLICATION
 (POWER BASED BARGAINING)
Total Variance Explained
Component





1 2.681 44.690 44.690















Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a  Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
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APPENDIX D.9 – BIVARIATE CORRELATION ANALYSIS: AUCTION 













Sig. (2-tailed) .026 .
N 96 96
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
APPENDIX D.10 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: AUCTION APPLICATION
(POWER BASED BARGAINING) – Q9, Q10, Q11, Q19
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues











1 2.747 68.679 68.679 2.747 68.679 68.679
2 .762 19.042 87.721
3 .346 8.652 96.373
4 .145 3.627 100.000








Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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1 1.963 39.265 39.265













Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  2 components extracted.
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APPENDIX D.13 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: AUCTION APPLICATION 
(COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING) After deleting Q16
Total Variance Explained
Component Initial Eigenvalues











1 2.265 56.616 56.616 2.265 56.616 56.616
2 .897 22.424 79.039
3 .653 16.333 95.372
4 .185 4.628 100.000








Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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1 1.962 39.235 39.235













Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  2 components extracted.











Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .
N 96 96
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX D.17 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: SUCCESSFUL EVENT 
IMPLEMENTATION (After deletion of Q22 and Q23)
Total Variance Explained
Component Initial Eigenvalues












1 1.932 64.399 64.399 1.932 64.399 64.399
2 .831 27.687 92.086
3 .237 7.914 100.000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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APPENDIX D.18 – RELIABILITY ANALYSIS: SUCCESSFUL EVENT 



















APPENDIX D.19 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: SUCCESSFUL EVENT 
IMPLEMENTATION (After deletion of Q21, Q23 and Q24)
Total Variance Explained
Component Initial Eigenvalues











1 1.758 87.894 87.894 1.758 87.894 87.894
2 .242 12.106 100.000






Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
APPENDIX D.20 – RELIABILITY ANALYSIS: SUCCESSFUL EVENT 






























1 1.784 59.472 59.472 1.784 59.472 59.472
2 .658 21.918 81.390
3 .558 18.610 100.000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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1 1.831 61.020 61.020 1.831 61.020 61.020
2 .635 21.181 82.202
3 .534 17.798 100.000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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1 2.031 67.699 67.699 2.031 67.699 67.699
2 .681 22.684 90.382
3 .289 9.618 100.000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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1 1.995 66.516 66.516 1.995 66.516 66.516
2 .830 27.664 94.180
3 .175 5.820 100.000







Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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N N of Items
.710 144 3
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APPENDIX D.29 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: ATTRIBUTE OF THE ALLIANCE 
(COORDINATION) with Q36 deleted
Total Variance Explained
Component Initial Eigenvalues











1 1.825 91.253 91.253 1.825 91.253 91.253
2 .175 8.747 100.000






Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
APPENDIX D.30– INTER-CORRELATION ANALYSIS: ATTRIBUTE OF THE 













Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .
N 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX D.31 – RELIABILITY ANALYSIS: ATTRIBUTE OF THE 


































1 3.717 74.341 74.341 3.717 74.341 74.341
2 .529 10.589 84.930
3 .324 6.489 91.419
4 .277 5.531 96.950
5 .152 3.050 100.000









Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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APPENDIX D.34 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: ATTRIBUTE OF THE ALLIANCE 
(CONFLICT RESOLUTION)
Total Variance Explained




1 1.267 25.336 25.336
2 1.224 24.472 49.808
3 1.115 22.302 72.110
4
5




Q42 .676 .133 -.550
Q43 .193 -.667 .407
Q44 .554 .611 .252
Q45 -.601 .532 .311
Q46 .532 .039 .641
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  3 components extracted.
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1 2.565 64.126 64.126 2.565 64.126 64.126
2 .640 16.007 80.134
3 .566 14.138 94.271
4 .229 5.729 100.000








Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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APPENDIX D.37 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: INFORMATION SHARING
Total Variance Explained






1 3.000 2.609 37.276 37.276

















Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a  Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
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Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .
N 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX D.39 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: INFORMATION SHARING
(With Q51, Q52, and Q56 deleted)
Total Variance Explained
Component Initial Eigenvalues











1 2.575 64.375 64.375 2.575 64.375 64.375
2 .646 16.157 80.533
3 .410 10.262 90.794
4 .368 9.206 100.000








Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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APPENDIX D.41 – FACTOR ANALYSIS: STRATEGIC SUPPLIER ALLIANCE
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues











1 3.051 61.023 61.023 3.051 61.023 61.023
2 .689 13.771 74.794
3 .496 9.914 84.708
4 .396 7.917 92.625
5 .369 7.375 100.000









Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a  1 components extracted.
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APPENDIX E.1 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE 
AUCTION DESIGN (FORMAT) SCALE
Correlations
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 Pearson 
Correlation
1 .346(**) .233(*) .473(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .032 .000
N 95 93 85 85
Q2 Pearson 
Correlation
.346(**) 1 .493(**) .529(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000
N 93 94 85 85
Q3 Pearson 
Correlation
.233(*) .493(**) 1 .437(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .032 .000 .000
N 85 85 85 85
Q4 Pearson 
Correlation
.473(**) .529(**) .437(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 85 85 85 85
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.2 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000




Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000




Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 84 86 87
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
APPENDIX E.3 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE






Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .005




Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .015




Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .015
N 59 57 62
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.4 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE
AUCTION APPLICATION (POWER BASED BARGAINING) SCALE
Correlations
Q9 Q10 Q11 Q19
Q9 Pearson 
Correlation
1 .702(**) .701(**) .301(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .003
N 94 90 84 94
Q10 Pearson 
Correlation
.702(**) 1 .854(**) .324(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .002
N 90 91 85 91
Q11 Pearson 
Correlation
.701(**) .854(**) 1 .416(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 84 85 85 85
Q19 Pearson 
Correlation
.301(**) .324(**) .416(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .002 .000
N 94 91 85 96
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.5 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE
AUCTION APPLICATION (COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING) SCALE
Correlations
Q12 Q13 Q14 Q18
Q12 Pearson 
Correlation
1 .268(*) .226(*) .306(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .040 .003
N 94 89 83 94
Q13 Pearson 
Correlation
.268(*) 1 .809(**) .371(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .000 .000
N 89 90 84 90
Q14 Pearson 
Correlation
.226(*) .809(**) 1 .434(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .000 .000
N 83 84 84 84
Q18 Pearson 
Correlation
.306(**) .371(**) .434(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .000
N 94 90 84 96
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.6 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE













**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
APPENDIX E.7 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000




Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000




Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 145 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.8 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000




Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000




Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 145 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
APPENDIX E.9 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000




Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000




Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
N 145 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
265
APPENDIX E.10 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE
ATTRIBUTE OF THE ALLIANCE (COORDINATION) SCALE
Correlations
Q34 Q35
Q34 Pearson Correlation 1 .825(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 145 145
Q35 Pearson Correlation .825(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
APPENDIX E.11 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE
COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR (INFORMATION QUALITY) SCALE
Correlations
Q37 Q38 Q39 Q40 Q41
Q37 Pearson 
Correlation
1 .706(**) .712(**) .721(**) .520(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
Q38 Pearson 
Correlation
.706(**) 1 .662(**) .794(**) .646(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
Q39 Pearson 
Correlation
.712(**) .662(**) 1 .799(**) .541(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
Q40 Pearson 
Correlation
.721(**) .794(**) .799(**) 1 .661(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
Q41 Pearson 
Correlation
.520(**) .646(**) .541(**) .661(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.12 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE
COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR (INFORMATION PARTICIPATION) SCALE
Correlations
Q47 Q48 Q49 Q50
Q47 Pearson 
Correlation
1 .522(**) .404(**) .383(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145
Q48 Pearson 
Correlation
.522(**) 1 .745(**) .575(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145
Q49 Pearson 
Correlation
.404(**) .745(**) 1 .461(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145
Q50 Pearson 
Correlation
.383(**) .575(**) .461(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.13 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE
COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOR (INFORMATION SHARING) SCALE
Correlations
Q53 Q54 Q55 Q57
Q53 Pearson 
Correlation
1 .501(**) .456(**) .598(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145
Q54 Pearson 
Correlation
.501(**) 1 .622(**) .492(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145
Q55 Pearson 
Correlation
.456(**) .622(**) 1 .481(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145
Q57 Pearson 
Correlation
.598(**) .492(**) .481(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.14 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION FOR THE 
STRATEGIC SUPPLIER ALLIANCE SCALE
Correlations
Q58 Q59 Q60 Q61 Q62
Q58 Pearson 
Correlation
1 .596(**) .550(**) .467(**) .595(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
Q59 Pearson 
Correlation
.596(**) 1 .597(**) .374(**) .505(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
Q60 Pearson 
Correlation
.550(**) .597(**) 1 .423(**) .485(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
Q61 Pearson 
Correlation
.467(**) .374(**) .423(**) 1 .516(**)
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
Q62 Pearson 
Correlation
.595(**) .505(**) .485(**) .516(**) 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000
N 145 145 145 145 145
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX E.15 – PEARSON PRODUCT-MOMENT INTER CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SCALES
























RED -.08 -.03 1
POWE
R
.01 -.08 -.03 1
COLLA
B
-.05 .07 -.02 -.73** 1
IMPLT -.08 -.04 .21 .20 -.06 1 .38**
TRUST .09 -.20 -.20 .18 -.13 .38** 1
COMM -.00 -.21* -.21* .20 -.28** .31** .60** 1
INTD -.05 -.12 -.12 .17 -.31** .08 .16 .32** 1
COOR
D
.05 -.12 -.12 .15 -.14 .48** .42** .40** .05 1
SMOO
TH
.09 -.04 -.04 -.05 .18 -.11 -.07 -.17* -.15 -.128 1










.30** -.23* .44** .29** .37** .08 .42** -.27** -.13 .037 1
HARS
H
.01 .04 .04 -.19 .18 -.30** -.42** -.33** -.18* -.14 .02 .07 .21** -.15 1
INFOQ .078 -.13 -.13 .29** -.34** .28** .37** .41** .10 .66** -.01 .03 .06 .44** -.19* 1
INFOP -.02 .05 .05 .23* -.14 .53** .43** .49** .27** .59** -.05 .07 -.12 .45** -.37** .52** 1
INFOS .09 -.09 -0.09 .215* -.23* .34** .40** .41** .14 .47** -.07 .01 -.03 .44** -.26** .58** .68** 1
SSA .09 -.15 -.15 .23* -.24* .37** .47** .48** .12 .54** -.15 -.08 -.07 .46** -.32** .58** .63** .70** 1
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
FOR: Auction Design (Format) TRUST: Attribute of the Alliance (Trust) PERS: Persuasive Attempts by Either Party
EVENT: Auction Design (Event Organization) COMM: Attribute of the Alliance (Commitment) JOINT: Joint Problem Solving
RED: Reduction in Purchase Price INTD: Attribute of the Alliance (Interdependence) HARSH: Harsh Words
POWER: Auction Application (Power based Bargaining) COORD: Attribute of the Alliance (Coordination) INFOQ: Information Quality
COLLAB: Auction Application (Collaborative Problem Solving) SMOOTH: Smooth over the Problem INFOP/INFOS: Information Participation / Information Quality




SCALE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
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Factors / Items N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation
Auction Design (Format)
       Q1. Auctions where suppliers can see others’ bids are effective in reducing purchase 
prices (open-bid). 95 2 7 6.07 1.15
       Q2. Auctions where suppliers only know they have been outbid are effective in reducing 
purchase prices (sealed-bid).{Reverse Scored}
94 1 7 4.41 2.03
       Q3. Multi-round sealed bid auctions are more effective than multi-round open bids in 
reducing the purchasing prices. {Reverse Scored}
85 1 7 2.92 1.56
       Q4. Multi-round open-bid auctions are more effective than multi-round sealed bids in 
reducing the purchasing prices. 
85 2 7 5.41 1.35
Auction Design (Event Organization)
       Q6. Auctions organized in-house are more effective than auctions organized with the 
help of an online reverse auction service provider (market maker) in reducing 
purchasing prices.
85 1 7 3.56 1.70
       Q7. Auctions organized with the help on an online auction service provider (like Trade-
Partners or Freemarkets) are effective in reducing purchase prices.{Reverse 
Scored}
94 2 7 5.78 1.05
       Q8. Auctions organized with the help on an online auction service provider (like Trade-
Partners or Freemarkets) are more effective than auctions organized in-house in 
reducing the purchasing prices.{Reverse Scored}
87 1 7 4.51 1.73
Reduction in Purchase Price
OPMC: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in the purchase price 
paid for purchasing production material and components.
81 0% 30% 12.9% 0.065
OMRO: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in the purchase price 
paid for purchasing MROs.
66 3% 71% 16.7% 0.106
       OSER: The use of online reverse auctions has led to a decrease in the purchase price paid 
for purchasing services.
62 0% 40% 13.5% 0.082
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Factors / Items N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation
Auction Application (Power-based Bargaining)
       Q9. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we buy production material 
and components.
94 1 7 3.90 2.03
       Q10. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we buy MROs. 91 1 7 4.35 1.95
       Q11. Our goal is short term contract with the suppliers when we buy services. 85 1 7 4.20 1.99
       Q19. We use online reverse auction to pressure our suppliers to reduce purchase prices. 96 1 7 5.94 1.00
Auction Application (Collaborative Problem Solving)
       Q12. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we buy production material 
and components.
94 1 7 5.18 1.55
       Q13. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we buy MROs. 90 1 7 4.08 1.94
       Q14. Our goal is long term contract with the suppliers when we buy services. 84 1 7 4.08 2.01
       Q18. We use online reverse auction to identify new long-term partnering suppliers. 96 1 7 4.22 1.82
Successful Event Implementation
       Q21. We are satisfied with our savings using online reverse auctions. 96 1 7 5.84 1.10
       Q24. We are satisfied with our company online reverse auctions results. 96 1 7 5.70 1.26
Attribute of the Alliance (Trust)
       Q25. We trust that our strategic supplier alliances will be beneficial to our business. 145 2 7 6.26 0.78
       Q26. We do not get an equitable (fair) deal from our suppliers in these alliances. {Reverse 
Scored}
145 1 7 5.54 1.24
       Q27. The relationships with our suppliers are marked by a high degree of harmony. 145 1 7 5.34 1.11
Attribute of the Alliance (Commitment)
       Q28. We would like to discontinue buying from our current suppliers. {Reverse Scored} 145 1 7 3.51 1.94
       Q29. We are very committed to buying from our current suppliers. 145 1 7 5.12 1.24
       Q30. We have minimal commitment to our suppliers. {Reverse Scored} 145 1 7 5.14 1.48
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Factors / Items N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation
Attribute of the Alliance (Interdependence)
       Q31. It would be very easy to terminate the relationship with any supplier and establish 
another strategic supplier. {Reverse Scored}
145 1 7 5.30 1.54
       Q32. The time to establish another new strategic supplier partnership would be 
extremely long.
145 1 7 4.70 1.55
       Q33. The cost to establish another new strategic supplier partnership would be extremely 
high.
145 1 7 4.46 1.46
Attribute of the Alliance (Coordination)
       Q34. Our activities with our suppliers are well coordinated. 145 1 7 5.43 1.17
       Q35. Programs at our company are well coordinated with our suppliers. 145 1 7 5.18 1.32
Communication Behavior (Information Quality)
       Q37. To what extent do you feel that your company communication with your suppliers 
is timely?
145 2 7 5.51 1.01
       Q38. To what extent do you feel that your company communication with your suppliers 
is accurate?
145 2 7 5.48 0.99
       Q39. To what extent do you feel that your company communication with your suppliers 
is adequate?
145 1 7 5.23 1.28
       Q40. To what extent do you feel that your company communication with your suppliers 
is complete?
145 2 7 5.26 1.15
       Q41. To what extent do you feel that your company communication with your suppliers 
is credible?
145 3 7 5.77 0.99
Conflict Resolution
       Q42. Smooth over the problem 145 1 7 4.16 1.69
       Q43. Outside arbitration 145 1 4 1.54 0.76
       Q44. Persuasive attempts by either party 145 1 7 4.74 1.41
       Q45. Joint problem solving 145 3 7 6.03 0.81
       Q46. Harsh words 145 1 7 2.23 1.43
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Factors / Items N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation
Communication Behavior (Information Participation)
       Q47. We actively seek advice, counsel, and information from our suppliers. 145 2 7 5.78 1.02
       Q48. Our strategic suppliers participate in our planning and goal setting activities. 145 1 7 4.69 1.63
       Q49. We participate in our suppliers’ planning and goal setting activities that are 
relevant to our strategic partnership.
145 1 7 4.57 1.65
       Q50. We actively encourage improvement suggestions from our suppliers. 145 2 7 5.89 1.11
Communication Behavior (Information Sharing)
        Q53. We inform our suppliers in advance of changing needs. 145 1 7 5.43 1.05
      Q54. In this relationship, it is expected that any information which might help the other 
party will be provided.
145 3 7 5.76 0.93
       Q55. The parties are expected to keep each other informed about events or changes that 
might affect the other party.
145 3 7 6.03 0.71
       Q57. Our Supplier keep us fully informed about issues that affect our business. 145 2 7 5.07 1.25
Strategic Supplier Alliance
        Q58. In our strategic supplier alliances, the parties work together to solve problems. 145 3 7 5.86 0.87
        Q59. Our suppliers are flexible to requests we make. 145 3 7 5.68 0.91
        Q60. Our suppliers make an effort to help us during emergencies. 145 4 7 6.25 0.68
        Q61. When an agreement is made, we can always rely on our suppliers to fulfill the 
requirements.
145 2 7 5.53 1.01






APPENDIX G.1 – HYPOTHESIS 1 ANALYSIS FOR DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
By Annual Sales






Less than One Billion 29 5.79 4.74 0.88 4.29 6.57 0.000
More than One Billion 55 3.55 .47 0.60 2.53 5.89 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume





Less than 500 Million 33 5.42 4.99 0.87 3.95 6.25 0.000
More than 500 Million 51 3.61 4.34 0.61 2.59 5.94 0.000
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 30 5.37 5.37 0.98 3.70 5.47 0.000
More than 1000 Employees 54 3.74 4.16 0.57 2.79 6.61 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 30 5.73 5.04 0.92 4.17 6.23 0.000
More than 20 Employees 54 3.53 4.29 0.58 2.56 6.06 0.000
By Job Title





VP or Director 25 4.88 4.17 0.84 3.45 5.84 0.000
Sr. Manager or Manager 50 4.38 4.79 0.68 3.24 6.47 0.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 2.44 5.27 1.76 -0.82 5.39 0.000
277
APPENDIX G.2 – HYPOTHESIS 2 ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 27 -2.56 3.13 0.60 -3.58 -4.24 1.000
More than One Billion 57 -1.17 2.49 0.33 -1.73 -3.56 1.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume







Less than 500 Million 32 -2.63 2.96 0.52 -3.51 -5.02 1.000
More than 500 Million 52 -1.00 2.48 0.34 -1.57 -2.91 0.997
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 28 -2.57 3.25 0.61 -3.62 -4.19 1.000
More than 1000 Employees 56 -1.14 2.39 0.32 -1.68 -3.57 1.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 31 -2.55 2.95 0.53 -3.45 -4.80 1.000
More than 20 Employees 53 -1.08 2.53 0.35 -1.66 -3.09 0.998
By Job Title





VP or Director 26 -1.31 2.74 0.53 -2.22 -2.43 0.989
Sr. Manager or Manager 49 -1.92 2.94 0.42 -2.52 -4.32 1.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 -1.44 1.94 0.65 -2.65 -2.23 0.972
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APPENDIX G.3 – HYPOTHESIS 2 ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS – IN 
THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION
Test Value = 0 versus < 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 27 -2.56 3.13 0.60 -1.53 -4.24 0.000
More than One Billion 57 -1.17 2.49 0.33 -0.62 -3.56 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume







Less than 500 Million 32 -2.63 2.96 0.52 -1.74 -5.02 0.000
More than 500 Million 52 -1.00 2.48 0.34 -0.42 -2.91 0.003
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 28 -2.57 3.25 0.61 -1.52 -4.19 0.000
More than 1000 Employees 56 -1.14 2.39 0.32 -0.61 -3.57 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 31 -2.55 2.95 0.53 -1.50 -4.80 0.000
More than 20 Employees 53 -1.08 2.53 0.35 -0.49 -3.09 0.002
By Job Title





VP or Director 26 -1.31 2.74 0.53 -0.39 -2.43 0.011
Sr. Manager or Manager 49 -1.92 2.94 0.42 -1.11 -4.32 0.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 -1.44 1.94 0.65 -0.24 -2.23 0.028
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APPENDIX G.4 – HYPOTHESIS 3A ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 26 0.12 0.08 0.015 0.096 7.85 0.000
More than One Billion 54 0.13 0.06 0.007 0.12 16.87 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume







Less than 500 Million 33 0.127 0.077 0.1013 0.10 9.53 0.000
More than 500 Million 47 0.13 0.06 0.008 0.12 15.73 0.000
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 28 0.11 0.06 0.012 0.09 9.53 0.000
More than 1000 Employees 52 0.14 0.066 0.009 0.12 15.16 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 26 0.011 0.066 0.013 0.09 8.66 0.000
More than 20 Employees 54 0.14 0.06 0.008 0.123 15.81 0.000
By Job Title





VP or Director 23 0.12 0.06 0.0129 0.097 9.14 0.000
Sr. Manager or Manager 50 0.13 0.07 0.009 0.12 14.03 0.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 7 0.14 0.069 0.026 0.089 5.36 0.001
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APPENDIX G.5 – HYPOTHESIS 3B ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 20 0.14 0.10 0.022 0.104 6.43 0.000
More than One Billion 44 0.18 0.11 0.016 0.15 10.96 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume







Less than 500 Million 25 0.15 0.092 0.018 0.12 8.15 0.000
More than 500 Million 39 0.18 0.11 0.018 0.15 9.79 0.000
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 18 0.13 0.079 0.018 0.095 6.86 0.000
More than 1000 Employees 46 0.18 0.11 0.016 0.16 11.10 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 18 0.14 0.09 0.02 0.103 6.37 0.000
More than 20 Employees 46 0.18 0.11 0.016 0.15 10.99 0.000
By Job Title





VP or Director 19 0.14 0.063 0.014 0.112 9.56 0.000
Sr. Manager or Manager 38 0.18 0.13 0.02 0.14 8.76 0.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 7 0.19 0.07 0.025 0.138 7.39 0.000
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APPENDIX G.6 – HYPOTHESIS 3C ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 18 0.13 0.08 0.018 0.092 6.65 0.000
More than One Billion 42 0.13 0.08 0.012 0.112 10.56 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume







Less than 500 Million 22 0.12 0.08 0.017 0.094 7.30 0.000
More than 500 Million 38 0.14 0.08 0.013 0.113 10.15 0.000
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 19 0.14 0.08 0.019 0.11 7.46 0.000
More than 1000 Employees 41 0.13 0.08 0.012 0.11 10.04 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 17 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.103 6.74 0.000
More than 20 Employees 43 0.13 0.08 0.012 0.011 10.51 0.000
By Job Title





VP or Director 19 0.12 0.062 0.014 0.09 8.23 0.000
Sr. Manager or Manager 35 0.14 0.09 0.015 0.11 9.06 0.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 6 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.068 4.09 0.005
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APPENDIX G.7 – HYPOTHESIS 4A ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
By Annual Sales
Sales Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than One Billion 31 -0.409** 0.022
More than One Billion 64 -0.581** 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume
Purchasing Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 500 Million 37 -0.412** 0.011
More than 500 Million 58 -0.584** 0.000
By Number of Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 1000 Employees 33 -0.445** 0.009
More than 1000 Employees 62 -0.554** 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 20 Employees 35 -0.449** 0.007
More than 20 Employees 60 -0.557** 0.000
By Job Title
Job Title N Pearson correlation P-Value
VP or Director 27 -0.406** 0.035
Sr. Manager or Manager 57 -0.613** 0.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 -0.129 0.741
**  Correlation is significant
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APPENDIX G.8 – HYPOTHESIS 4B ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
By Annual Sales
Sales Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than One Billion 31 -0.796** 0.000
More than One Billion 64 -0.800** 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume
Purchasing Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 500 Million 36 -0.766** 0.000
More than 500 Million 53 -0.816** 0.000
By Number of Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 1000 Employees 33 -0.833** 0.000
More than 1000 Employees 62 -0.784** 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 20 Employees 34 -0.823** 0.000
More than 20 Employees 55 -0.796** 0.000
By Job Title
Job Title N Pearson correlation P-Value
VP or Director 25 -0.822* 0.000
Sr. Manager or Manager 55 -0.778** 0.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 -0.773** 0.015
**  Correlation is significant
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APPENDIX G.9 – HYPOTHESIS 4C ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
By Annual Sales
Sales Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than One Billion 27 -0.940** 0.000
More than One Billion 56 -0.860** 0.000
By Annual Sales
Sales Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 500 Million 21 -0.943** 0.000
More than 500 Million 61 -0.865** 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume
Purchasing Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 500 Million 31 -0.927** 0.000
More than 500 Million 50 -0.856** 0.000
By Number of Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 1000 Employees 30 -0.946** 0.000
More than 1000 Employees 57 -0.851** 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 20 Employees 33 -0.914** 0.000
More than 20 Employees 49 -0.863** 0.000
By Job Title
Job Title N Pearson correlation P-Value
VP or Director 23 -0.859** 0.000
Sr. Manager or Manager 51 -0.910** 0.000
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 8 -0.813** 0.014
**  Correlation is significant
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APPENDIX G.10 – HYPOTHESIS 5A ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 31 -1.13 3.27 0.59 -2.13 -1.92 0.968
More than One Billion 62 -1.42 3.05 0.39 -2.07 -3.66 1.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume







Less than 500 Million 37 -1.03 3.13 0.52 -1.90 -2.00 0.973
More than 500 Million 56 -1.52 3.12 0.42 -2.21 -3.65 1.000
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 33 -0.88 3.36 0.59 -1.87 -1.50 0.929
More than 1000 Employees 60 -1.57 2.97 0.38 -2.21 -4.08 1.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 35 -0.97 3.34 0.56 -1.93 -1.72 0.953
More than 20 Employees 58 -1.53 2.98 0.39 -2.19 -3.92 1.000
By Job Title





VP or Director 27 -1.11 3.20 0.62 -2.16 -1.80 0.958
Sr. Manager or Manager 57 -1.35 3.20 0.42 -2.06 -3.19 0.999
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 -1.78 2.49 0.83 -3.32 -2.14 0.968
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APPENDIX G.11 – OPPOSITE OF HYPOTHESIS 5A ANALYSIS BY 
DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus < 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 31 -1.13 3.27 0.59 -0.13 -1.92 0.032
More than One Billion 62 -1.42 3.05 0.39 -0.77 -3.66 0.000
By Annual Purchasing Volume





Less than 500 Million 37 -1.03 3.13 0.52 -1.158 -2.00 0.027
More than 500 Million 56 -1.52 3.12 0.42 -0.821 -3.65 0.000
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 33 -0.88 3.36 0.59 0.11 -1.50 0.071
More than 1000 Employees 60 -1.57 2.97 0.38 -0.93 -4.08 0.000
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 35 -0.97 3.34 0.56 -0.017 -1.72 0.047
More than 20 Employees 58 -1.53 2.98 0.39 -0.880 -3.92 0.000
By Job Title





VP or Director 27 -1.11 3.20 0.62 -0.060 -1.80 0.042
Sr. Manager or Manager 57 -1.35 3.20 0.42 -0.642 -3.19 0.001
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 -1.78 2.49 0.83 -0.235 -2.14 0.032
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APPENDIX G.12 – HYPOTHESIS 5B ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 30 1.16 3.62 0.66 0.043 1.76 0.044
More than One Billion 59 -0.17 3.69 0.48 -0.972 -0.35 0.637
By Annual Purchasing Volume







Less than 500 Million 36 1.00 3.57 0.59 -0.005 1.68 0.051
More than 500 Million 53 -0.21 3.74 0.51 -1.07 -0.40 0.656
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 31 1.52 3.54 0.64 0.44 2.39 0.012
More than 1000 Employees 58 -0.38 3.64 0.48 -1.18 -0.79 0.785
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 34 1.03 3.67 0.63 -0.04 1.63 0.056
More than 20 Employees 55 -0.18 3.67 0.41 -1.01 -0.37 0.643
By Job Title





VP or Director 25 0.36 4.01 0.80 -1.01 0.45 0.329
Sr. Manager or Manager 51 0.63 3.67 0.51 -0.23 1.22 0.114
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 -1.89 3.44 1.15 -4.02 -1.65 0.931
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APPENDIX G.13 – HYPOTHESIS 5B OPPOSITE - ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT 
GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus < 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 30 1.16 3.62 0.66 2.29 1.76 0.956
More than One Billion 59 -0.17 3.69 0.48 0.63 -0.35 0.363
By Annual Purchasing Volume





Less than 500 Million 36 1.00 3.57 0.59 2.01 1.68 0.949
More than 500 Million 53 -0.21 3.74 0.51 0.65 -0.40 0.344
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 31 1.52 3.54 0.64 2.59 2.39 0.988
More than 1000 Employees 58 -0.38 3.64 0.48 0.42 -0.79 0.215
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 34 1.03 3.67 0.63 2.10 1.63 0.944
More than 20 Employees 55 -0.18 3.67 0.41 0.65 -0.37 0.357
By Job Title





VP or Director 25 0.36 4.01 0.80 1.73 0.45 0.671
Sr. Manager or Manager 51 0.63 3.67 0.51 1.40 1.22 0.893
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 -1.89 3.44 1.15 0.25 -1.65 0.069
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APPENDIX G.14 – HYPOTHESIS 5C ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
Test Value = 0 versus > 0
By Annual Sales







Less than One Billion 27 1.67 3.63 0.70 0.47 2.38 0.012
More than One Billion 55 -0.60 3.80 0.51 -1.46 -1.17 0.876
By Annual Purchasing Volume







Less than 500 Million 32 1.44 3.83 0.78 0.29 2.12 0.021
More than 500 Million 50 -0.68 3.72 0.53 -1.56 -1.29 0.899
By Number of Employees





Less than 1000 Employees 30 1.70 3.64 0.66 0.57 2.56 0.008
More than 1000 Employees 52 -0.75 3.76 0.52 -1.62 -1.44 0.922
By Number of Purchasing Employees





Less than 20 Employees 33 1.39 3.71 0.65 0.30 2.16 0.019
More than 20 Employees 49 -0.69 3.80 0.54 -1.61 -1.28 0.896
By Job Title





VP or Director 23 -0.04 4.20 0.88 -1.55 -0.05 0.520
Sr. Manager or Manager 51 0.63 3.67 0.51 -0.23 1.22 0.114
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 8 -2.37 3.70 1.31 -4.85 -1.82 0.944
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APPENDIX G.15 – HYPOTHESIS 7A ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
AUCTION EXPERIENCE
291
APPENDIX G.16 – HYPOTHESIS 7A ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH NO 
AUCTION EXPERIENCE
292
APPENDIX G.17 – HYPOTHESIS 7A ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
LESS THAN 15 AUCTIONS IN THE LAST 3 YEARS
293
APPENDIX G.18 – HYPOTHESIS 7A ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
MORE THAN 15 AUCTIONS IN THE LAST 3 YEARS
294
APPENDIX G.19 – HYPOTHESIS 7B REGRESSION MODEL BEFORE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
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APPENDIX G.20– HYPOTHESIS 7B ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
AUCTION EXPERIENCE
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APPENDIX G.21 – HYPOTHESIS 7B ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH NO 
AUCTION EXPERIENCE
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APPENDIX G.22 – HYPOTHESIS 7B ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
LESS THAN 15 AUCTIONS IN THE LAST 3 YEARS
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APPENDIX G.23 – HYPOTHESIS 7B ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
MORE THAN 15 AUCTIONS IN THE LAST 3 YEARS
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APPENDIX G.24– HYPOTHESIS 7C ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
AUCTION EXPERIENCE
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APPENDIX G.25 – HYPOTHESIS 7C ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH NO 
AUCTION EXPERIENCE
301
APPENDIX G.26 – HYPOTHESIS 7C ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
LESS THAN 15 AUCTIONS IN THE LAST 3 YEARS
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APPENDIX G.27 – HYPOTHESIS 7C ANALYSIS FOR COMPANIES WITH 
MORE THAN 15 AUCTIONS IN THE LAST 3 YEARS
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APPENDIX G.28 – HYPOTHESIS 8 ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
By Annual Sales
Sales Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than One Billion 29 0.066 0.732
More than One Billion 56 0.315** 0.018
By Annual Purchasing Volume
Purchasing Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 500 Million 36 0.139 0.419
More than 500 Million 49 0.275 0.056
By Number of Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 1000 Employees 30 0.326 0.078
More than 1000 Employees 55 0.197 0.150
By Number of Purchasing Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 20 Employees 29 0.257 0.178
More than 20 Employees 56 0.189 0.163
By Job Title
Job Title N Pearson correlation P-Value
VP or Director 24 0.014 0.948
Sr. Manager or Manager 53 0.263 0.057
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 0.566 0.144
** Correlation is significant at 0.05 level
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APPENDIX G.29 – HYPOTHESIS 9 ANALYSIS BY DIFFERENT GROUPS
By Annual Sales
Sales Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than One Billion 29 0.598** 0.000
More than One Billion 66 0.239** 0.048
By Annual Sales
Sales Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 500 Million 23 0.619** 0.002
More than 500 Million 72 0.263** 0.026
By Annual Purchasing Volume
Purchasing Volume N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 500 Million 37 0.510** 0.001
More than 500 Million 58 0.272** 0.039
By Number of Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 1000 Employees 33 0.454** 0.008
More than 1000 Employees 62 0.305** 0.016
By Number of Purchasing Employees
Total Employees N Pearson correlation P-Value
Less than 20 Employees 35 0.527** 0.001
More than 20 Employees 60 0.264** 0.021
By Job Title
Job Title N Pearson correlation P-Value
VP or Director 27 0.362** 0.046
Sr. Manager or Manager 59 0.333** 0.010
Sr. Buyer or Buyer 9 0.695** 0.038
**  Correlation is significant
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